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Preface  
This PhD study began in March 2003. It was primarily motivated by two pre-
ceding studies I had undertaken in South Africa’s forest industry. The first one, 
being part of a 1998-1999 MA research in Sociology at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, was on Impacts of timber contracts on household gender rela-
tions in KwaZulu-Natal. The second study, which I did in 2000, researched 
Community-company partnerships in South Africa’s natural resource sectors and 
was part of South Africa’s CSIR and IIED (UK) coordinated research series on 
Instruments for Sustainable Forestry Development. With the changing patterns in 
forestry ownership presented by government withdrawal from 1999 onwards, 
new forestry trends and relationships began to take shape and informed the 
questions examined in this research. 
Despite these previous undertakings, this research project would not have been 
possible without the involvement of various entities and individuals. First, I have 
to thank God for always watching over me. Second, I particularly want to 
acknowledge and thank the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of 
Tropical Research (WOTRO) and South Africa/Netherlands Programme for 
Alternatives in Development (SANPAD), for financial assistance. To Manon 
Schmitz of Radboud University, thank you for the administrative support. The 
SANPAD side of funding was administered through the Department of Forest 
and Wood Science, at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. I am grateful 
for the assistance of the head of project, Professor Gerrit Van Wyk, and Mrs. 
Poppie Gordons. I am also indebted to Dr David Fig, formerly of the University 
of the Witwatersrand, and Dr Isla Grundy, formerly of the University of Stellen-
bosch, who were my mentors in the early days when I started thinking about PhD 
studies.  
This study focused on South Africa’s forest industry, but more specifically on 
two new industry players; Singisi Forest Products (SFP) in the Eastern Cape 
Province, and Siyaqhubeka Forests (SQF), based in KwaZulu-Natal province. I 
owe a lot of gratitude to these two companies for accepting me into their territory 
and allowing me to question their activities. I take this opportunity to thank 
Charlie Scott of SFP and several of his colleagues whom I interviewed. I also 
want to single out Mr. Satywa for taking some of his limited time to show me 
around the SFP areas and for introducing me to respondents and informants in 
different parts of the province. At SQF, I would like to mention Doggy Kewley 
who facilitated and arranged for my access, and Zenzele Gumede, for allowing 
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me to accompany him on field trips and community meetings. Zenzele gave me 
insights into the Zulu way of life, and helped me to understand the local 
dynamics, especially as they relate to formal establishments and entrepreneurial 
initiatives. These are aspects of my research that I would have found difficulty in 
understanding were it not for these insights. At both SFP and SQF areas, I 
conducted individual and group interviews and held informal talks with several 
people. This thesis is complete because of the perspectives of all these respond-
ents. Although I am not able to mention all by name, I am very grateful to each 
and every one of you for agreeing to share with me your views and experiences.  
In doing research, one may often come across people who are really interested 
in the topic, so much so that their keenness inspires and adds energy to the whole 
fieldwork experience. I am honoured to have met two people who were not only 
key respondents, but who also had a deep academic and entrepreneurial com-
mitment to local development issues and to industrial forestry. On two opposite 
ends of my study sites, Simangele Cele in KwaZulu-Natal, and Simpiwe Som-
dyala in the Eastern Cape, thank you for the invaluable information, for your 
assistance and for always being willing to listen whenever I had follow-up 
questions. Other South African institutions and individuals within them also 
acted as resource points during this study: the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF), my alma mater the University of the Witwatersrand, and 
Forestry South Africa (FSA).  
At Radboud University, I was for four years affiliated to the Centre for Inter-
national Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN), and the Centre for Sustainable 
Management of Resources (CSMR). I am grateful to all my colleagues for their 
company and kind words of encouragement. A special acknowledgement to all 
past and present members of Young CIDIN, particularly Hein de Haas, Gerben 
Noteboom, Willem Elbers, Jacqueline van Haren and Nienke van der Veen, for 
listening to my story and for sharing your research experiences as well. A word 
of gratitude also to a special section of Young CIDIN colleagues who understood 
what it means to do a PhD in a foreign land, far away from home, away from the 
comfort of friends and family and away from the ‘priceless’ sunshine: Alfred 
Lakwo, Theophile Djedjebi and A. Kamanzi. To my colleagues Iris Shiripinda 
and Azza Abdelmonium, it was comforting knowing I could always knock on 
your door and debate. 
I cannot fail to mention the names of my very close friends who have been 
present with me throughout this journey. For those emails, surprise phone calls 
from across continents and for just keeping me in your thoughts, my utmost 
appreciation to Malehoko Tshoaedi, for being a true comrade and a believer in 
excellence, and to Dinkie Dube, Zanele Khoza, Nontyatyambo Petros, Caroline 
Kihato, Phumla Yeki, Asanda Benya, Manon Stravens and Rhulani Kubayi, all 
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for a truly inspiring friendship. To my international connections, my cousins and 
families Maurice and Dickens Oyuo, my friends Maria Awuor, Hellaine 
Anyango, Beatrice and Mark Adiedo, you all provided me with love, unwavering 
moral support, and of course great getaways when I needed to escape.  
This thesis would not have been possible without the thoughts and support of 
my family. Whenever the research became a bit difficult, I simply had to 
remember my origins, that pool of highly motivated and excellent achievers, 
most of who had successfully gone through similar academic processes. A big 
thank you to my siblings and your families; Harrison Kojwang, Kephas, Dave, 
Isaiah, Philip, Sam and to Dan - especially for letting me move in and out of your 
Joburg house at whim. And to the last three in the family, my incredible sisters: 
Aphia, Miriam and Helen, thank you for being the stars that you are! One very 
special person has come into my life just six months before this graduation, my 
little son Zuri. For your unconditional love and that smile I say, asante sana. 
Last and most importantly, a word of appreciation to Prof. dr. Wouter de 
Groot and Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink, both of Radboud University, for your technical 
support, and for letting me carve my own space and grow into a better researcher 
during the four years.  
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Introduction 
This study is about changing ownership structures and new business relationships 
in South Africa’s forestry sector after 1994, the post apartheid period. In efforts 
to move away from a discriminatory past, economic sectors in South Africa have 
undergone transformation, in line with the broader democratic policies driven by 
the African National Congress (ANC)-led government. Forestry, like other key 
economic sectors, has experienced changes in ownership through a process of 
restructuring, whereby the state has gradually withdrawn from forestry as more 
private actors have moved in. This double experience, of democratization and 
government withdrawal, has created new opportunities for inclusion, and new 
responsibilities for business. 
Forestry in South Africa is largely commercial, with exotic plantations culti-
vated mainly for industrial purposes. Unlike other known forest growing coun-
tries such as Nepal and Brazil, South Africa has very minimal natural forests. As 
such, issues around people and forests mostly revolve around restoration of rights 
to land due to displacements during apartheid, people’s involvement in local 
processes, and beneficiation in proceeds from activities in these environments.  
Restructuring is not unique to forestry, but is generally congruent with broader 
change processes elsewhere in South Africa. The big policy issues in South 
Africa are replicated in forestry. These are manifested through certain policy 
practices such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), whereby government 
has encouraged business actors to change the way they operate, so that their 
composition and outlook is more reflective of South Africa’s demographics. 
Although these processes are basically similar across sectors, the forestry case 
stands out and makes an interesting study for several reasons. First, plantations 
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are located away from urban centers in rural areas, where developmental chal-
lenges such as unemployment and inadequate infrastructures tend to be higher. 
Hence forestry companies are strategically placed to offset some of these 
developmental issues through the opportunities that are availed in their opera-
tions. Second, in international environmental discourses, the idea of people and 
forests has gained significance, especially since the 1992 Rio summit on envi-
ronment and development. Local people gained a central focus, particularly 
where environmental resources were concerned. In this regard, certain pro-people 
practices in natural resources management have been intensified as instruments 
through which local actors become more involved in the way their environments 
are managed. South Africa’s forestry has adopted, in varying degrees, some of 
these ideas as part of their restructuring and transformation efforts. Third, 
forestry in South Africa is a test case of how multiple actors with diverse objec-
tives and values can co-exist and benefit from a single, common commodity. 
Government, through policy directives, has ensured that as they sell their forests, 
both developmental and business aspirations are addressed. The business sector 
is bound to experiment with ways that are beyond their traditional practices, and 
at the same time, work with other non-business interest groups.  
In light of the above scenario, the central question this study attempts to 
answer is how such diverse interests can be addressed and represented through a 
single process of forest restructuring. In tackling this main question, I rely first 
on the theoretical concept of policy implementation, as a primary lens to capture 
the way government withdrew from forestry. It also helps to highlight how this 
withdrawal set the pace and nature of change in forestry, and how implementa-
tion objectives were delivered under the auspices of not one, but several govern-
ment departments. Natural resources management (NRM) is the second lens 
applied to examine and position the question of local communities in forestry 
within this process of restructuring. How do they organize to form business rela-
tionships with private actors? The final and the dominant concept that underpins 
this study is empowerment, which is contextualized as Black Economic Empow-
erment (BEE). Empowerment captures the essence of transformation, necessi-
tated by the legacy of both political and economic disenfranchisement. It also 
helps to highlight how the forestry actors diffuse their wealth, skills and know-
ledge to those who previously had no access. 
This study is generally about new structures and relationships at the micro-
sector level, with forestry chosen as the case study as qualified above. Within the 
forest sector itself, there are two further cases, one featuring the Eastern Cape 
Province and the second in KwaZulu-Natal. The assets in these provinces were 
sold by the state in the year 2000 and 2001, to Singisi Forest Products (SFP) and 
Siyaqhubeka Forests (SQF) respectively. Other provinces, particularly the 
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Western Cape, Limpopo (formerly the Northern Province) and Mpumalanga, are 
the only other three regions with plantation forestry. At the time of the study, 
government withdrawal was not complete in these latter areas hence they re-
mained out of the scope of this study. The remaining four provinces of Gauteng, 
North West, Northern Cape and the Free State do not possess any commercial 
plantations. These forest-free provinces are drier than the rest, but rich in other 
minerals.  
Map 1 shows the distribution of plantation forests in South Africa. The dotted 
areas indicate the combined presence of Eucalyptus, Pine and Wattle plantations. 
The subsequent Picture 1 shows what these plantations look like against the 
backdrop of the natural environment. 
The policy challenge in South Africa 
South Africa is a country of disparities and contrasts in more ways than just the 
physical. Its physical nature can be juxtaposed to the social and economic 
spheres where gaping differences exist, mostly as a result of the past racial 
discrimination instituted by the previous system of apartheid. As one important 
central policy paper summed it up, 
The economy (South Africa) was built on systematically enforced racial division in every 
sphere of our society. Rural areas were divided into under-developed Bantustans and well-
developed white-owned commercial farming areas. Towns and cities were divided into 
townships without basic infrastructure for blacks and well-resourced suburbs for whites. 
Segregation in education, health, welfare, transport and employment left deep scars of 
inequality and economic inefficiency (The Reconstruction and Development Program 1994) 
Inasmuch as the policies of apartheid were dismantled in 1994, its legacy 
persists with the majority of the black population still faced with abject poverty. 
As is common in political speak in South Africa, it is a country of two nations, 
one rich and the other poor or rather, there are two economies existing side by 
side; a first economy with all the modern infrastructures and competing in the 
global economy and a second, that is lacking in skills and therefore unable to 
become part of, or benefit from, the advanced infrastructures of the first economy 
(Montlanthe 2005). The two economies are still visibly characterized along the 
artificial dichotomy drawn out at apartheid, and which was based on race. The 
first economy is largely white and rich, with a few black people making in-roads, 
while the second is mostly black and poor. This two dimensional conception of 
the economy of South Africa is mainly urban and does not adequately capture the 
essence of what I would term the third economy of South Africa. The third 
economy is rural and poor with very limited access to the first economy. It is 
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  Map 1 Map of South Africa showing provinces and afforested areas 
  Source: Forestry South Africa 2004 
constrained by distance, lack of skills and basic infrastructure. Unlike the second 
economy that feeds the first economy with labour and a growing consumer 
market, the third economy comprises a population that has limited opportunities 
to sell their labour and skills, and relies mainly on pensions and subsistence 
farming for their livelihoods. The presence of any industrial activity in the rural 
areas is limited, and where an industry exists, it is often the single significant 
employer in an area where thousands of unemployed people compete to sell their 
labour. It is because of these disparities that the post apartheid policy is a trans-
formational one that started with a constitutional overhaul as well as policy 
changes across the various economic sectors. 
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Picture 1 An exotic plantation and an indigenous forest in the background 
Picture taken by author at SFP (2006)
Whilst policy challenges in any sector in South Africa, by and large, are quite 
similar to those of any other young developmental state, its recent history of 
colonialism and apartheid makes it peculiar, since these defined the policy 
atmosphere for over three centuries, until 1994. In this respect, South Africa has 
to deal not only with basic issues such as job creation, social security and im-
proved infrastructures, but also with problems of societal transformation, and 
these traverse each and every economic sector. Transformation in this sense 
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implies a wide range of changes, including the ownership structure of South 
Africa’s economic assets, in management and other cadres of employment, in the 
procurement business, and perhaps even a change in prejudiced attitudes that 
were the bedrock of previous discriminatory policies. Broadly, these new policies 
aim to change the economic landscape in a way that integrates the two econo-
mies, and that ensures that those population groups previously dispossessed and 
whose wealth was confiscated or stifled by apartheid policies, productively 
engage in the economy. However, change is a contested process, and while it 
could be argued that in South Africa, there has been an understanding that apart-
heid policies had to be replaced, it is the instruments employed in their imple-
mentation and the pace of it that is under contestation. 
Research problem 
This project takes the forestry industry in South Africa as a case study, and looks 
at the changes that have permeated it over the years, but especially since the 
advent of democracy in 1994. These include, but are not limited to, changes in 
the ownership structure of the forest assets, gradual changes in the composition 
of the workforce to reflect the majority of the population, and attempts to include 
other interest groups, especially the rural population who in many ways are 
affected by forestry activities. While the forest industry in South Africa is largely 
an economic enterprise given its nature of plantation forestry, like any other 
sector, since 1994 it has had to deal with other important socio-political and 
environmental issues posed by policies of the new democratic government. This 
in itself has created new challenges first for government as the driving policy 
maker, second for the industry that is perceived as a sector in dire need of 
change, and third for black people generally, and rural people in particular, who 
may have new or increased opportunities for entering the forest sector, either as 
owners, workers, entrepreneurs, or managers.  
In the midst of difficulties inherent in such a broad process of change, one 
policy mandate that may have either facilitated the process or complicated it, as 
debated in the later chapters, is the fact that restructuring, which involved the 
privatization or sale of state-owned forest assets, was part of the change process 
in the forest industry. On the surface, this would appear as an opportunity to 
solve the problem of concentration of ownership, thus fulfilling the political 
aspiration of, at least, balancing the skewed, racial nature of ownership within 
this particular industry. But the objective of the sale itself was also an economic 
one, aiming to boost the competitiveness of the sector both domestically and 
internationally. What this meant is that in floating the assets for sale, it was still 
attractive and logical, at least in a financial sense, to have the highest bidder take 
up the state assets. At the same time, due to the history of poverty, systematic 
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dispossession, and stifling of business within the black population, black entre-
preneurs were only just emerging, and they did not yet have significant financial 
clout to take on such huge industrial assets. It is because of these contradictions 
in the needs and objectives of such a process that the main thrust of this research 
attempts to answer the questions below: 
Research questions 
Central question: How are diverse interests in forestry reconciled, represented 
and addressed within a single process of restructuring? More specifically: 
• How do actors in forestry whether government, private mostly white-
owned companies, emerging black business interests, local community 
groups and individuals, organize themselves to handle the inherent ten-
sions in the restructuring process?  
• What policy objectives and instruments are applied to facilitate the forest 
restructuring process? 
• How do these policies work out in practice? 
In this thesis, the questions will be tackled within three areas of tension and these 
are exemplified in:  
1. The processes of policy implementation, as government withdraws from 
forestry and divests its forest assets to private actors,  
2. The application of the concept of Natural Resources Management (NRM), 
where communities organize to collabourate with private actors in managing and 
benefiting from forestry and finally: 
3. The operationalization of the idea of Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE), as forest companies and communities attempt to share ownership, as well 
as improve and exchange knowledge and skills. 
In engaging the three areas above, and based on local circumstances (SFP and 
SQF case studies), I focus on the application of three theoretical approaches: The 
first core issue in this thesis tackles discourses around policy implementation 
especially in the context of societal transformation. What bearing does the nature 
and pace of implementation have on subsequent actions such as community 
organizing, and the establishment of community-company relationships? What 
policy objectives have been achieved through restructuring, and which have been 
compromised? 
The second approach examines the notion of co-management in Natural 
Resource Management. How do actors, especially community groups, organize? 
How do actors negotiate and handle possible conflicts in co-management pro-
cesses? 
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The last point of analysis tackles empowerment, contextualized as BEE in 
South Africa, and relates the differences between the case studies where, on one 
hand a community trust is a shareholder in the private enterprise, while the other 
case presents a black business enterprise as partner. Hence, how does empower-
ment as practice unfold in each case and what are the implications for the actors? 
How do actors handle the tensions inherent in empowerment processes? How do 
such differences inform the way actors negotiate and organize, and the choice of 
instruments they institute? 
Whilst this study broadly focuses on institutions and alliances between them, 
the primary focus of investigation are individual actors and how they perceive 
interrelationships between their respective organizations. The unit of analysis is 
the individual.  
The rest of this chapter gives an insight into South Africa’s forestry in terms of 
size, ownership patterns, positioning amongst other economic sectors and contri-
bution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The last section details a complete 
layout of the rest of the thesis. 
Background of South Africa’s forestry 
Commercial forestry within South Africa’s economy and land use 
Statistical data indicate that by 1995, South Africa had indigenous forest cover 
amounting to some 346,516 hectares, compared to 1,761,649 hectares of planted 
or commercial forests (Statistics South Africa 2004). Evidently, indigenous forest 
cover in South Africa is relatively small compared to areas that are planted for 
industrial purposes, mostly with exotic tree species. However, Forestry South 
Africa (2004) reveals that by 2003, the commercial forestry sector had a total of 
1,351,402 hectares with annual, albeit minimal, increases in afforested areas in 
the recent past. Of the total land cover, planted forests take up just over 1%. The 
discrepancy between statistical detail from Statistics South Africa and FSA is 
probably the result of one body including unplanted land falling under control of 
commercial forest owners.  
Although commercial forestry, based on its relatively small size, is not consid-
ered to be a major land use activity, its contribution to the Gross Domestic 
Product of South Africa has been significant (Figure 1). In the year ending 2002, 
forestry contributed 1.3% to the total GDP while forest products contribution to 
manufacturing GDP stood at 7.3% and at 8.7% of total agricultural share of GDP 
(Figure 2).  
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  Figure 1 Land use in South Africa 
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  Figure 2 Contribution of forestry to GDP 1980-2002 
  Source: Forestry South Africa, 2004. 
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In terms of meeting domestic demand, the different strands of forestry-related 
manufacturing sectors that produce pulp, paper, and wood supply 90% of local 
consumption needs (Mayers et al. 2001), but products from the sector are signifi-
cantly geared toward foreign markets. Export earnings from the sector in the year 
2002 accounted for 4.14% of overall export earnings excluding those from gold,1
while imports of forest products stood at 1.99% of total imports.  
The industry has also become internationally competitive and the pulp and 
paper sector, as Mayers et al. (2001) report, has a global presence producing 2.8 
million tons (1.63%) of global pulp, 2 million tons (0.76%) of global paper and 
1.3 million m3 of sawn timber (0.3% of global production).   
Changing ownership patterns in the forestry sector 
The first batch of state forest assets was transferred to private enterprise in 1999. 
Before then, as mentioned earlier, the state had been a main actor in plantation 
forestry, owning a combined 30% of total assets in the country. By 2002, private 
ownership had increased to 62.3% as state ownership decreased to 23.6% (FSA 
2004) after selling portions of its Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal assets (Figure 
3). Mondi and SAPPI remain as the major private actors, owning a combined 
total of 47% (Mayers et al. 2001). The rest of the forest assets are under the own-
ership and management of medium sized companies, individual entrepreneurs, 
trusts and municipal councils. 
62,3%
13,8%
23,6% 0,3%
Private Companies Individuals/Partnerships/Trusts
State (incl. Safcol) Municipalities
Figure 3 Plantation area by ownership 2002  
 Source: FSA, 2004 “Forestry and Forest Products Indus try: Facts and Figures 1979/1980 to 2002/2003. 
Contrary to the objectives of South Africa’s forest restructuring, the recent 
sale of state forests has not significantly broadened the ownership base in 
                                                                 
1
   See FSA 2004, table 25C. In 2003, gold exports totalled 12.74% of all exports (see FSA, 2004) quali-
fying as the single biggest export from South Africa. 
11 
forestry. In KwaZulu-Natal for instance, Mondi forests, already a major player in 
the industry, acquired majority shares in the divested assets that are now held as 
Siyaqhubeka Forests. In the case of Singisi Forest Products that took over the 
Eastern Cape North forests, the major shareholder, Hans Merensky holdings, is 
not a newcomer in forest activities, having had saw milling operations in the 
area. While state’s forest assets have shrunk, and will continue to do so until it 
has divested all its plantations to private enterprise, patterns emerging from the 
sector show increased ownership by existing players rather than newcomers. The 
current status of ownership in the sector is illustrated in Figure 4.
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med-sized private Singisi Siyaqhubeka
Figure 4  Plantation area by ownership 
 Data Source: Forestry South Africa (2004) 
Plantation forests are spread mainly across five provinces (see Map 1) in 
South Africa: Mpumalanga and Limpopo (formerly the Northern Province), 
Eastern and Western Cape provinces and Kwazulu-Natal. These provinces 
record, on average, annual rainfall of over 500 mm2 and forest plantations are 
mostly located on the slopes of the escarpments. Mpumalanga province has the 
highest concentration carrying over 40.4% of total planted forests followed by 
KwaZulu-Natal province at 39.2% and Eastern Cape at 10.9% (Figure 5). The 
latter two provinces were selected as study areas. 
                                                                 
2
  http//www.environment.gov.za/enviro-info/prov/rain.htm 
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  Figure 5 Plantation area by Province 
  Source: FSA: 2004 
The provinces possess both softwood and hardwood plantations; some private 
companies operating in the areas are vertically integrated, and supply their own 
processing factories with raw timber. However, other smaller companies over the 
years have received their supplies of raw timber from state forests. Hans 
Merensky was a case in point before they bought into state assets in the Eastern 
Cape. 
Forestry also contributes to the rural economy through significant employ-
ment. Talking of employment in forestry includes those in the primary sector, for 
instance in the plantations, and also in the value-added industries, mainly the 
pulp and paper producing sectors, and in saw milling. Because there is an in-
creased tendency to outsource primary activities such as silviculture and trans-
port, a number of people working in forestry are not in permanent employment 
(Mayers & Vermuelen 2002). However, an estimated 13,000 people are directly 
employed in the pulp and paper sector, as well as an additional 17,000 workers in 
the contractual sectors, especially in plantation management and transport. What 
is of significance is the fact that forestry is one of the non-agricultural industries 
that contributes to rural employment. Increasingly, and within the discourse of 
pro-poor strategies as argued by Ashley & Ntshona (2003), forestry in South 
Africa is now viewed as one of those avenues through which investment can flow 
into marginal local areas. 
Set-up of the thesis 
This thesis is structured in nine chapters. Chapter two delves into three main 
theoretical concepts that act as the pillars of this study. These are: policy imple-
mentation, Natural Resource Management (NRM) and power and empowerment. 
The first section presents key elements of implementation theory, re-emphasizing 
the proverbial gap between policy pronouncements and actions. The second 
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section on NRM highlights the progression of natural resource management 
systems from traditional management systems to state management, and more 
recently, the introduction of the market into resource management. These periods 
are respectively captured under three dominant approaches namely the classical, 
neo-populist and neo-liberal approaches. The concept of co-management is 
argued to have survived through these changes to result into mixed systems, in 
which elements of the old are carried over into neo-liberal systems. Under the 
section on power and empowerment, the discussion traces two main conceptions 
of power as power over and power to. It observes that there is a thin line between 
the two conceptions, as power is cyclical in its influence. The chapter ends with a 
justification and a reflection on the case study method, as applied in the study. 
The method of analysis involved labelling the responses according to the three 
main theoretical concepts that the thesis builds upon. A comparative analysis 
between the two cases is done where necessary.  
In chapter three, a detailed background is presented into South Africa’s policy 
history. This chapter is important to understand the political context upon which 
the whole thesis is based. It outlines the early ideological convictions of the 
ANC, and how these changed from the early 1990s in light of the imminent new 
political dispensation. The chapter also presents an account of the forest policy 
and how this has changed, especially since 1994. Lastly, it gives a contextual 
conceptualization of empowerment in South Africa, and the key debates that 
BEE has raised within South Africa’s development discourse. 
Chapter four introduces the two case studies, SFP and SQF, in their respective 
provinces of Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. It describes briefly the study 
areas and the shareholding structure of each company. In each case, the main 
approach to NRM and BEE is highlighted. The more interesting aspects of these 
case studies are found in subsequent empirical chapters. 
Chapter five is the first of three empirical chapters. This chapter is grounded 
by the theory of policy implementation and tells the story of forestry restructur-
ing as it evolved. The roles of key actors are discussed as well as their over-
lapping nature and the bearing of these on the overall restructuring exercise. The 
discussion revisits the original objectives set out at the beginning of restructuring 
and examines which were achieved and which were dropped along the way, and 
implications for the choices made.   
In chapter six, a presentation is given of the management systems employed 
by both SFP and SQF. Of central interest in this chapter is how in both cases 
relationships were established with surrounding communities, either as business 
partners, or simply for outreach purposes. The chapter also highlights key issues 
that challenge these processes, such as the question of land and community 
rights, the marking of operational boundaries, problems of identification, and 
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definition of community actors. The distinction between the cases is found in the 
way they approach the idea of community engagement. While SFP has a com-
munity Trust as a shareholding junior partner, SQF avoids this route but engages 
in a straight business with a black entity, and uses this entity to find solutions to 
the problems of skills and entrepreneurial development at community level. 
Chapter seven is the last of the empirical chapters and describes the notion of 
empowerment and how it is operationalized in both cases. It presents the case 
study view of empowerment against the backdrop of the normative meaning as 
outlined in policy papers. Both cases have employed their own strategies in 
advancing the ends of empowerment. The chapter highlights these while pre-
senting reasons for progress or stagnation. The idea behind most empowerment 
activities is to enhance skills and entrepreneurial capacities in the communities 
that both SFP and SQF employ. Once again, the notable difference in the two 
approaches is found in the ownership structure of the companies, but the empow-
erment activities show similarities. Both cases target potential individual entre-
preneurs rooted in the community, for mentoring. 
Chapter eight serves as the conjunction where all the key findings are ana-
lyzed. In presenting this analysis, the chapter revisits, in individual sections, the 
three theoretical lenses of implementation, natural resource management and 
empowerment. Hence it applies secondary information and the broader South 
Africa’s political and economic context to explain the findings. 
Chapter nine is the concluding one and gives a summary discussion linking 
the findings to the original intentions of the research. 
2 
Theory and methods 
Introduction 
This study is grounded in three theoretical concepts, which this chapter discusses 
in three separate sections. The research is primarily embodied in broad economic 
transformational policies in South Africa and the specific implementation of the 
forest policy, in relation to forest restructuring. In this respect theoretical debates 
on policy and their implementation are explored and presented as the first topic 
upon which the thesis is structured. 
The second concept under debate and use is natural resource management 
(NRM). Under NRM, I trace the trends in resource management systems over the 
years citing Blaikie & Jeanranaud’s (1997) use of three distinct approaches: the 
classic, populist and neo-liberal. These are further identified as having been 
dominant under certain political systems. The classic approach denotes the 
fortress system of resource management, where state agencies practiced pater-
nalistic management and local users were restricted. The populist era saw in-
creased agitation and adoption, in varying degrees, of community-based manage-
ment of environmental resources. The neo-liberal period involves the entry of the 
market as a key player, but also the retention of some elements of the populist 
agenda. In this progression, I single out co-management as an approach that has, 
to some extent, survived the neo-liberal inroad on NRM. The cases discussed in 
this thesis are examples of hybrid practices in resource management. 
The third and last section deals with the concept of empowerment. To a large 
extent, empowerment as a concept has been used particularly in the context of 
gender, race relations or indigenous populations disenfranchised in one way or 
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the other by virtue of their status within their contexts. While this study will draw 
upon such examples, its specific context is South Africa where segregation and 
inequality were based on race. The targets of empowerment are those disadvan-
taged by apartheid. What also distinguishes the application of the concept here is 
that South Africa presents an empowerment case of a majority coming out of 
suppression by a minority. In other instances, the reverse has often been the case 
where minorities are on the margin, and empowerment, as an approach, implies 
concerted efforts for their increased access to social and economic structures. 
More often than not, as with minorities in North America for instance, notions of 
identity and multiculturalism are core discourses in empowerment literature (Yon 
1999). As discussed in the latter part of this chapter, in a case like South Africa, 
while such discourses may surface, post-apartheid debates on empowerment take 
a different angle as they specifically deal with access to mainstream economic 
structures of power.  
The three conceptual areas have been chosen due to their relevance to contem-
porary development debates in South Africa. In addition, they inform the re-
search from multiple angles while at the same time giving a synthesized and 
adequate direction for the case studies. 
Policy implementation in theoretical discussions 
Policy implementation as a distinct part of the policy process in the recent past 
has received its own focus within development debates. Attempts to isolate this 
element of policy in theoretical discussions are seen in writings by Hill (1993), 
Ham & Hill (1993), Hogwood & Gunn (1993), Hjern & Porter (1993), Minogue 
(1993) and Sabatier (1993). These writings have arisen out of concerns that 
implementation has been neglected in theoretical literature (Minogue 1993) 
despite its perceived importance in the overall policy process. 
Policy implementation is an arena where political decisions are constructed 
into practical actions. It is the administrative or management aspect of the policy 
process, or the sphere where “decisions are translated into events” (Minogue 
1993: 18). At this stage, policy pronouncements are translated into solutions 
hence failure and/or success would be most visible. The success or failure of 
policy decisions may not only be a failure at the implementation level, but as 
Masiza & Mangcu (2001) suggests, these could also be symptoms of poor theo-
retical grounding at the design stage. 
In Minogue’s (1993) analysis of the discrepancy between theory and practice, 
he discusses the gap in knowledge between the theoretician and the practitioner. 
His point of view assumes that policy decisions are made at an upper level, far 
removed from the reality of the practitioner. The knowledge of the policy maker 
is theoretical while that of the implementer is based on actual issues and con-
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straints. It also implies that those who implement policy have little direct influ-
ence on theoretical aspects of policy making. Minogue’s analysis further contra-
dicts notions that presume the policy process as cyclical, assuming that informa-
tion from practitioners may feed back into the process, and could be used in their 
revision. His analysis suggests that the policy maker is politically inclined, and 
strives to deliver certain promises through crafting solutions that remain theoreti-
cal until they undergo the actual processes of implementation. Due to the politi-
cal nature of his/her mandate, it will not always be desirable to receive critical 
input, especially in regard to the techniques that he/she proposes as crucial to 
realizing outcomes. In the end he argues, the policy maker, by virtue of his more 
powerful position, may overrule the ideas and input from the practitioner. These 
differences arise out of the separate worlds from which the policy maker and 
public managers originate, and also because they have different uses for policy. 
As the policy maker struggles to promote particular techniques in order to reach 
the desired policy outcome, the public manager may not be so much preoccupied 
with theoretical orientations and methods that inform the process but rather, how 
practical and workable the proposals are on site. The tensions that arise out of 
these discrepancies inherently turn into power struggles, and in the end, he 
asserts, “power dictates what truth is” (ibid.). The knowledge held by the practi-
tioner may be manipulated or discarded, especially if it challenges interests of 
policy makers. Crosby (1996: 1404) summarizes this by indicating that:  
Policy implementers are generally excluded from the process of formulation and policy 
selection, have little ownership of either the policy or the process, and have minimal control 
over the diverse resources needed to carry out the policy mandate, lack the appropriate 
organizational resources and often operate in an environment hostile to the changes man-
dated. 
The lack of connection between policy makers and implementers seem to be 
over-emphasized. Where the policy process is understood not to be a one-direc-
tional hierarchical process, policy can be revised or reformed especially when it 
faces implementation hurdles, or when it is considered obsolete. Such revision 
would be based upon feedback that often emanates, though not always, from 
implementers themselves.  
The implementation arena is wrought by contestation, but it is also a stage at 
which new ideas come into play, and where technical prescriptions from the 
policy making stage is advanced, challenged or discarded. Many policy scientists 
acknowledge the divide between policy decisions and implementation, but the 
problems are not always attributable to inadequate understanding of reality by 
those who craft policy. Practitioners are guided by own preferences and personal 
beliefs as well, and these can affect their understanding, interpretation and 
execution of policy. Minogue (1993: 21) challenge the views that presume policy 
to be a state-led process, devoid of influences from other non-powerful apolitical 
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entities or individual interests along the execution line. They argue, rightly so, 
that politics exist even within organizations, and individuals in those entities also 
compete for control of resources and manipulate these processes when it suits 
them. Therefore, analyses that tend to portray organizations as non-political are 
narrow, as “the internal world of the organization cannot be isolated from the 
world external to the organization”.  
Earlier studies on policy-making and implementation portrayed the processes 
as linear and one-directional. Implementation in particular was analyzed as em-
ploying either a top down or bottom up approach (Sabatier 2000). The top down 
approach implied a political process where policy decisions were made in the 
upper echelon of the political structure. These decisions were in turn channelled 
to the implementation levels without consideration of local input, perceptions or 
interpretation. In reverse, the bottom up approach assumed that policy was 
crafted with ample consideration of local views and perceptions of their pro-
blems. Within this view, it was understood that the perspective of a wide range of 
actors with varied interests in the policy process had been incorporated (Birkland 
2005). More recent analyses have discredited these assumptions and argue that 
implementation processes involve different interests, organizations and different 
subsystems within them (ibid.). Due to the diversity of the numerous entities, 
negotiation and bargaining becomes a core characteristic of these processes. 
Hence Birkland (2005: 188) argues that contrary to the top down or bottom up 
perspective, “implementation is as much a matter of negotiation and communica-
tion as it is a matter of command”.  
Hjern & Porter (1993) and Brinkerhoff (1996) reinforce this dimension to the 
debate while they challenge previous approaches to the study of policy imple-
mentation, particularly the methodological challenges explicit in policy analysis. 
Instead of using the organization or individual actors as a unit of analysis, they 
advocate the study of implementation structures. This focus acknowledges that 
across several entities that partake in implementation, there exist clusters of 
actors. Implementation of policy may involve several different organizations 
ranging from the private to public, profit and non-profit, and small and large 
entities. Within each organization, a cluster of actors exists who may create a 
network with clusters in the other organizations. Combined, they form the imple-
mentation structure.  
The implementation structure as an alternative administrative unit of analysis, 
serves to recognize that no single organization is responsible for policy manage-
ment, but that the tasks cut across several organizations both public and private. 
Secondly, the proponents of this method argue that previous strategies focused 
broadly on the organizational unit and, in the process, neglected information and 
data from the smaller functional units within the organizations. The role of 
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informal networking that takes place between these clusters is also ignored and 
when the focus is almost solely on one organization as the implementing agency 
as well, external forces that shape the direction of implementation are excluded, 
resulting in inadequate analysis through loss of data. 
Hence the debate on implementation so far tackles three major issues: the 
divide in knowledge and understanding between the theoretician and practitioner 
and its consequences, the political and power dynamics in policy making, and the 
search for appropriate methods of analysis when studying the implementation 
aspect of policy. Underlying these issues are two distinct assumptions: that 
implementation is initiated from the top and led by the state. The second as-
sumption, although not refuting the state facilitation of the process, seems to 
disagree with the linearity or the downward movement of policy and recognizes 
the existence a number of organizations and networks that are not necessarily 
public, but who also contribute to processes of implementation.  
The divide between the policy maker and the policy implementer may exist, 
but not in a clear, unambiguous way as the literature suggests. There is still 
inadequate analysis on the extent to which implementers may influence policy 
making and even policy mending. 
Co-management and models of natural resource management 
The notion of co-management is difficult to determine. Most literature on co-
management highlights the element of plurality of actors, especially the sharing 
of power between supra-local government and local actors in resource manage-
ment. The presence of supra-local involvement is deemed necessary, especially 
where the empirical scale of the resource is large, to the extent that monitoring 
and coordination becomes difficult for local users. Fisheries, forests and wildlife 
are good examples of these. Secondly, a custodian role of government may be 
necessary when the resource contains biodiversity of special value (for instance 
endemic or globally threatened species); it cannot always be expected that local 
users necessarily share this special motivation.  
In this scenario, resource management that incorporates plural actors becomes 
a process that goes through various levels of maturity, negotiated and renegoti-
ated when necessary. Before a detailed description of the concept, I first trace its 
origin and the influences that have stimulated its emergence both in theory and 
practice. 
The evolution of co-management is closely linked to changes in policies that 
have a bearing on issues of natural resources. Such policies do not change in a 
vacuum, but are outcomes of political and economic dynamics at the macro level 
whether nationally or internationally. In environmental politics, for instance, 
local resource users have increasingly demanded more say in the way their envi-
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ronments are managed, while pressure groups with local and international net-
works have supported such lobbying. These have evolved as struggles for self-
determination, supported by a vibrant civil society pushing the local agenda in 
the national and international arena, thus creating a wave of change. Uhlig & 
Jordaan (1996: 59) opine that redefinition and changes in natural resource 
management (NRM) could be partly attributed to the emergence of “new social 
agendas driven by diverse cultural values” that increasingly question previous or 
existing management systems that are perceived as deficient. Such sentiments 
question previous practices of resource management that isolated environmental 
issues from social and economic ones, and argue for their increased interconnec-
tivity.  
Changes in political systems in the developing world, especially the move 
toward plural politics, have also played a role in the creation of co-management 
practices. Notions of pluralism are essentially rooted within principles of democ-
ratization. Venema & van den Breemer (1999) capture this political influence to 
co-management, observing that democratization that has paved the way for co-
management practices is a direct result of pressure from western countries and 
institutions such as the World Bank. Internal political struggles have also influ-
enced political changes in developing countries to a significant degree. These 
political actions create enabling legal and administrative conditions necessary for 
engagement in contractual relationships between government and local commu-
nities. Yet analyses around co-management still would benefit from a broader 
assessment that unravels ways in which ‘external’ ideas interconnect with local 
ones, and how these are received and reconstructed by actors at various levels. 
Co-management has been applied extensively in resource management where 
there exists multiple and often economically unequal interest groups. In the 
context of fisheries management, Sen & Nielsen (1996) grapple with ambiguities 
that characterize such discussions. In their attempt to provide clarity to the 
debate, they categorize co-management practices according to types, which 
themselves are based on the level of involvement of interest groups, especially 
government and local users. The level of interaction between government and 
local users varies from a situation where government makes all decisions re-
garding resource management to one in which information is shared between 
both parties.  
For this thesis, two types of resource management systems are relevant, Sen 
and Nielsen’s “fortress type” and a hybrid system in which co-management 
broadens to include market parties as a key actor (see Blaikie & Jeanrenead 
1997). In deviating from the traditional use of the concept of co-management that 
referred only to practices between government and local resource users, I concur 
with Notzke’s (1995) argument that co-management should be studied as a 
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system that integrates two or more resource management systems. Such an 
approach leaves open the parameters of debating co-management and other 
evolving theories of collective action. 
Streamlining the concept of co-management can be approached through 
different paradigms that have dominated studies on resource management. It can 
also be positioned within certain periods of time, but at varying degrees, 
depending on prevailing circumstances or socio-political convictions in specific 
regions. Early systems of resource control were mostly community-based under 
traditional tenure systems. Later, these were undermined by the removal of 
authority from the local to state agencies. The peak of romanticizing the nation-
state, roughly from the mid 1960s to the 70s, saw the state assume ownership and 
control of local resources among other economic sectors. The reasoning behind 
such moves was that local inhabitants were assumed to be unable to manage 
natural resources without causing their degeneration (Ostrom 1990). However, 
state ownership and control of resources also came under scrutiny as this take-
over created instead “open access resources where limited access common-
property resources had previously existed” (1990: 23). In basically all areas 
except in strictly protected national parks therefore, over-exploitation was given 
free reign. Subsequent trends in the 1980s saw relegation of management back to 
local inhabitants, but these were often in the presence of already eroded resources 
and weaker norms of use and access. Erosion of local rules during the tenure of 
the state undermined the resumption of workable local control systems. 
In the face of the failure of the state to manage local resources outside the 
strict national parks, theorists and policy analysts were crafting other paradigms 
as alternatives to single entity control, whether by the state or sole community 
management. The late 1980s saw the coining of discourses of joint management 
or co-management. Fisheries are still the major areas of experiment, but in 
forestry practice popular examples are the joint management programs in India 
and Nepal (Agarwal 2001; Kumar 2002; Ballabh et al. 2002). The concept thus 
visualizes the interdependence of diverse interest groups in resource manage-
ment, and importantly, it acknowledges that not only is local knowledge critical 
in resource management, but that local resources ideally should respond to issues 
of social justice.  
To conceptualize co-management as another model of resource management 
requires an understanding of theories that have preceded it within discussions of 
collective action. In presenting an understanding of the various key approaches to 
the analyses of resource management, I borrow Blaikie & Jeanrenaud’s (1997) 
three distinct categories as a benchmark. These are the classic, populist and neo-
liberal schools of thought.  
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The classic approach to NRM 
The classic school of thought advanced the idea of single-entity control of 
resources as a solution to problems of over-exploitation. This point of view 
entrenched the central state as the justified and capable manager of natural re-
sources such as forests and fisheries. Empirical analyses around this type of 
control suggest it was often accompanied by systematic alienation of local users 
and inhabitants by state agencies (Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997). In this model, the 
focus was on the environment, and particularly in protecting that environment 
from local inhabitants through exclusion from the resource in order to solve 
problems of conservation.  
One of the more prominent students of the classic school is Mancur Olson and 
in his 1965 book The Logic of Collective Action, he posits a challenge to as-
sumptions of group theorists who state that members of a group make logical 
decisions that contribute to the overall interest of the whole group. Olson argues 
that collective action for the common good, such as natural resources, would be 
minimal, especially in cases where the group is large, and that compliance to 
group requirements would only be obtained if there were some amount of coer-
cion or incentives. He further challenges traditional group theorists to re-assess 
the relationship between group size and their effectiveness, pointing out that  
Though all members of the group therefore have a common interest in obtaining this collec-
tive benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective 
good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would get any 
benefit provided whether he had borne the cost or not (Olson 1965: 21).  
Olson implies that in achieving group objectives, there is always a tendency 
by some members of the group to shirk, (Hara 1999; Ostrom 1991) hence 
preventing the achievement of optimum returns from collective goods. The 
problem of free riding in groups is also echoed in Hardin’s (1968) ‘Tragedy of 
the Commons’ who suggests the intervention of an external agency as a solution 
to the dilemma of rational actors, while Olson prescribes coercion or some form 
of incentive to enable consumers to be responsible users of collective goods. 
Hardin underscores self-interest as a driving factor in the exploitation of 
common resources. He implies that common property users are devoid of collec-
tive responsibility and choose not to exercise restraint in access and use of avail-
able resources, leading to an overexploited and degraded resource (Hara 1999). 
The underlying scenario was that if there were a resource to which everyone had 
access, individuals would consume without considering that there were others 
relying on the same resource. This would result in an overexploited resource 
recklessly consumed for individual gain, but having all users jointly sharing in 
the negative consequences posed by the resultant scarcity and eventual collapse 
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of the resource. The solution to such a situation as advanced by Hardin was either 
a centralized or a privatized control of the resource (Ostrom 1990; Hara 1999).  
However, Hardin’s assumptions have since been challenged, as the fortress- 
type state control regimes have led to many practical and moral failures. For-
tresses may work, but with minimal sensitivity to issues of equity, especially in 
the longer term and where there are inadequate resources. In his analysis, Hardin 
failed to create distinctions between open access property and common resource 
situations (de Groot & Persoon 1998; Hara 1999) ending up with generalized 
conclusions that are dangerous to apply in natural resource management.  
Both Hardin and Olson ignore, and therefore undermine, the ability of com-
munity groups to make decisions that add up to their common good, and at the 
same time elevating, without concrete evidence, the ability of the state or private 
entities as better managers of natural resources. They also make no reference to 
other societies where there have been successful practices in common-pool 
management (Klooster 2000). 
Consequently, there has been a massive pool of writers unpacking and criti-
cizing Hardin and Olson’s line of thought, but ironically also, an incredible 
amount of attention paid to these theories in the design of policies for managing 
natural resources. Several developing countries, for instance, have gone through 
periods of state intervention in which natural resources such as forests were 
declared state property, and therefore under direct management of the state. 
These actions often undermined common property regimes and created open-
access situations (Klooster 2000: 2; Ostrom 1990). The intrusion of modernizing 
states and their economic relationships is thus argued to create the “real Tragedy 
of the Commons” (The Ecologist 1993; Monbiot 1993). Consequently the dis-
course has become more populist in nature, with theorists increasingly supporting 
plural interests in resource management, but with a radical focus on local people 
as resource managers.  
The neo-populist view  
Contrary to the thinking of classical theorists, the neo-populist view tends to give 
weight to the ability of local resource users to establish institutions capable of 
managing their common resources. Elinor Ostrom has come out as a remarkable 
proponent of local users as resource managers supporting locally crafted institu-
tions. In her intense analysis based on various case studies (1990), she disagrees 
with the classical views of Olson and Hardin on external intervention as a pana-
cea for achieving sustainable use of natural resources. Instead she takes a 
supporting view of community-based institutions in resource management, while 
she warns of the dangers of prescribing and relying on absolute solutions to 
natural situations that are quite diverse. She observes that institutions are 
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embedded, and neither the state nor the private sector exists in isolation to each 
other (1990: 9).  
Secondly, in making a further contribution to theory-building regarding 
common-pool regimes, Ostrom (1990) underscores the fact that users make 
choices about what kind of rules to employ in resource management, and when it 
is necessary to craft these rules. The suggestion that common resource users 
would establish and re-establish institutions when necessary to govern their 
resources, contrasts with the views of Olson and Hardin, who imply that users of 
collective goods engage in uncontrolled consumption until the resource is com-
pletely depleted or destroyed. But Klooster (2000: 3), while acknowledging that 
institutions, as Ostrom says, are constructed rules guiding behaviour, adds that 
analysis should not be confined within such a narrow framework, as institutions 
are also heavily laden with cultural content and meaning. He maintains that the 
contexts within which the commons are embedded are not only historical and 
economic structures, but include complex cultural sets of “meanings, symbols 
and values”. Such complexities are often susceptible to misinterpretation, or are 
entirely missed by both researchers and policy analysts.  
One of the more remarkable observations made by Ostrom (1990: 21) is the 
need to build theory from practical cases and to move away from the tendency to 
manufacture single theoretical solutions to common problems without paying 
“attention to how diverse institutional arrangements operate in practice”. Actors 
make such institutional choices. Because establishing these institutions is a 
choice, the implication is that they can be changed, modified or improved over 
time depending on the circumstances. De Groot & Persoon (1999: 18), comple-
menting Ostrom, argue for openness in theory building to “avoid the risk of 
conflicts and failures inherent in a fixed approach”. From the viewpoint of the 
populists, contextualizing and comparing practices, picking out factors responsi-
ble for success or failure among others, is the key to building an appropriate 
theory. Ostrom (1990: 22) calls it inductive theory making, building upwards 
from individual cases. According to Ostrom, the critical question when building a 
theory regarding common pool regimes should be what makes some institutions 
work while others fail, and not necessarily trying to find a single answer to 
numerous problems of collective action. Klooster (2000: 3) criticizes Ostrom’s 
route as being “contextually thin” as it “minimizes or eliminates considerations 
of history and processes outside the community of resource users”, such as power 
relations existing in the regional, national or international sphere. Ostrom’s 
fascination with local communities as effective managers in the presence of 
‘institutional arrangements that work’ can be said to lead her towards the extreme 
side of the populist debate. However, in her later writings (see Ostrom 2000), she 
acknowledges the role of the state in a more balanced manner. 
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Unlike centralized or community-based approaches to resource management, 
co-management brings the element of balance to the debate where earlier ap-
proaches have either taken extreme ‘left’ position, as in Ostrom’s community-
based system, or far ‘right’ as proposed by the state-based approaches of Hardin 
and to some extent Olson. Co-management is still in its early stages of evolution, 
evidenced by various available case studies. Such arrangements are therefore 
often unique, either according to the place of resource, type of resource or politi-
cal and cultural contexts. Their definition, use and meanings are also as fluid. 
Sifting through ambiguities to create distinctions: Co-management as a loaded 
concept 
Due to the current acknowledgement of diversity of interests in natural resources, 
as well as the intertwined roles of various parties, discussion and application of 
the concept of co-management have intensified. Although a major portion of the 
literature on co-management practices is derived from case studies on fisheries 
management (Pinkerton 1989; Hara 1999; Sen & Nielsen 1996; Kuperan & 
Abdullah 1994; Jentoft & Kristoffersen 1989; Dryer & Goodwin 1994), the 
model has become popular in restructuring management of other resources such 
as wildlife and forests (Notzke 1995; Mayaka 2001; Klooster 2000; Lynch 1997; 
Venema & van den Breemer 1999; Ballabh et al. 2002; Kumar 2002; Agarwal 
2001).  
Because co-management arrangements are often unique to their contexts, 
whether cultural, economic, or political, and also depending on the resource in 
question, their definitions are justifiably varied. Pomeroy and Williams 1994 (in 
ICLARM 1994: 2) point out that it is not a single strategy but one that should be 
viewed “as a set of alternative management strategies, appropriate for certain 
areas and situations”. 
Pinkerton (1989: 4), avoiding a straight definition of the concept and choosing 
to concentrate on its characteristics, sees co-management as negotiated agree-
ments where “all parties give to get in arrangements which last”; Sen & Nielsen 
(1996: 406) define it as “an arrangement where responsibility for resource 
management is shared between the government and user groups”. All these 
writers view the evolution of co-management practices as responding to pro-
blems of resource over-exploitation and/or depletion. Perhaps Borrini-Feyer-
abend (2000: 7) gives the most comprehensive definition so far. She regards co-
management as a  
situation in which two or more social actors, especially from the local and supra-local level
negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management 
functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural re-
sources (emphasis added) 
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One notices that in most attempts to define co-management, the recurring 
theme is that of sharing or the search for a balance, and this is a departure point 
from the earlier models of Hardin (1968) and Olson (1971), and to some extent 
Ostrom (1991). Ideally the notion of sharing in a co-management arrangement 
would not be confined to a single aspect of the process, but would encapsulate 
main functions such as decision-making, redistribution, and resource enhance-
ment and protection. The creation of management situations that involve multiple 
actors is therefore a direct response to the declining sole control by the state, 
private or other user groups, whether voluntarily or due to exerted pressure. 
Instead, there is a relative appreciation and consolidation of management 
knowledge and skills of both local users and the powers-that-be, hence Borrini-
Feyerabend (2000: 7) also views co-management as “a political and cultural 
process par excellence: seeking “democracy” and social justice in natural re-
source management”. Therefore co-management is perceived here as an essential 
element of empowerment processes at the local resource level. 
Pinkerton (1989) further opines that these processes evolve when government 
fails in terms of providing adequate data in management of fisheries, thus facing 
pressure from users who demand a part in the decision-making process. On the 
other hand, government still perceives users as responsible for stock depletion, 
especially when left unchecked by external authority. Lack of trust is a part of the 
relationship and culminates in the two parties engaging in a process which results 
in a power-sharing scheme that enables each to represent their own interests, 
while at the same time ensuring that previous problems, believed to have been 
perpetuated by the opposite camp, are kept in check to avoid recurrence. 
However, research and analyses have moved beyond simply looking at checks 
and balances in situations characterized by diverse objectives and perspectives, 
toward the resources in question. Recent literature on institutional theory in-
creasingly recognize informal networks within groups as crucial in building 
strong and lasting institutions, in reducing internal suspicion, and also capable of 
spilling over as causal effect in building trust with external groups (Evans 1996). 
Such networks are based on notions of norms, trust and reciprocity that cement 
reliable relationships among those involved. The concept of social capital has 
been used to refer to similar networks of social relations (Putman 1993; Evans 
1996; Baron et al. 2000).  
Putman (1993: 167), who has significantly advanced the debate on social 
capital to the sphere of political analyses (Baron et al. 2000), defines social 
capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”. This 
perspective again seems to challenge the general assumptions of rational choice 
theorists through advancing analyses that explain why certain groups have over-
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come the dilemma of collective action. In fact, it also counters the liberal eco-
nomic position that sees the market as a solution to all economic questions. 
Instead it projects the significance of informal social relations as crucial in 
building developmentally relevant institutions (ibid.). When concentrated 
amounts of trust exist within a group, it is presumed that free riding or shirking 
would be minimized (Ostrom 1990). The behaviour of individuals is self-regu-
lated by the informal understanding within the group, but which obligates actors 
to be reliable in their decisions and to act in the collective good, while at the 
same time also expect to benefit from similar behaviour from other members. 
This increases the density of trust amongst members. 
Perhaps one other significant dimension to the discussion on social capital that 
has relevance to the debate on co-management is the element of embeddedness 
and complementary of actors. Evans (1996: 1120) refines the definition of these 
two concepts, and understands embeddedness to be “ties that connect citizens 
and public officials across the public-private divide,” while the idea of comple-
mentarities recognizes that the public and private (government and communities) 
play different roles, which are interdependent with mutually beneficial end 
results. The underlying and connecting logic between the two concepts is the 
enmeshing of efforts from different actors to produce stronger results that would 
otherwise not be if parties acted independently. Cooperation is a crucial compo-
nent in understanding ‘complementarity and embeddedness’.  
Whilst different authors have based their analyses of social capital on different 
units, for example public and private institutions (Evans 1996) and civic commu-
nities (Putman 1993), they agree on the point that just as dense amounts of social 
capital are capable of enhancing cooperation within groups of people, so they can 
also cause social exclusion. People who have cultivated such amounts of trust of 
each other are likely to have been brought together before for certain purposes, or 
could already be members of an existing social organization, such as a church 
group or a water management/use group, and have developed a certain group 
culture. Because building such a relationship is a continuous process and may 
take a long time, potential new members would likely find it difficult to catch up, 
just as existing members may also view them as outsiders and be reluctant to 
integrate them. 
Therefore in a co-management situation, it is assumed that a group with strong 
internal cohesion and trust is likely to engage better within the group, and also 
organize in a more advanced way should they decide to cooperate with external 
groups. Putman (1993) captures this element of the debate clearly when he coins 
the concepts of bonding and bridging social capital. To bond social capital is to 
consolidate it within the group for stronger internal relationships, while bridging 
social capital becomes relevant when such internal stock of social capital facili-
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tates a collective strategy in relating to external groups of actors. Existing social 
capital then becomes a platform for exploring social relations beyond the group’s 
original borders for reasons that add up to the collective benefit of the whole.  
While social capital can also be constructed in communities with no existing 
stock, Evans (1996) argues that though lack of any amount of prior stock of 
social capital can be a constraining factor in enhancing group objectives, the 
main problem lies not in construction but expansion of such existing capital to 
higher political and economic levels. 
Besides internal unity that is vital for engaging external actors in collective 
action, such processes are characterized by continuous negotiations. In a co-
management arrangement, because of interests that may often conflict, negotia-
tions often end up in trade-offs where parties give up certain aspects of their 
involvement to external actors, who, in turn, acquire new responsibilities for 
purposes of influencing the direction of management of the resource. The 
projected situation is one in which all actors fairly gain, and where the sum of 
joint efforts is greater than if players had acted independently. Axelrod 1984 (in 
Pinkerton 1989: 5) contends,  
co-management systems set up a game in which the pay-offs are greater for co-operation 
than for opposition and/or competition, a game in which the actors can learn to optimize 
their mutual good and plan co-operatively with long term horizons. 
The give and take scenario as a central characteristic of the process of co-
management is based on the presumption that different actors in resource 
management are embedded, and need each other in order to benefit from their 
diversity.  
Whilst sharing of management responsibility between actors is an integral part 
of co-management, the extent to which management functions are shared is not 
fixed across different cases, and power-sharing arrangements not necessarily 
balanced (de Groot & Persoon 1999). Pinkerton (1989: 5) continues to argue that 
ideally, co-management denotes situations where management functions are 
shared; therefore she refers to non-compliant situations as incomplete but open 
and susceptible to positive upward movement toward completion. Co-manage-
ment is an evolving process the construction of which is bound to experience 
changes through continued negotiation and trust building (ibid.), and even 
through community struggles over norms (Klooster 2000).  
Therefore distribution of functions in a co-management situation is determined 
by the management stage at which other actors come on board, whether at 
planning, implementation or evaluation (Sen & Nielsen 1996). This process also 
depends on the negotiating ability of user groups and their management 
knowledge, as well as their level of cohesion and internal trust. The extent to 
which a co-management arrangement would be fair in terms of distribution of 
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functions and tasks as well as other tangible benefits is likely to be influenced by 
the intensity or lack of bargaining at this crucial stage in the process. Though an 
ideal co-management situation would imply that key user groups start at the same 
level and approach major issues of distribution more or less at the same time, this 
might not be practical as more often than not, at least one user group is already 
fairly organized and has some vague or valid experience in the business. There 
are cases where local groups of users either begin from scratch, or refine existing 
local institutions to engage with external groups in co-management. The case 
studies in this thesis could well be examples of such cases, due to the general 
undermining of local capacities that was part of the apartheid system. 
The classic and neo-populist approaches are all basically regulatory in con-
ceptualization of action. Recently, also more market-based approaches have 
developed especially with the diminishing role of the state in NRM. Hence the 
concept of co-management seems to envelope a new identity. Within the new 
political economy where the market rules imperfectly, while still argued to be 
better than ‘imperfect states’, (Carney & Farrington 1998; Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 
1997), there are attempts to harmonize roles and interests of various actors, 
including public, non-governmental and local inhabitants. Because of the multi-
plicity of interests, the focus moves away from natural resources as a simple 
form of livelihood for local communities, a revenue generator for governments, 
and a conservation sphere for environmentalists, to a business venture where 
each party gives to get a proportional return. The emphasis underlying these 
shifts in NRM is placed within the recent promotion in development circles of 
sustainable use as a way of ensuring that all actors benefit from natural resources.  
In privatizing natural resources, concepts such as public-private-community 
partnerships have emerged to define the current political economic reality 
through the separation of roles of the state and the market, and more recently the 
acknowledgement of their interdependence. However, these recent approaches 
have not been without debate and intense criticism on their intentions, processes 
and impacts. 
The neo-liberal approach: General aspects 
Economists have dominated the debate on what the relationship between the state 
and the market should be. The general view of neo-liberal economics renders the 
state as inferior, inefficient or sometimes incapable, when compared to the 
market, in managing key economic sectors of a nation state. While the market 
boasts huge finances and advanced human resource capacities all focused on 
making enterprise more profitable, the same cannot be said of the state, espe-
cially when it purports to own, produce, and market, and at the same time 
regulate and advise. These dual roles are seen as conflicting by opposing critics 
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and observers, and are subsequently a hindrance rather than a benefit to the 
dynamics of the market. Hence proponents of the market economy advocate 
reduced regulations to facilitate easy movement of trade and finances across 
borders, as well as the removal of state subsidies and price control on certain 
goods. Simply, the neo-liberal school of thought demands less state in the 
economy, a process they recommend, can be achieved through divestment of 
state-owned enterprises to private hands, thus rendering more power to market 
forces. With such autonomy, the market is believed to have the ability to self-
regulate, set commodity prices and make available products in line with prevail-
ing demands. The market also generates the most efficient allocation of resources 
hence it is the best guarantee for economic growth. This does not necessarily 
generate equity, however, as in many cases the poor become poorer in the 
process. The usual balancing act for most governments therefore involves the 
market operating within state regulation, while state-based safety nets are insti-
tuted for the poor. 
Privatization per se involves a redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of 
the public sector, and the question of ownership of assets is central to the 
process. Sheshinski (2003) identifies a wide range of objectives for privatization. 
He asserts that fundamentally, privatization seeks to enhance micro-economic 
efficiency, which he argues, is seldom achieved in public-owned enterprises 
because of lack of competition, and hence the absence of the threat of takeover 
due to non- trading on the market, unlike their private sector counterparts. Ineffi-
ciency translates to poor turnover and undermines the extension of incentives 
necessary to motivate management. The assumption of privatization theorists is 
that turning these potentially productive assets from public ownership into 
private property is a necessary first step in increasing efficiency and profitability. 
Recent literature, interestingly from the World Bank, indicates that this is not 
always the case (Stigliz 2002). 
Public ownership of enterprises often means that there is a degree of political 
influence on management. Sheshinski (2003) argues that such political influence 
negatively impacts on management, their performance, motivation and decision-
making processes. The second assumption maintains that since private enterprise 
does not have to be subjected to political patronage, they are more likely to 
adhere to set objectives and achieve their goals, a view that further validates the 
transfer of ownership to the private sector. 
While several states in both developed and developing countries have applied 
these theories to their macro-economic policies, privatization exercises have 
often been undertaken in stages, sometimes cautiously since there are acknowl-
edged downsides such as loss of employment that would lead to unfavourable 
political consequences for government. Certain countries have avoided blanket-
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type privatization exercises, instead concentrating on partial privatization in the 
midst of criticism that such firms have recorded lower profitability and produc-
tivity when compared to fully privatized ones (Sheshinski 2003). However, there 
are often competing demands, both economic and political that are more often 
that not, a dichotomy rather than a complementarity, and therefore requires that a 
balance is found while setting privatization objectives in specific countries.  
The neo-liberal approach in natural resource conservation 
In natural resource conservation, there has been significant progression from the 
paternalistic fortress systems where preservation of nature enjoyed prominence 
over their use for livelihoods. Blaikie & Jeanrenaud (1997) note that this shift 
away from strictly protected and state-managed (classic) approach to conserva-
tion changed, to recognize people as partners (neo-populist) not only in efforts to 
preserve biodiversity, but also to use these in a sustainable way for their liveli-
hoods. Within the realm of neo-liberal economic approach to conservation, the 
element of a people-inclusive process is borrowed from the neo-populist school, 
but at the same time, the commercial value of such resources are also empha-
sized: hence, the neo-liberal position goes further to assert the role and hegemony 
of the market in natural resource regulation and management. 
The neo-liberal view therefore requires that the state, in light of its presumed 
inability to manage natural resources, transfer these to the market, preferably 
through outright sales or privatization. The market in turn would inject the 
required capital that the state lacks, and at the same time use economic incentives 
to entice acceptable human actions and thereby control unsustainable exploita-
tion. 
The incentive-based neo-liberal approach to conservation seems to address 
some of the issues related to “productive use values” (Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 
1997) of natural resources, but does not engage how non-marketable species and 
systems can be protected. It also perpetuates a rewards system in which actors 
conserve and use wisely because of the tangible, tradable benefits they derive 
from the resources. To a point, therefore, the multiple actors and their multiple 
uses of the resources are acknowledged as opposed to the equally, if not more, 
beneficial but non-valued aspects of biodiversity. 
The said changes from state control to market-based approaches cannot be 
explained by a single reason. Although there are numerous cases of the state’s 
failure in managing natural resources, either due to inadequate capital and incen-
tives, inefficiency, or corrupt practices, political changes towards democratiza-
tion in developing countries have also helped to open up areas such as the natural 
resource sector to multiple uses (see Venema & van den Breemer 1999). Democ-
ratization is then perceived not only as affecting the political space but the 
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economic sector as well. Changes in conservation strategies are then intrinsically 
linked to political and economic change both nationally and internationally 
(Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997). 
Subsequent broadening of the conservation arena to include more actors 
ignites competition between the needs of the market as well as socio-political 
imperatives. As clearly summarized by Blaikie & Jeanrenaud (1997: 52), “differ-
ent actors appropriate different values from different aspects of biodiversity, and 
gain access to different functional benefits”. But the financial and technical 
ability of the market elevates it to a more advantageous position to secure the role 
of owner and manager. The capabilities of the market do not generally make it a 
better natural resource manager when compared to other systems such as state or 
community-based ones, as issues of graft and unacceptable resource utilization 
also occur in market-led entities. However, the strength of their combined 
resources gives them an edge over the ideological debates. 
In conclusion, if we take into account the growth of co-management in natural 
resource management and the direction it has taken, there is reason to enrich its 
meaning and scope in order to have a holistic understanding of the concept. The 
fact that the market has infiltrated an arena in which the state had been the main 
player for a period of time, justifies this redefinition. Jeanrenaud & Blaikie 
(1997: 61) present a three-stage model that details the three major approaches to 
conservation; the classic approach, the populist and the neo-liberal approach. In 
this thesis, I modify this model by first creating a distinction between the regu-
latory and economic approaches, the classic and populist schools belonging to 
the latter, and the neo-liberal view corresponding to the former. Secondly, I 
demonstrate where along the actor-continuum the concept of co-optation of 
community fits, taking into account the progression from classic through neo-
populist to the neo-liberal economic approaches. In the end, I redefine the 
concept of co-management to encompass dynamics beyond the state and local-
based actors to include supra-local economic actors as well. Figure 6 simplifies: 
 Classic Populist Neo-liberal 
Style of policy Regulatory Regulatory Economic 
Focal sector Supra-local Local Market-based 
Policy psyche Paternalistic Community 
optimism 
Market and NGO 
optimism 
Community 
relations 
Outreach to 
community 
Community as 
central actors 
Co-optation of 
community 
Figure 6 NRM paradigms 
Source: modified from Blaikie & Jeanrenaud (1997). 
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A Review of empowerment literature and theory 
The notion of empowerment can be best understood within the broader concept 
of societal transformation. Broadly it implies a diffusion of power, whether social 
or economic, through concerted instruments and strategies to those who lack it or 
are unable to access it due to certain structural barriers. The assumption here is 
that somewhere along the social processes, a particular social group has been left 
out of the mainstream processes of development, and lost the capacity to re-enter 
this process. Empowerment efforts seek to restore equity and social justice for 
those who have undergone a certain amount of exclusion.  
In literature debating empowerment theory, writers have approached the dis-
cussion from different perspectives. While some have laid emphasis on empow-
erment of the individual through increased conscientization and knowledge 
(Batliwala 1997; Sen 1997), other writers have prioritized a focus on collective 
empowerment as opposed to an ‘atomized’ individualist approach (Herrick 
1995). There have also been attempts to bridge the two approaches by portraying 
them as interconnected parts that require simultaneous attention (Rowlands 
1997). Simplified, the collectivists maintain that the individualist view of 
empowerment ignores the role of structures that facilitate access and control of 
resources. Individualists question the effectiveness of material access and con-
trol, when unaccompanied by improved self-consciousness and knowledge that 
would sustain material acquisition. These arguments seem to regard actors and 
structures as isolated, autonomous parts and hence they both downplay the 
linkages that may exist between the two.  
This diversity in the discussion is also manifested in the fact that several 
academic disciplines have analyzed and applied the concept within their own 
fields of analysis. While the disciplines of social work and psychology pioneer 
the focus on the individual’s self-consciousness as a way to empowerment (Lee 
2001), organizational studies tend to narrow it down to human relations and 
increased delegation of work and authority at the workplace as a means to 
empowerment (Boje & Rosile 2001). Development theorists perhaps have a 
wider space for this discourse, encompassing empowerment in the general 
context of gender studies (Batliwala 1997; Rowlands 1997), race relations (Bobo 
& Gilliam 1990), poverty (Sen 1997), or governance (Stewart 2000).  
The tendency to discuss empowerment from numerous perspectives suggests 
that definitions, meanings and operationalization are not only different, but also 
relatively unique to their individual spaces. In concurring with writers who have 
emphasized a clearer understanding of empowerment, such as Batliwala (1997) 
and Rowlands (1997) who argue against the perpetuation of its ambiguity 
through definitions that are inadequate or too general, it is also equally important 
in this understanding to isolate and identify the type of power in question, as 
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explored later in this section. Evidently empowerment by its semantic construc-
tion implies a process where power is central. To understand the process of 
empowerment first requires a critical understanding of power. From a broad 
perspective, I first review some debates of empowerment as theory, before 
indulging in its pragmatic reconstruction and positioning within this thesis.  
A number of scholars have approached empowerment as basically concerned 
with the “forces of discrimination and oppression as they impact individuals and 
groups” (Deutchman 1991: 1). While this approach challenges existing social 
relations, empowerment theory particularly responds to “society’s failure to 
adequately and equally meet the needs of all its members”. Deutchman has 
further argued that empowerment refers to people’s abilities, whether at individ-
ual or group level, to access and control resources. However, this conception of 
empowerment as a struggle for access and control of resources is found to be 
problematic, with some empiricists arguing that there is no obvious relationship 
between access/control of resources and increased empowerment (Batliwala 
1997). Batliwala’s observation refutes simple changes in ownership and control 
structures without a meaningful re-examination of the ideology that informed the 
perpetuation of inequalities in the first place. Without confronting such ideolo-
gies, which are entrenched in the thinking of both the powerful and the power-
less, being resourceful alone is not effective; even those dominated can perpetu-
ate their own subordination and that of others around them. The point Batliwala 
makes, although she argues within the framework of gender analysis, is similar to 
that advanced in other disciplines, such as social work that calls for self-
consciousness of those who perceive themselves to be oppressed as a prerequisite 
to understanding and subsequently resisting ideologies that inform such discrimi-
nation. Resisting and dismantling unequal power relations, she says further, is a 
complex process as inequalities are reproduced at several levels whether through 
the family, education system, religion and even economic, political and legal 
structures.  
Batliwala’s understanding of empowerment in the light of such complexities 
demands a multi-level approach, whether in theory or praxis, to the question of 
empowerment. Thus she asserts that empowerment “is a process which changes 
existing power relations by addressing itself to three dimensions: material, 
human and intellectual resources.” While it is arguable from the literature if 
access and control of resources is a central component of empowerment, the 
point of intellectual resources that Batliwala (1997: 2) adds in her analysis has 
not received as much attention. Intellectual resources in this case imply “knowl-
edge and information (…) and the capacity to have ideas and think in new ways”. 
In this thesis therefore, while I try to apply the concept I rely, to some extent, on 
Batliwala’s three-dimensional levels while arguing that in the case of South 
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Africa, and specifically based on evidence from my case studies, acquisition of 
intellectual resources seems crucial to sustain access and control of material 
resources. I argue that raising the level of skills, concentrating on improving 
competency and encouraging innovation would boost economic integration and 
sustain empowerment of black people in South Africa. Therefore views of 
empowerment as only, or mainly, concerned with control and access are inade-
quate, especially when discrimination has been extended to the point where it 
destroys or stifles structures of producing and reproducing knowledge, and when 
it has been internalized within the existing social order. Perhaps the missing link 
in these contributions is a critical look at notions of will, individual or collective 
self-efficacy and motivation. If empowerment is a strategic process that involves 
developing a sense of added responsibility, then those perceived as powerless 
need to be motivated, willing, and interested in changing their social or economic 
status. If empowerment can be transferred or given to a people then are they 
ready for it and all that it entails? 
The notion of ‘internalized oppression’ is a psychological issue that may 
emanate from prolonged domination and subsequent attempts to survive within 
one’s subordinate circumstantial reality. Rowlands (1997) develops this argu-
ment, postulating that while oppression can be internalized through consistent 
messages passed to the oppressed by the powerful - messages that try to justify 
discrimination - this does not necessarily amount to a situation in which there is 
no resistance, but one in which conflicts are suppressed either directly or through 
manipulation when they arise e.g. when the oppressed attempt to develop new 
notions of power.  
The debate on empowerment can also be related to three system levels; the 
individual, the collective and the interface level (connecting the individual and 
collective). It can also be related to types of capital, including economic and 
human capital. Economic capital refers to wealth, ownership of productive assets 
such as land, shares in companies, and reserves of finances. Human capital is 
equated to individual or collective acquisition of skills and capacities, and the 
drive to improve one’s well being. 
Debating power 
In contemporary discussions on power, it is common to encounter references to 
Michel Foucault as a dominant postmodern power theorist. Foucault himself, in 
his earlier writings, for instance in his 1974 book The Order of Things, argued 
that the theme in his writings was “subject and not power” therefore implying 
that the question of power was incidental, and simply a result of his discussions 
of subject. Szakolczai (1998: 1402) rejects the understanding that Foucault 
formulated a theory of power but found rather “his work was an ongoing process 
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of reflection”. Nevertheless, Foucault’s conception of power becomes clearer in 
his later works and published interviews, when he postulates that there exists an 
intricate link between knowledge and power (1988: 106). He argued that ‘truth’ 
for instance is a form of power. In addition, power did not exist in isolation but 
was enmeshed in different types of human relations and actions.   
Foucault’s analysis went beyond Weberian understanding of power as A 
having or exercising power over B, or by definition “the ability to exert control 
over people, even against their will” (Calhoun 2002: 511). Foucault understood 
power as a more complex web of relations, which could not be confined to 
agency and the state. Moreover, the preoccupation with the issue of power, espe-
cially in terms of who exercised power, was not sufficient, if at the same time 
there was no understanding of how such power was exercised (Foucault 1988: 
103). To Foucault power was a concept that in its manifestation employed certain 
techniques and these called for analyses. Resistance was also a central element of 
such power relations. Power permeated all relations whether between the sexes, 
different races, state and subjects or generally in any system where some exer-
cised authority over others. However, his contribution to contemporary social 
theory, which he approached from several angles depending on what his subject 
was at a particular time, presents a point from which writers have managed to 
depart or reconstruct discussions on power. Other writes that have acknowledged 
the role of agency in power relations include Giddens (1984), Rowlands (1997; 
1998) and McGettigan (2002). 
The predominant explanation of power before Foucault’s theoretical ‘reflec-
tions’ was reliant on Weber’s (1948) notion of power as dominance or as ‘power 
over’ (Bachrach & Baratz 1970). Recent writers, particularly on empowerment, 
while acknowledging that power as controlling and authoritative permeates 
human relations, also add that this discursive space can be broadened to include 
other specific problems of human relations that do not necessarily have to be 
analyzed through the lens of ‘power over.’ To Rowlands (1998: 13), the idea of 
‘power over’ denotes a situation where others must have less for the rest to have 
more; this kind of power is exercised either overtly through coercion, or covertly 
through manipulation and creation of other conflicts to deflect direct threats to 
the status quo. Empowerment in a context where ‘power over’ is dominant, in 
essence is inherently threatening to those who are powerful. The justification of 
advocating the use of other lenses for analysis seems to be based on the under-
standing that if power can be understood as a process and conceptualized differ-
ently, then this would amount to less conflict than is inherent in the ‘power over’ 
model. Besides, looking at power through one dominant lens is limiting and may 
exclude other significant variants. 
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Hence the other dimension of power as ‘power to’ refers to the enhancement 
of capacities of individuals or groups to improve their situation whether socially, 
intellectually and even economically. The notion of ‘power to’ as discussed by 
Rowlands (1998) challenges the understanding of empowerment as something 
that can be transferred or given, and posits empowerment as a personal process of 
self-discovery, with subsequent resistance to oppression and the structures that 
support it. This conception, therefore, contradicts the idea that access and control 
of resources on its own can constitute power, but resonates Foucault’s notion of 
power as consolidated through knowledge. It also departs, however, from 
Foucault’s understanding in the sense that it views power as not necessarily 
adversarial. The idea of ‘power to’ presents a broader understanding of power 
than the notion availed through the ‘power over’ model as it encapsulates the 
acquisition of a wide range of capitals, whether intellectual, social, cultural, self-
efficacy or economic. 
Rowlands (1998) further examines the notion of ‘power to’, which she under-
stands as intrinsic to the individual, and by extension the collective, and as being 
able to present possibilities to those lacking power, and enabling them to organ-
ize on their own terms and based on their own agenda. In other words, it is power 
as creating or facilitating motivation, as well as the drive to achieve goals 
without necessarily dominating another. Rowlands’ optimistic view ignores the 
implications that would arise as a result of spin-offs emanating from exercising 
‘power to’. These may enable individuals or groups to emerge as a relatively 
powerful group in their contexts, and hence use this position and influence either 
to enhance their lives differently, or to reproduce a scenario of control and 
authority as described in the ‘power over’ model. Secondly, if this type of power 
is capable of ‘generating’ confidence and drive, recipients become more aware, 
and are likely to confront existing structures that perpetuate inequality. Such a 
situation inherently provokes conflict and resistance against the status quo. 
This notion of power is backed up by Sen (1997), who categorizes the two 
dimensions of power as ‘extrinsic,’ referring to controlling power or ‘power 
over’, while referring to ‘power to’ as the ‘intrinsic capability’ that emanates 
from increased sense of self-worth and awareness, but which expands to enable 
the acquisition of more capitals, whether intellectual, social, cultural or eco-
nomic. He maintains that whichever type of power is consolidated first, they may 
have cyclical influence on one another. Underprivileged groups who acquire 
increased access to resources may develop improved consciousness as a result, 
and vice versa. 
Discussions on ‘power over’ tend to suggest that this dimension of power is 
limited and can be exhausted while ‘power to’ is more sustainable. Distinctions 
in the different types of power may be elucidated in the way that power evolves 
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or in the way it is consolidated (means), but delineations in their end result is thin 
given its cyclical nature.  
Pulling the concepts together: Policy implementation, NRM and empowerment 
The connecting logic between the three concepts is the capacity of actors to 
influence processes of empowerment, NRM or policy implementation. These are 
manifested through agitations to diffuse power, as seen in efforts at creating other 
alternative forms of power, such as ‘power to’. The agency of actors is also 
evidenced in the shifts in NRM paradigms, and the move from paternalistic styles 
of resource governance to styles that co-opt local users. In processes of policy 
implementation, actors redefine policy resulting into non-linear influences from 
below. 
Research methodology 
Case study approach- a justification 
In helping to understand the choice of case study as the main approach in this 
research, I employ Yin’s (2003) three criteria that he proposes as a possible 
benchmark when choosing an appropriate method of research.3 The way a 
question is phrased, coupled with the kind of output a researcher intends, may 
determine such choices. Hence the first factor to consider when deciding on a 
method is the nature of the research question. Questions that require explanatory 
results and which involve ‘how’ or ‘why’ tend to suit the case study and/or histo-
riography as the method. Quantitative methods, in fact, may also be put to work 
for explanatory questions. Inductive statistics that connects behavioural phenom-
ena, for instance tree choices for growers, to explanatory factors such as prices 
and soil suitability, may be a case in point. Such studies can interconnect 
phenomena that are well known and isolatable. In contexts such as this present 
study, where concepts and phenomena are ambiguous, complex and overlapping, 
explanation requires a conceptually much more careful qualitative approach. 
Secondly, Yin intimates that the choice of method should also be guided by 
the amount of control a researcher has “over actual behavioural events” (2003: 
7). Where there is little or no control over events because they are in the past, a 
historical method may be appropriate. This may include reliance on secondary 
historical material in order to access past information, hence contemporary 
events can also be studied as grounded in their historical contexts.  
The third point, which overlaps with the second, indicates that case studies are 
relevant when an investigation involves contemporary events, but where the 
                                                                 
3
  Although Yin (2003) discusses the case study as a method, other methodologists (see Hamel, Dufour 
& Fortin 1993 ) prefer to view it as an approach since it has the capacity to apply several methods 
within a single study. 
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researcher is not in a position to influence or manipulate behaviours. Yin ob-
serves that the two main points of difference or advantage that the case method 
has over history is the option to engage in participant observation, as well as gain 
access to individuals and/or groups for in-depth interviewing. The problem of 
subjectivity and manipulation in participant observation as a method is high-
lighted as a possible weakness.  
In designing this research, a case study approach was selected as the most 
appropriate based on factors similar to the ones above, and also on certain unique 
contextual circumstances. The research aimed to gauge the challenges that 
emanated during the forest restructuring process through the perceptions of 
individual actors across diverse interest groups. Questions around perceptions are 
explanatory, and are best captured through in-depth interviewing using open- 
ended questions, either with individual actors or small groups of actors. The 
intention of the research was to add knowledge to certain theoretical concepts 
rather than to provide statistical generalization. Yin (2003: 10) refutes critiques 
of case studies as inadequate for scientific generalization, stating that like 
experiments, case studies “are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
population or universes”, thus the final intention when employing a case study 
should be “to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to 
generalize frequencies (statistical generalization)”. Also, because forestry is only 
a minor economic sector in South Africa, analyzing the events through the 
general lens of BEE, NRM and policy implementation - concepts that are not 
unique to forestry but also relevant to large sections of South Africa’s society - 
makes all the more sense for an analytical generalization. 
The policy phenomenon studied in this research is a current, on-going process 
that began at the end of Apartheid in 1994, and exists within a broader context of 
societal transformation. Individual actors and institutions that continue to shape 
the process were accessible for information. Because the process is current, there 
were numerous other available sources of information, including frequent debates 
in print and electronic media, in contemporary government policy papers, as well 
as current organizational policies of participating private companies. Such varied 
wealth of information involving multiple interests is best captured by employing 
a mix of research techniques in the confines of a case study.   
The case method was also necessary in helping to limit the operational scope 
of the research. The questions posed in this research could be applicable to 
several economic resource sectors, as transformation traversed each economic 
fabric in South Africa. The forest sector was chosen as a case for two main 
reasons: it presented a rural angle that has been identified, within the context of 
South Africa, as weak or marginalized when concepts such as empowerment 
through alliances are debated and practiced. The researcher also had prior re-
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search knowledge and work experience in the forest industry thus making it a 
logical choice.  
Within the forest sector, the restructuring has been a national exercise with 
several forest businesses competing for state forest assets, making it necessary to 
select only cases that most suited the research questions. To a great extent, the 
pace of the policy process also limited these choices, as only restructured forest 
assets were delineated for research. This gave way to two case studies SQF and 
SFP (see chapter 4 for details on cases) within the forestry sector. The two cases 
differed in terms of the creation of alliances between private companies and 
empowerment entities. While SQF partnered with a black business outfit to 
advance its empowerment credentials, SFP got into agreement with a large group 
of communities neighbouring its forest assets. Based on this difference, the 
research not only feeds into available knowledge on concepts of empowerment 
and natural resource management but to some extent, also presents this knowl-
edge through a comparative perspective. 
In summary, the case study method was the appropriate design for this re-
search due to its flexibility in the use of several methods necessitated by the 
multi-layered nature of actors in the policy process. A strict approach to data 
collection that treats respondents on the same level through a uniform question-
naire would not have been justified in a case with multiple and often subjective 
perspectives on the phenomenon under study. The nature of the inquiry also 
demanded a deeper understanding of the challenges posed by restructuring 
forestry, and called for an in-depth study in addition to the varied secondary 
materials available from diverse sources. The restructuring exercise unfolded in 
real time and the research ran simultaneously, ensuring a continuous amount of 
information and twists in public debates particularly around the key concepts of 
empowerment and natural resource management. Yin (2003: 13) defines a case 
study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident”.  
Pre-existing knowledge and preparation for research
The primary data collection was conducted from July 2003 to November 2004. 
This task was preceded by a theoretical study that explored the concepts upon 
which the guiding questions are formulated. Research interest in commercial 
forestry and communities began earlier 1998, when I was enrolled for a Master of 
Arts degree at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. The research 
output was an analysis of the impacts of contract forestry and their bearing on 
gender relations in participating households. This previous study was conducted 
at forests managed by Mondi and Sappi forests; located in northern KwaZulu-
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Natal, an area that once again makes up one of the two case studies in this 
research. In 2000, I undertook a second related desk study for the Centre for 
Scientific and Industrial research (CSIR-Pretoria) in which I analyzed trends in 
community-company partnerships across several sectors in South Africa, 
including mining, agriculture, wildlife conservation and forestry. Ideas for the 
current study emerged from these two projects. This particular study differs 
somewhat from the previous ones in the sense that it is limited to new forestry 
cases that have come up since the state has devolved its forest assets to the 
private sector, and it is guided by development concepts that have become rele-
vant within the new political dispensation of South Africa. 
The groundwork for this research therefore relied to a great extent on existing 
contacts at the CSIR and DWAF: the latter helped in approaching the two private 
companies SFP and SQF. Yet acquiring approval to study the two cases took 
several months and even with the go-ahead in hand, it was still difficult to agree 
on a schedule convenient for the companies. In case study research, the re-
searcher has no control over the behaviour of respondents, or of the environment 
where data collection occurs (Yin 2003). It is the researcher who gets into the 
territory of the interviewee hence the one who needs to fit into the lifestyle and 
schedule that is made available to her/him.  
Nature of respondents and problems of identification 
The research, being policy-oriented, demanded a multi-level approach in identi-
fying respondents. The targeted participants included the public sector as policy 
administrators across different government departments, particularly those 
responsible for forestry (DWAF), restructuring of state assets (DPE), land affairs 
(DLA), and local government. The primary focus was on two private forest 
companies SFP and SQF who make up the case studies, but information was also 
sought from Forestry South Africa (FSA), an association representing large 
private entities and smaller individual interests within the forest industry.  
Due to the relational nature of the research aims, black representation in 
private forestry was considered an important focus, and these included partici-
pating groups of communities as well as small emerging black-led companies. In 
their localities, groups of communities interested in forestry activities were 
diverse, as they consisted of ordinary people, those in authority under local 
government or traditional structures, and groups with similar associational net-
works, such as teachers, taxi owners (local transport), and workers unions, 
particularly those with memberships in the forest sector.  
Both cases, Singisi (SFP) and Siyaqhubeka (SQF) approached the issue of 
community representation in their businesses differently, and their categorization 
and definitions of community, although often problematic, also had a bearing on 
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the identification of the respondents. SFP had a whole group of communities as a 
business partner which was brought together under the auspices of a community 
trust called Singilanga, and which is fed by two sub-trusts Singisi and Langeni; 
this meant that regardless of diversity of interests or association in the locality, 
these interests would have to be consolidated through one channel, Singilanga 
Trust. This kind of representation makes sense for business, but at the same time 
it attempts to create a sense of community of interest where there may be little or 
none. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the haphazard definition of a community 
to lay the foundation for a business partnership, in itself, was problematic and 
slowed down these processes. The identification of respondents relied on this 
broad membership and Singilanga was used as an organizational unit of analysis 
where community issues were concerned. 
In the SQF case, as opposed to SFP, the structural issues were much less 
complex as there was a clear distinction of the business partner, being a black 
operational business entity, and the neighbouring local community, who were not 
business partners, but were engaged within broader social corporate outreach 
activities. The interviews therefore involved both partners in the business as well 
as selected local respondents as interested parties, regardless of their non-direct 
participation in the enterprise. 
In both cases, the research technique involved direct in-depth interviews using 
a semi-structured question guide with key participants in the processes that have 
created the companies and alliances, as well as group discussions especially 
where local interested residents were concerned. 
In-depth interviews 
In each case study, I employed a multi-level approach to interviewing given the 
diverse nature of actors. At SFP case, I conducted 18 direct interviews. Out of 
these, five were managerial staff members at SFP, five were officials represent-
ing the community trust, two black contractors and six ordinary members of the 
community.  
In the second case study, SQF, I conducted a total of 15 interviews. six of 
them were staff, two contractors on training and seven members of the local 
community. In both instances, the questioning was flexible, depending on the 
interviewee. Although the overall inquiry was guided by two key conceptual 
issues in the research design - empowerment and natural resource management - 
questions that were posed to actors at each private entity differed in content on 
certain issues that were specific to the company, and not necessarily relevant for 
the community trust. This also applied to community issues that were not suited 
for the private actors.  
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It is important to mention that in conducting the research, none of these groups 
was considered homogenous entities. Diversity in perspectives exists not only 
within community members represented by the community Trust, but across the 
different managerial lines within each private company as well.  
At the government departments mentioned above, the combined direct inter-
views amounted to seven. Each government side was involved in the restructur-
ing process differently, while others like the DLA influenced the pace and 
direction of the exercise. In certain departments, I was allowed to talk only to the 
relevant head of department and even then, getting permission to conduct the 
single interview often encountered strict bureaucratic requirements such as 
demanding to see the questions upfront before considering an interview.  
In total, in-depth interviews undertaken were 40, across a wide spectrum of 
actors. 
Group discussions 
Between the two cases, six group discussions were conducted (two with SFP 
affiliates and four at SQF). In both cases, the discussants were local community 
members. The results of the group interviews were aimed at complementing the 
direct interviews, as well as to gain knowledge of issues that were relevant for 
the community as a collective. All the groups comprised both men and women 
but few younger people attended.  
At the SFP case, the low availability of the younger people was attributed to 
out-migration to the cities to seek employment and a better life. The few who 
attended were only interested in issues that had a bearing on job creation. In the 
later chapters, I will deal with the view of the youth towards alliances and the 
concept of empowerment that are driven by what they can get out of the venture 
in the short term, and not in the future.  
Each group interview was scheduled for between eight and twelve people, but 
at times the number expanded rapidly as other people in the vicinity got inter-
ested and joined in.  
In addition, I collected information and took notes where relevant at commu-
nity meetings. Such meetings were scheduled for other purposes i.e. those called 
by the traditional authority or community development meetings convened by 
area councillors or the development wing of the private companies.  
In the group discussions at both cases, a combined total of 120 individuals 
participated although not everyone always contributed to the discussions. 
Print media as a source of information 
The print media acted as a significant source of information that has been used to 
support analyses in the later chapters. The issues upon which this research is 
based are contemporary, and elements of empowerment and partnering between 
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established white and new black business have realized enormous media cover-
age since 1994. Over a period of one and a half years between July 2003 and 
December 2004, I monitored the trends, as well as views and perceptions of 
different writers and key personalities as presented in debates around empower-
ment and partnerships. The newspapers whose articles were reviewed include the 
Financial Mail, Business Day, the Mail and Guardian, the Sunday Times, the Star 
and City Press. Archival material particularly on the process of forestry privati-
zation that is available on Business Day website has also assisted in the analyses.  
Secondary sources 
The research also relied on secondary material sources. These included relevant 
government reports and policy documents. Also reviewed were policy documents 
and annual reports of SFP and SQF. Forestry South Africa (FSA) provided 
information and statistical data specific to the forest industry.    
Problems of research execution and impacts on methodology 
Access to study sites 
As mentioned earlier, acquiring permission to conduct research in a case study 
site is a different task from seeking and obtaining an appropriate schedule of 
interviews with respondents and actually gaining access to them. The question of 
access can be discussed at two levels. First, it is imperative in case study research 
to seek permission from the broader actors, whether it is an organization or 
individuals, before actually arriving for data collection. Due to the flexible nature 
of research methods that are modifiable as research unfolds, it becomes impracti-
cal to schedule each and every interview before arriving at the study site. There-
fore the second process involves using information received from the first key 
informants to redesign the data collection procedure and to further streamline the 
identification of more respondents.  
Drawing from experiences in this research, the said process required reliance 
on people who were familiar with the areas of operation and who had knowledge 
of the type of respondents the researcher sought to interview. Inasmuch as using 
a research guide is often necessary, the strategy inherently transfers certain 
decisions from the researcher to the guide. Due to lack of knowledge of the area 
and the people, the researcher often had to rely on the choices of the guide for 
interviews. It also followed that, because of the spontaneity of certain interviews, 
the data collection strategy also had to be as flexible.  
Access to information 
The interviewing process itself posed other unique challenges. Although only one 
government department had requested the interview schedule upfront, which I 
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explained would clash with my own methods of using guiding questions rather 
than a strict questionnaire during interviewing, and that relied on further probing 
based on answers obtained, respondents from the company SFP seemed to have a 
sense of the questions I had posed in the preceding interviews. Hence there was a 
lot of pre-empting in at least three of the interviews I conducted at SFP. The 
impact of this tendency was far-reaching, given that even within one company, I 
exercised a lot of flexibility in the types of questions I asked, based on the nature 
of work my respondent undertook. For instance, when talking with the manager 
in charge of community engagement, the bulk of my questions tended to do with 
understanding the relationship unravelling between local communities and the 
private company. On the other hand, when interviewing a forester, I would ask 
questions pertaining to access to the resource, their management systems and 
issues of compliance to environmental standards. An interviewee, assuming that 
he or she knew upfront what I would be asking, complicated and prolonged the 
process as in some instances, I was interrupted and not allowed to finish a 
question, and hence got answers for questions I was presumed to be asking, but 
which I did not actually ask.  
The experience above could generally be explained by the corporate culture 
that seeks to speak to ‘outsiders’ with caution and a united voice to avoid contra-
dictions from within the rank and file. Secondly, when the historical and political 
context of South Africa is taken into account, the fact is that it is still difficult to 
bring down the invisible walls that divide black and white South Africa. As a 
black researcher in a predominantly white company, I was considered, by virtue 
of being black, to be pro-government: but this was a contradiction of sorts, given 
that one government department was also reluctant to grant me an interview, and 
asked directly to see the questions upfront. Hence, in the early period of my 
research, especially with the private companies, I was given responses that were 
sugarcoated and not necessarily reflective of the reality of the issues that I was 
researching. Later on, as the research matured and I got to interview other local 
actors, it was easy to understand the political dynamics of the various categories 
of actors and reasons that explained their inclination towards certain viewpoints.  
The private sector is under pressure to realign with new government policies, 
especially those to do with transformation in the new South Africa, hence the 
level of suspicion when one is doing research tends to be high. The misconcep-
tion is that one could easily be checking on areas where the companies are 
underperforming, and that may contravene government policy. Since 1994, new 
policies, such as those dealing with labour issues, occupational health and safety, 
and employment equity have been instituted. One respondent later admitted that 
they were practicing extra caution as there had been instances where other people 
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had approached their companies posing as students, but later turned out to have 
been investigative journalists.  
Relevant government departments on the other hand, were struggling to 
implement the many policies in the face of numerous challenges. At DWAF, 
there was sensitivity around the process of privatization, since parts of it had 
been marred by irregularities in the procedure and allegations of corruption that 
saw the cancellation of the sale of the largest of the forest assets (Komatiland 
forests). A second time around, the sale process was cancelled due to projected 
uncompetitive behaviour that would arise from the sale of the whole asset to a 
single entity. They also had their share of journalists especially interested in the 
forest privatization exercise that had been marred by alleged corruption and court 
battles during the exercise.  
The problems above were partly overcome by continuously explaining the 
purpose of the research as purely academic and promising feedback sessions 
where I would share the contents of the draft report. I also asked for follow-up 
interviews in cases where I thought I could still get more information. The repeat 
interviews were much more fruitful and by this time, I had made more progress 
in winning more confidence of respondents. 
The question of language, the use of translation and tape recording 
The researcher’s inability to understand and converse in Xhosa and Zulu, the two 
languages mostly used in research areas affected the research process to a certain 
degree. The nature of the research questions enabled discussions and follow-up 
questioning that would have been much more effective if done solely by the 
researcher instead of receiving this through a translator. The use of a translator in 
in-depth discussions is susceptible to omissions of certain information or phrases 
that could be significant to a researcher during analysis. Often, the line between 
translation and interpretation becomes thin, as the interview progresses and the 
translator gets too familiar with the research. There emerges a tendency to 
summarize to the researcher or to give an interpretation instead of a direct trans-
lation.  
In order to minimize the limitations posed by the language barrier, the discus-
sion processes were recorded for a complete transcription to be made later. It also 
made it possible to isolate direct quotations that are relevant for analysis and 
write-up. 
Analysis of research material 
The guiding questions for interviews were categorized according to their rele-
vance to the three issues that are the pillars of this study, management, empower-
ment and implementation. In analyses, the responses were similarly labelled and 
coded along the three main issues. Direct empirical quotes are often cited in this 
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text as evidence to support the findings. The empirical chapter 5 on implementa-
tion for instance, relies more on historical and documentary evidence since most 
of it is an account of the restructuring process. In comparison, chapter 6 and 7, on 
management and empowerment both rely mostly on respondents’ accounts, opi-
nions and perspectives. Since there are two case studies, a comparative analysis 
has been done where necessary.  
3 
Policy making and rethinking 
the development agenda in 
post-apartheid South Africa 
The year 1994 serves as a watershed when discussing contemporary policy 
processes in South Africa. The end of apartheid and the dawn of the democratic 
dispensation ushered in an era of vigorous policy overhauls and major adjust-
ments in the way South Africa was run in both political and economic terms.  
This chapter is dedicated to the historical and policy changes and debates that 
form the context of the case studies. It first analyzes the broad policy context that 
embraces all policy issues in South Africa. Because the commercial forestry 
sector is the case study, the chapter follows its origins and growth up until 1994, 
and the changes that have permeated it since then to the present day. One of the 
key issues that South Africa’s forestry faces, like all the other economic sectors, 
is the imperative to transform in a way that is broad and inclusive of all popula-
tion groups. These efforts are aimed at responding to the skewed nature of 
ownership of capital, skills and access to resources. This process is known 
locally as the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Therefore, the chapter ends 
with the debates that surround the process of BEE. It gives a brief insight into its 
antagonistic understanding and shows how the concept deviates or is similar to 
other empowerment practices that have taken place in South Africa in the past, 
and particularly during apartheid.  
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A search for balance: the ANC’s changing policy direction 
Specific sector changes do not happen in a policy vacuum, and other macro 
policies have informed the way that individual sectors change and operate. In 
terms of economic policy, South Africa has seen several shifts in thought since 
the lifting of the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) in 1990. In this 
respect, I give a brief insight into three documents unveiled by the ANC and 
these are MERG, RDP and GEAR. I also present a range of existing and possible 
explanations for these changes, including a brief look at the role of the ruling 
party’s alliance members (the Congress of South Africa’s Trade Unions: 
COSATU and South Africa’s Communist Party: SACP). In part, the influence of 
these left-aligned organizations explains the earlier sentiments that emphasized 
nationalization. Other factors especially pressure from the domestic and interna-
tional business community, in addition to the general prevailing economic 
thinking of the western world, also contributed to the ANC’s shift toward a more 
neo-liberal oriented economy. Hence South Africa embarked on a privatization 
exercise that has resulted in a partial sale of certain major state enterprises like 
Telkom, and a major restructuring of what it calls its non-core assets like com-
mercial forestry. Apart from unpacking debates that dominate such a versatile 
policy environment, this chapter presents mainly an assessment of how the 
broader frameworks of transformation have influenced sector policies and the 
role that the ruling party, the ANC, its allies and other key actors have played.  
As entailed by the Freedom Charter launched in 1955, the ANC and allies had 
long been associated not only with the quest for equal human rights in South 
Africa, but also with the ideology that the attainment of freedom would require 
the consolidation of South Africa’s wealth under the control of the state. Senti-
ments on nationalization are entailed in the Freedom Charters’ preamble: 
The people shall share in the country’s wealth. The national wealth of our country, the 
heritage of South Africans shall be restored to the people; the mineral wealth beneath the 
soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as 
a whole; all other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well being of the people; 
all people shall have the right to trade where they choose, to manufacture and enter all 
trades, crafts and professions 
It was not until 1990, when apartheid government lifted the ban on the ANC, 
that a macro economic research group known by its acronym MERG was 
convened by the ANC. Its aim was to train black economists and to produce a 
document that communicated thought on the economic policy route the ANC 
would adopt on assuming political power. In the late 1980s however, the ANC 
emphasis on nationalization must have been weakening since the idea of redistri-
bution was excluded in its 1988 constitutional guidelines (Davis 2003). The ANC 
was already ideologically divided on this issue given its broad constituency who, 
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although united in the quest for freedom, held more diverse aspirations. The 
make-up of the ANC support base stretched from workers organized under the 
umbrella of the labour unions to upcoming black elites who were interested in 
private enterprise. Padayachee (1995: 2) remarks that the ANC was never a 
“monolithic party” and members often espoused different viewpoints on sub-
stantive policy issues. However, it is of no doubt that the fight against apartheid 
united a large number of oppressed black South Africans, and this is further seen 
in the creation of a successful ANC alliance, bringing together support from the 
labour unions under COSATU and the similarly left-aligned SACP.  
The 1993 MERG document was developed by a group of economic experts 
(mainly of academic orientation), working under the auspices of the ANC 
department of economic planning (DEP) that in 1991 had moved its headquarters 
from exile in Lusaka to Johannesburg (Padayachee 2003). Although it was not an 
official macro economic policy framework, it envisaged a situation where growth 
would be stimulated at a rate of 5% annually, with 300,000 new jobs created. 
MERG prioritized the development of social and physical infrastructures in 
addition to a strong industrial policy (ibid.). According to Webster & Adler 
(1997: 12), this was a “two-phased crowding-in approach to a growth strategy for 
South Africa”. At the heart of the Mass Democratic Movement was the impera-
tive to create jobs and to redistribute wealth. Some of these sentiments are 
expressed in the MERG document through a focus on the labour market, 
improving skills through increased education and training, and also an assess-
ment and improvement of wages (Davis 2003).  
Although there were already reports of some ANC members reneging on the 
idea of nationalization per se, Davis (2003) argues that the document still 
entailed strong elements of state interventionism, especially in the minerals 
sector, and in the future structure of the private sector, particularly in relation to 
the way mergers and acquisitions would be practiced and monitored. Due to 
immense interest in the policy process at this time in South Africa, it did not 
come as a surprise that the document was read and analyzed in quite different 
ways. Some saw strong leanings to the left and support for state involvement in 
the economy, as it entailed “hopes for a social democracy” or “left-Keynesian-
ism” (Webster & Adler 1997: 13). Other analysts saw a reduction in the role of 
the state and the creeping in of neo-liberalism. The document broadly espoused 
an economic path that would be achieved through rigorous redistribution that 
would stimulate growth. 
The MERG document was never adopted by the ANC as its official economic 
policy. The demise of the document has been attributed to the shifting stance in 
ANC economic thought and to some extent on tensions between DEP and the 
MERG secretariat (Terreblanche 2002). 
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By 1994 another document called the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) was unveiled. The RDP became the first official macro-econo-
mic policy framework of the new democratic South Africa. Unlike the MERG 
that was drawn up by a team of researchers mostly from academia, RDP was a 
joint effort of COSATU, SACP and ANC. COSATU was understood to be the 
mastermind behind the RDP, and commitments were made to reform the labour 
market, entrench rights for collective bargaining, and organized strikes by 
workers. Fronting the interest of workers and mostly poor people, the RDP 
reflected on specific issues and set targets for their achievement. For instance, it 
stipulated that after five years, one million houses would be built, targeting those 
who did not have proper shelter, and that 30% of arable land would have been 
transferred back to black people. Specifically, the RDP was concerned with deep-
seated poverty and inequalities that characterized South Africa. It was funda-
mentally inclined towards an economic path that was redistributive in nature, and 
that recognized that economic growth and general development were inter-
dependent and ‘mutually reinforcing’ (RDP 1994).  
In essence, the RDP implied that its priorities and objectives in achieving 
change would be met alongside growth, as opposed to waiting for economic 
growth first in order to reconstruct society. In this respect, the RDP extended the 
line of thinking that had prevailed in its predecessor, the short-lived MERG 
document. Alternative voices that held the view that redistribution should only 
take place after economic growth were rebuffed, basing the argument on earlier 
evidence from apartheid years when there had been significant growth without 
redistribution (Terreblanche 2002). It seemed that the concept of growth through 
redistribution that had dominated ANC economic thought since the advent of the 
Freedom Charter in the 50s, but that some analysts believed ANC was slowly 
abandoning, had been significantly re-ignited in the RDP document. This reem-
phasis can be attributed to the strong involvement of COSATU and SACP. 
According to Webster & Adler (1997: 12), “the RDP originated in an attempt by 
labour to produce an accord that would tie a newly elected ANC government to a 
labour-driven development programme”. 
In spite of this, the RDP entailed significant ideological strides from the left to 
the right, especially where business interests were concerned. Where earlier 
leftist sentiments favoured an upward revision of corporate tax and increased 
domestic savings in order to release funds for reconstruction and redistribution 
(Terreblanche 2002), the RDP talked of “appropriate tax reforms and a review of 
exchange controls along with fiscal discipline (…) to facilitate growth” (RDP 
1994: 9). Again, as in preceding economic papers of the recent past, the docu-
ment reaffirmed the “independence of the South African Reserve Bank, so as to 
ensure that it is insulated from partisan interference and is accountable to the 
52 
broader goals of reconstruction and development” (RDP 1994: 25). In the same 
vein, while increased investment in the public sector was earlier understood to be 
complementary to the private sector in stimulating growth, RDP plans were to 
cut down on public expenditures, especially through trimming down on person-
nel and only replacing 5% of vacated positions. 
Although there were numerous changes, the RDP when read carefully, 
reflected a certain degree of compromise with the major players, especially 
industry, COSATU and ANC were prepared to give and take on various issues. 
The making of economic policy became quite a contested process, since each 
interest group was advocating its own agenda that was, more often than not, 
uncomplementary to the rest. The ANC and allies managed to push through an 
agenda for affirmative action, targeting those previously marginalized under 
apartheid. They also advocated anti-trust laws to regulate unfair competition 
from economic monopolies. The latter was realized through the enactment of a 
Competition Act (No. 89 of 1998) and the launch of a competition commission to 
deal with such cases.  
Business won to the extent that government toned down its intentions to 
increase its role in commercial enterprise, and they also managed to get promises 
for relaxation of exchange controls for easier movement of capital. The labour 
unions under COSATU fought for redistribution and ‘redirection’ of the coun-
try’s wealth to the needy masses, but most constructively, and making a break 
with the past, a Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995) was established that 
legitimized collective bargaining and the right to hold legal strikes. In a nutshell, 
it was clear that in a case like South Africa, one ideological way would not 
necessarily work; hence a whole-scale importation of what had worked elsewhere 
would most likely fail. From the RDP, one can discern attempts at a mixed 
economic system in which no particular interest reigns supreme, there is a give 
and take scenario, and an economic policy constructed from various aspects 
advocated by each interest: but could such a route hold in a historically and 
economically divided country like South Africa, and within a global context of 
neo-liberal hegemony? 
Unsurprisingly, the RDP, like its unofficial predecessor MERG, was ‘re-
placed’ in 1996 after two years, when the Minister of Finance introduced another 
macro-economic policy in the name of GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redis-
tribution). The ANC argued that the new document was not a replacement but 
rather, a complementary strategic document that would be applied to realize the 
goals set out in the RDP. COSATU and other analysts (see Marais 2001; Webster 
& Adler 1997; Davis 2003; Knight 2001) read this differently, regarding it as a 
total turn-around from the RDP that, despite its flaws, had tried to accommodate 
the interests of labour, government and business. GEAR seemed to blatantly 
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challenge the very foundation of the RDP; that economic growth would be 
realized alongside redistribution.  
In GEAR the sequencing, as in the RDP, seemed to reflect the order that the 
country’s economic path was intended to follow. In accordance with free market 
principles, employment and redistribution would be realized as a consequence of 
economic growth. Thus the ANC had finally succumbed to pressure both from 
within its ranks, and from domestic and international business: the proponents of 
the neo-liberal economic hegemony. According to Davis (2003), the ANC’s 
gradual move from the left to embrace the ‘Washington Consensus’ had culmi-
nated in GEAR, which unlike other post-1994 policy documents that were 
opened for public scrutiny, was not up for negotiation, as stated by the Minister 
for Finance. 
While the goals entailed in GEAR were not so different from those in the RDP 
i.e. to stimulate economic growth at a rate of 6% annually, redistribute income 
and land, create employment amounting to at least 400,000 by the year 2000, to 
provide housing and other services, Webster & Adler (1997) observe that it is the 
means through which these goals would be achieved that became controversial. 
GEAR indicated that government would institute tighter fiscal and monetary 
policy, reduce the country’s budget deficit, keep inflation at a minimum, engage 
in a gradual relaxation of exchange controls: amongst measures most contradic-
tory to ANC earlier sentiments was the decision to reduce taxes and tariffs, relax 
the labour laws, as well as to restructure a number of state-owned enterprises. In 
GEAR, the ANC government clearly committed itself to moving out of enter-
prise. The economy would also be outward bound through increased exports: but 
the core of its intentions was to make South Africa appear attractive for foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  
The ANC alliance partners COSATU and SACP particularly resented govern-
ment’s emphasis on the relaxation of labour laws, fiscal austerity and the deci-
sion to privatize major state-owned enterprises. The government had carefully 
evaded the use of the term ‘to privatize’ instead opting ‘to restructure’ its enter-
prises. In part, this pointed to an acknowledgement of the unique situation in 
which South Africa found itself, based on diverse results that would be expected 
from such processes beyond the conventional reasons that motivated other coun-
tries to privatize. For instance, through restructuring, government would promote 
BEE, enable transfer of skills, promote equity ownership and diversify procure-
ment to allow previously disadvantaged entrepreneurs to enter the market (see 
Jerome 2004). Alternatively, the selective use of words was meant to confuse, 
ward off criticism and keep at bay potential discontent, especially that which 
would be emanating from its key ally, the umbrella trade union COSATU. 
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Tightening public expenditure conflicted with expected processes of redistri-
bution to the poor segment of the population. The alliance partners projected that 
privatization would most likely pose negative impacts for workers through job 
losses. On the contrary, more government in the economy would ensure a 
targeted redistribution of resources that was believed to be one way of solving 
apartheid-fuelled economic divisions.  
Government marketed GEAR while still clinging, at least verbally, to the 
economic ideals declared in the RDP. GEAR also magnified the efforts of power-
ful forces, especially from the business sector, that were working behind the 
scenes to protect their interests. Views from the corporate world in support of 
GEAR were consistently advanced through the print media (especially Business 
Day) with the help of political platforms, especially from the mainly white 
dominated opposition parties like the Democratic Alliance. On another level, the 
GEAR debate showed that contested policy arenas have losers and winners, as 
opposed to the RDP that portrayed situations in which every one wins. In fact 
one of the reasons cited for the collapse of the RDP was that “it was too broadly 
formulated and ended with a wish list for too many people” (Terreblanche 2002: 
109).  
Critics have argued that GEAR worked almost perfectly for the business 
community that has continued to support it, even in the face of imminent failure 
in addressing issues that were core of the RDP process that it purported to 
advance. Masiza & Mangcu (2001) and Terreblanche (2002) give an assessment 
of GEAR and why it has worked for some interests and failed many others. 
By the year 2000, successes of GEAR could be measured, based on self-
prescribed indicators that were entailed in the policy document. Terreblanche 
(2002) summarizes these gains as follows; the government had managed to 
reduce the budget deficit to below 3% of the GDP. At the end of 2004, the 
balance of payment was still fairly stable at 3.2%.4 Similarly in 2000, the annual 
rate of inflation was contained at around 6% decreasing to 4.3% by the end of 
2004. Government had also managed to reduce import tariffs to less than 7.5% of 
value imports (ibid.).  
On the opposite side of the equation, the fiscal and monetary stabilization 
successes did not necessarily translate into real benefits, especially those that 
would have been welcomed by labour and their constituency. Instead, the failures 
were glaring, just as had been predicted by opponents of GEAR, especially 
COSATU and SACP. In the year ending 2000, annual economic growth was 
calculated at 2.7%, in contrast to the projected 4.2%. To make it worse, this 
growth was a jobless one as the rate of employment shrank rather than improved 
at the projected annual rate of 3%.  
                                                                 
4
  See South Africa Reserve Bank (2005-04-14) statement of the monetary policy committee. 
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The imperative to attract FDI into South Africa, regarded by many critics as 
the reason for ANC’s adoption of GEAR even to the extent of risking their 
political alliance with COSATU, also fell short of expectations. Despite all the 
changes in fiscal and monetary policy to reflect standards of western free-market 
based economies, FDI only ploughed in R8 billion instead of the forecasted R30 
billion at the end of 2000. Private sector investment, which was expected to 
receive a boost in savings due to reduced corporate taxes and other incentives, 
only grew by a minimal 1.2% instead of 11.7%. Surprisingly, investments in 
state-owned enterprises increased by 13.6% surpassing the GEAR projections of 
7.6%. 
Masiza & Mangcu (2001) injects more substance to the debate, refuting the 
basic assumptions upon which GEAR was developed. They question whether 
there is a causal link between FDI, economic growth and job creation. They 
argue that contrary to conventional economic wisdom that places a causal rela-
tionship between FDI and economic growth, it is a vibrant domestic economy 
that stimulates or attracts FDI and not the other way round. Investors, they argue, 
prefer progressive ‘profitable economies’ rather than move into weak economies 
to be the engines of growth.  
Similarly, they challenge analyses that postulate that increased exports have a 
causal relationship with improved domestic growth, also noting that most 
economic activities, even in developed countries, are largely internal: it is 
domestically successful companies that extend their markets outward, hence it is 
domestic growth that can facilitate increased exports (2001: 2). Once this 
happens, increased exports also are capable of intensifying domestic growth 
hence the effects are cyclical. 
The ANC government responded to the disappointments. Changes have since 
been noticed in terms of increased budget allocation to social welfare and the 
initial slow pace of restructuring and subsequent reverse decision, especially after 
the 2004 elections, not to wholly privatize entities like Telkom (telecommunica-
tions), Denel (defense equipments), Transnet (transport), and Eskom (electricity). 
Although there has been pressure from business and the main opposition 
party, the Democratic Alliance, to privatize, the move has been approached 
cautiously if compared to other changes that were envisioned in the GEAR 
document. So far there has been a partial privatization of Telkom, the telecom-
munications company, in 2003, with a portion of the shares being offered to the 
public through an initial public offering (IPO). A unique aspect of this sale was 
an offer of a discounted 20% on the share price that was only available to persons 
previously disadvantaged during apartheid. To government, this was necessary in 
efforts to restructure the economy and broaden the ownership base as well as 
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reach out to the labour unions and the constituency who were still opposed to 
privatization.  
In the recent past however, the pressure for South Africa to privatize has 
somewhat eased off, and government has changed its stance on the nature of 
restructuring it would undertake, if any, in the major state enterprises. Since 2004 
general elections and subsequent reshuffles in cabinet, the new Minister of Public 
Enterprises (formerly the Minister of Trade and Industry) Alec Erwin publicly 
announced a new government stand, declaring in parliament that there were no 
plans to sell off the four major enterprises as had been expected. Instead, there 
would be concentration on “concessions, public-private partnerships and joint 
ventures” (Phasiwe 2004). Government considers the sectors of telecommunica-
tions, transport and electricity as strategic in efforts to enhance service delivery 
to the populace, hence as a justification: it places emphasis on increasing invest-
ment levels in these assets to enable better service delivery, rather than entrusting 
these roles exclusively to a private investor. Boosting this line of thought are 
recent failures of privatized power utilities in California, scandals and subsequent 
failures of US Enron (Jerome, 2004), and the dismal performance of privatized 
rail transport in Britain. The anti-privatization stance gained legitimacy espe-
cially since the World Bank admitted that privatization has not always delivered 
the desired results (Stiglitz 2002).  
In summary, the search for a balance in South Africa’s post apartheid 
economic policy has moved from a Keynesian welfare model that was envisaged, 
to focus on the poorer citizens and their social and economic needs. The state 
would have a central role in redistribution efforts and generally in restructuring 
the economy to respond to the needs especially of those who did not previously 
have such privileges. Due to challenges ranging from the fall of communism as 
an alternative economic system, a democratic South Africa emerges at a time in 
the world’s history when the capitalist west is able to confidently reaffirm the 
lack of a challenge to their free-market economic model. South Africa, despite its 
domestic needs and the question of which policy route would best address these, 
finds itself in a more complex position with multiple interests both domestically 
and internationally. Subsequently, it embraces an economic model GEAR that is 
understood as ‘acceptable’ to business, donors and international financial bodies. 
However, because of internal pressures, mostly from labour and SACP as repre-
sentatives of workers and as alliance partners, and perhaps because of the inabil-
ity of GEAR to deliver on its promises, recent indications suggest that there are 
attempts, at least in practice, to re-embrace a mixed approach (neo-liberal and a 
bit of welfare) to the economy. Whether the search for a middle way will be 
pursued in a concerted manner and through another policy change remains to be 
seen. 
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From the contrasting scenarios presented above, it is plausible to argue that it 
is a challenge to accommodate multiple interests through a single policy process, 
and often the more powerful interests stand to benefit due to the influence they 
are able to propagate, especially with a powerful media at its disposal.  
For the next section, I discuss how these dynamics in the macro-policy arena 
have influenced the re-writing of other sector policies particularly forestry, and I 
start out with a brief history of commercial forestry in South Africa before 1997. 
South Africa’s forest policy and commercialization: A history 
The colonial and apartheid period 
The first forest plantation in South Africa was established in the Western Cape 
area, then a British colony, in 1876. It was a response to the need for timber in 
the growing colony, and it was also meant to replace the receding natural forests 
that settlers had purportedly found in the cape area (DWAF 2003). As the Cape 
settlement expanded and the mining industry emerged, the construction industry 
also grew to meet these demands. At this stage, the young forest sector was 
mainly geared towards local consumption. By 1910 at the declaration of the 
Republic of South Africa, plans were mooted for further expansion of plantations 
as a national forest estate; this was motivated by the need to gain self-sufficiency 
in timber and timber products.  
In the 1940s after World War II, continued development of the plantations was 
regarded as part of that effort to address the unemployment situation of poor 
whites. During this period, the growing state enterprises and resources were 
being mobilized, in part to foster the empowerment of whites, mainly Afrikaners, 
whose poor status had been exacerbated by the post-war economic recession. 
Secondly, the economy was inward looking, and since there were shortages in 
paper, timber, and other products, and imports were inadequate, the strategy 
focused on local production to meet domestic demand. Developing the plantation 
forest sector also was crucial since South Africa, unlike other countries in the 
region, did not have significant amounts of natural forests that it could rely on for 
industrial purposes.  
With government directly involved, saw milling operations expanded as well, 
and by 1950 private interest in the sector was already significant, with Sappi 
emerging as a major player. Plantation forests by then covered 693,000 hectares 
with 73% already under private sector (Dlomo & Pitcher 2002).  
In the 1950s, as private involvement intensified in the sector, the National 
Party government was hatching plans of confining black people into separate 
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geographic regions called the homelands.5 Forestry was again seen as one way of 
facilitating separate ‘development’ in these areas. Hence a government commis-
sion was set up to assess what role forestry could play in the socio-economic 
development of the homelands (ibid.). Subsequently, during the 1960s and the 
70s, areas of the former homelands of the Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Venda and other designated areas were planted under the administration of the 
homeland governments. These forest assets in the former homelands are often 
cited as having been poorly managed by the homeland administration because 
they served as an employment instrument, hence becoming overstaffed while 
they lost their commercial focus (DWAF 2003). Trends in overstaffing were 
consistently similar elsewhere in South Africa’s public service, and this factor as 
a sole reason is insufficient to explain the poor state of the homeland forest 
assets. In fact, apartheid employment policy in the public sector enabled over-
staffing to solve the white unemployment problem, but this did not necessarily 
lead to the collapse of such institutions. The homeland areas on the other hand, 
were over-populated and under-resourced, as well characterized by high rates of 
unemployment. The poor state of the forests was a reflection of a much broader 
failure of apartheid policy in general rather than a local organizational problem. 
In the then Republic of South Africa, the forest industry continued to grow and 
Mondi, a member of the giant Anglo-American group, also joined the industry as 
a major influence in the early 1960s. Alongside Sappi that was relatively well 
established, they built their own plantations and engaged in the pulp and paper 
industry: Sappi specializing in pulp and paper while Mondi concentrated more on 
pulp and sawn wood production (Ojwang 1999). From the 1970s onwards, al-
though there was an overall economic slowdown, the growth of the sector 
continued into the 1980s, supported by promotional incentives on the bedrock of 
protectionist policies (Bethlehem 1994). The government had started promoting 
export-led growth, and was injecting capital into private sector through financial 
bodies such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).  
Private sector forestry also benefited from tax cuts and while import quotas 
were given and tariff barriers extended, the industry also benefited from export 
incentives. In addition to and consistent with apartheid labour practices, the 
forest sector paid out low wages, but unlike other sectors in which certain 
organized labour practices had been allowed, this was prohibited until 1993. 
Moreover, education of black people was stifled, using a separate curriculum 
called the Bantu system of education that was tailored to create an unskilled pool 
of black labourers. The thinking behind an inferior education system was the 
belief of apartheid architects that black people did not need to acquire skills that 
                                                                 
5
  Homelands or Bantustans were areas declared by apartheid government as self-governing separate 
settlement areas for black people in South Africa’s rural areas.  
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would be more advanced than the jobs that were available to them. The other 
major reason was to insulate the white minority from threat of competition for 
available job opportunities. The effects of Bantu education policy are still felt in 
South Africa today, including the forest industry and its subsidiaries, which 
require but lack specialized skills in many areas. 
As afforestation gained momentum and the pulp and paper industry grew 
alongside it, concerns emerged over the impacts it was having on other resources 
such as water. Because these plantations consisted mostly of exotic pine and fast 
growing eucalyptus, they were believed to be detrimental to water streams and 
other riparian zones. The year 1972, therefore, marked a deviation from a rather 
quiet decade in the forest policy history with the introduction of an Afforestation 
Permit System. Afforestation was then controlled and was licensed only for areas 
that were not considered sensitive, and not close to water catchments areas, 
streams and wetlands (DWAF 2003). Regardless, between 1972 and 1994, 
afforested areas had increased by almost 400 000 hectares and the forest sector 
had become competitive hosting some of the world’s major industry players 
(ibid.) 
Just as forestry was conceived partly to sort out the problem of poor 
Afrikaners, especially those who were residing in the countryside, it is once 
again hoped that due to its rural strategic location, it will be a key contributor to 
rural socio-economics in the post apartheid period.
Reconceptualizing forestry within a new dispensation after 1994 
At the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, the forest sector, like all the other 
economic sectors, had to go back to the policy drawing board to transform and 
function in a way that reflected the mood of change in South Africa. Change was 
specifically geared toward achieving a non-racial society and mitigating past 
injustices as advocated by the first democratic government. The forest sector was 
also faced with the challenge of reintegrating its different strands of commercial 
forestry, indigenous and community forestry. These had been separated as 
emphasis was placed only on commercial forestry to supply the timber, pulp and 
paper industry. The view advanced in the White Paper for Sustainable Forestry 
Development (1996) and the National Forestry Action Plan (1997) was that there 
had been too much focus on the commercial forestry aspect and a subsequent 
relegation of the latter two. In addition, many artificial boundaries existed that 
separated what was then called the homeland forests from the state forests found 
in the then Republic of South Africa. The new forest policy and strategy had also 
to try, in terms of management and control, to reconcile the homeland forests 
with those of the former republic of South Africa that were under SAFCOL 
(DWAF 2003). 
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By this time, the sector had grown into a multi-billion rand industry. In terms 
of ownership, almost 20% of forest plantations were still under public ownership 
while another 10% was under the administration of the former homeland govern-
ments. At the abolition of the homelands, the ownership of the latter forests 
reverted to the National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. Thus in total, 
the state owned about 30% of the total plantation forests with the private sector 
also holding close to 55% and the other 15% held by several individual small to 
medium size growers (Mayers 2001).  
Forestry was also earmarked to embrace issues that it had not been obliged to 
deal with during the previous apartheid era. Apart from reconciling the three 
different strands of forestry mentioned above, the White Paper prioritized the 
potential role of forestry in rural development. It emphasized the link between 
the objectives of the RDP and the strategic position forestry held, especially in 
regional development. The forestry White Paper indicated that in redirecting its 
programs towards the goals of the RDP, it had singled out community forestry as 
one area that, although neglected by the previous policy, possessed significant 
potential especially in terms of rural development and energy supply needs. 
Wood serves as an energy source for one- third of rural households, and it is 
estimated that between 9 and 11 million tons of wood is consumed annually, 
which is nearly the same amount used by the formal forest industry (White Paper 
on sustainable forestry development 1996). 
Moreover, industrial forestry, already a significant contributor to the economy, 
was scheduled to redefine its role, which would be expanded beyond the making 
of profits to include the facilitation of local economic development (LED). 
Already the industry was contributing to an overall employment of between 
200,000 and 260,000 people, half of who were forestry workers. The vision of 
the White Paper went beyond job creation, and saw forestry as “an asset that 
brings with ownership wider responsibilities than the narrow objectives that have 
been routinely accepted” (1996: 4). These wider responsibilities referred to issues 
of local economic development.  
South Africa’s political changes in the early 90s unfolded at a period when 
other important world agreements, especially to do with the environment were 
also taking shape. The Rio summit of 1992 influenced and gave credibility to 
some of the issues that are contained in the forest policy paper. The idea of 
sustainability that gained prominence at the Rio Summit was sold to the industry, 
and encouraged stewardship and a rounded approach to business that was sensi-
tive to environmental and social concerns besides straight business. The approach 
of sustainable development emphasizes the integration of forestry (and other 
local industries) in rural development while creating a balance between the 
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social, economic, and environmental needs at both local and global levels 
(Montalembert 1999).  
Locally, the making of policy involved recognizing the link between various 
sector policies and aimed to promote complementary elements where this was 
relevant, and avoid contradictions between sector objectives. Again, the objec-
tives of RDP acted as a basis upon which other policies would project their own 
issues. The rural development strategy as contained in RDP, for instance 
envisioned the transformation of the rural areas from a situation of poverty, 
inadequate infrastructures, and inequality to a more prosperous future through 
substantial commitment and contribution of rural-based commercial industries 
such as forestry.  
The White Paper on Environmental Management Policy (1997) was soon 
followed by the National Environmental Management Act (1998), and both 
reinforced the significance of broad inclusive structures of decision-making 
where environmental resources are concerned, including forestry practices. The 
forest policy, then, would not act in isolation, but was complemented by other 
policies, especially those that had links to natural resources and regional 
development; but there were also cases where it was clear that conflicting issues 
and constraining factors were difficult to avoid.  
The new National Water Policy (1997) entailed potentially direct impacts on 
the way forestry would be managed. South Africa is relatively poor in water 
resources, and studies indicate that afforestation activities, especially those that 
involve exotic tree species prevalent in commercial forests, are capable of 
significant reductions in natural stream flows (National Forestry Action Plan
1997). The forest policy paper observed that in 1986 alone, industrial forest 
consumption of water was estimated at 1.2 billion cubic meters amounting to 
approximately 30% of the amount used for urban and industrial activities or 
about one-tenth of water used for irrigation (White Paper on Sustainable 
Forestry Development 1996). The National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998) provides 
legislation for the administration and issuance of afforestation permits under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Water Affairs. Success or failure of applications 
to afforest is based on projected reductions in stream flow that individual cases 
posit. The policy also provided for use of an environmental impact study where 
this would be deemed necessary.  
The forest industry has increasingly found fault with the afforestation permit 
system (APS), citing numerous hitches and delays in the process that interferes 
with afforestation opportunities. Further, since forestry, as opposed to other land 
and water users, is so far the only sector whose activities are monitored, they 
argue that the law has singled them out in what amounts to discrimination 
without adequate scientific evidence (FSA 2004). 
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The Restitution of Land Rights Act (No. 22 of 1993) also posed significant 
influence on the direction of new forest policy. From the Freedom Charter to the 
RDP, the South African land problem recurred as a key issue that the new 
government would have to tackle. The land question had long become a human 
rights issue given the history of forced removals and dispossessions at the height 
of apartheid. Besides, it has been one of the most emotive issues in Africa’s 
colonial and post-colonial history. The current forest policy recognized the land 
problem, more so because, in many instances, afforestation had taken place after 
forced removals of groups of black people from their lands. The Act enabled 
those who were removed under the racially discriminatory laws to be restituted 
or paid compensation. Several claims were made both in state forestland and in 
private forests. For the state, contradictorily, the claims process constrained its 
intentions to devolve itself from ownership of forests, as the law prohibited sale 
of any land under claims. 
All these policies notwithstanding, the state forests had been earmarked for 
restructuring that would involve government transferring its assets to private 
interests, while at the same time fulfilling the RDP objectives of advancing the 
goals of empowerment, such as broadening ownership of capital, improving the 
skills of black people, creating more opportunities for enterprise, and enhancing 
employment equity. Coincidentally the GEAR document that committed govern-
ment to privatizing some of its assets was released in June 1996, three months 
after the White Paper on Sustainable Forestry Development. While restructuring 
forestry was already a foregone conclusion, by the time the GEAR document was 
unveiled, it served to legitimize further the idea of reducing direct government 
involvement in the sector.  
Privatization sentiments in forestry had in fact preceded policies developed 
within the new South Africa. In an apparent move towards privatization of 
forestry, a Forest Bill had been introduced in parliament towards the end of 
apartheid in 1989 to allow for the commercialization of forestry assets that were 
under public ownership (Dlomo & Pitcher 2002). The assets would remain under 
the national forests authority, but they would employ acceptable accounting 
procedures similar to those of the private sector. In 1992, a corporation named 
South Africa Forest Company (SAFCOL) was created to isolate the commercial 
components of forestry and to manage its own workforce away from mainstream 
public service. Some critics viewed this process as less than adequate arguing, 
inter alia, that the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry was ill equipped to 
manage state forests as a commercial operation, and hence it was important to 
explore other alternatives. By extension, SAFCOL was also regarded as an arm 
of the government that it could possibly still use to interfere in the forest business 
(National Forest Action Plan 1997). 
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Within the new South African context, key reasons for privatizing were 
similar to other privatization exercises elsewhere, including the need to intensify 
the competitiveness of the industry, attract needed investment and increase 
efficiency by enabling more private sector players, while reducing the involve-
ment of the state. However, this particular privatization exercise presented 
opportunities for not only broadening private sector participation but also an 
avenue through which to address issues of inequality with which post apartheid 
South Africa was confronting. In this regard, forestry became important at two 
levels; like any other asset that government was selling, the process would be 
used as an instrument to enable entry of interested black business people or 
entities, and secondly, because forestry was rural-based, local communities had 
the opportunity to organize themselves and participate in one way or the other in 
the forest economy. 
One particular instrument, among several, that is being used in efforts aimed at 
transforming the economy of South Africa especially in terms of bridging 
inequalities either in capital or skills, is the process of a broad based economic 
empowerment of people who were historically denied these rights. It is also one 
particular instrument that affects forestry, making it an interesting concept to 
study because of its broad application in South Africa’s society. Locally known 
as BEE (Black Economic Empowerment), its conceptualization and the debates 
around it are presented in the next sub-section. Needless to say, it is another 
contested policy process in transforming South Africa, with opponents generally 
holding the view that it promotes apartheid in reverse to benefit only black 
people, and should be discontinued, while its architects insist that the debate 
should not revolve around whether it should be discontinued or not but on how to 
ensure a “progressive and democratic agenda for BEE” (Montlanthe 2005). BEE 
is one particular instrument that affects forestry. Its broader application in South 
Africa’s society makes the forestry sector study more grounded and relevant. 
Understanding the concept of empowerment in the South African 
context  
Broad based black economic empowerment (BEE) is a relatively new concept in 
South Africa having been introduced at the beginning of the democratic dispen-
sation. This subsection introduces its understanding from a policy perspective.  
The broad-based BEE Act (2003, p. 5) defines BEE as “the economic empow-
erment of all black people including women, workers, youth, people with dis-
abilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-
economic strategies that include, but are not limited to 
• Increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control 
enterprises and productive assets; 
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• Facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive 
assets of communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective 
enterprises; 
• Human resource and skills development; 
• Achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and 
levels in the workforce; 
• Preferential procurement; and  
• Investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people” 
Drawing from this elabourate definition of the BEE process, it is possible to 
discern underlying elements of notions of development, redress and social 
justice. Mazrui (2003)6 equates the process to that of economic democratization, 
following on the successes of political democracy in the new South Africa. It is 
this idea of democratizing the economy through legislative processes, being 
somewhat contrary to principles of predominant neo-liberal economics of market 
driven processes that has sparked much debate on this model of empowerment.  
BEE is marketed as a voluntary activity for business, unless such transactions 
involve public goods where government has a say and leverage. In this scenario, 
business has to show that they comply with government’s vision for societal 
transformation. These involve reflecting compliance to the various categories of 
BEE as outlined in the BEE codes of good practice. Apart from a government 
initiated scorecard that gives a percentage weight to each component of BEE, 
industry in association with other interest groups, has the leeway to draw up their 
own sector charters. These charters outline strategies, detail timeframes and 
weigh targets for achieving BEE goals for each component, whether in skills 
development, managerial occupancy, or ownership etc. Companies are also 
required when tendering for government contracts to show that they comply, and 
outsource from companies who also comply. Perhaps what is interesting is the 
idea of, on one hand, the voluntary nature of BEE, and on another hand, its 
snowballing effect of compliance, especially for those who want to do business 
with government. Thus government has arm-twisted business into its transfor-
mation agenda. However, the strongest motivation, and possibly one that could 
be more appealing to business, is the fact that the spending power of black 
consumers in South Africa has significantly increased, and is on an upward trend 
according market reports (Bisseker 2005; Nieftagodien & van der Berg 2007). 
Hence it makes business sense to tap into this vast market, and this also includes 
enabling and supporting entrepreneurial opportunities to groups and individuals 
within the black community.  
                                                                 
6
  Mazrui, A. cited in South Africa’s weekly Citypress on 21 September, 2003. 
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Unlike other debates on power (see chapter 2) that revolve round the prioriti-
zation of ‘power to’ which Sen (1997) refers to as intrinsic power or ‘power 
over’ or extrinsic power, South Africa’s efforts to transfer economic power is 
confronted by a lack of skills i.e. intrinsic power necessary for the acquisition of 
extrinsic or material power. Because the focus is on black people owning and 
controlling key economic sectors, some of which require specialized expertise, 
and due to the legacy of an education system that did not produce a pool of skills, 
contestation has been on whether the empowerment process should not have 
focused on creating skills first before concentrating on acquisitions.  
However, the careful wording of the policy definition of BEE as employing 
“integrated socio-economic strategies” rebuts arguments that tend to prioritize 
certain aspects of BEE over others, for instance the issue of ownership vis-à-vis 
entrepreneurial skills development. In other words, there are multiple simultane-
ous approaches to advancing the objectives of BEE, and thus according to this 
political view: arguments that call for skills development before emphasis on 
ownership and entrepreneurial engagement of black people do not conform.  
The concentration of public debate on just the ownership aspect of BEE can be 
attributed to the earlier stance of the African National Congress (ANC), 
perceived as eager to nationalize key economic sectors. When ANC abandoned 
the idea of nationalizing key enterprises in 1994, the concept of black economic 
empowerment had already been mooted. In fact, when the fall of apartheid 
seemed imminent in the late 1980s, white business were already looking for ways 
of surviving under a new dispensation; hence some critics have viewed BEE as a 
creation of white business to camouflage their continued economic domination 
(Mbeki 2003). However the non-homogeneity of South Africa’s business 
community was exemplified as the BEE concept provoked fear and anxiety 
among certain business owners who saw it as simply nationalization by another 
name. These fears have been exacerbated by the fact that the biggest BEE trans-
actions, especially in mining and financial services sectors, have involved a small 
clique of black business people who have close links to the ANC government.  
At its inception, two opposing views have developed around BEE, with its 
architects supporting and promoting its merits while dissenting views have 
likened it to reverse apartheid, and as a practice that disadvantages the white 
population. Its proponents view it as necessary in mitigating the legacy of dis-
crimination resulting from apartheid.  
There are also moderate viewpoints, especially from the trade unions, that 
although they are in support of economic redress in South Africa, they also view 
BEE in its current form as inadequate in reaching the black poor who are most in 
need of such intervention. Instead, they argue, the current BEE selects a few 
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politically connected black individuals and elevates them to the upper class 
through acquisitions, often multiple, of shareholdings in existing enterprises. 
Whether the debate has taken a political or economic dimension, both quite 
relevant, the central issue that triggers such antagonism is the question of post 
apartheid power relations and how these are conceptualized at different levels of 
the political and economic landscape of South Africa. 
The divided nature of South Africa’s economy along racial categories to some 
extent has shaped the direction of debates that surround BEE. Such distinctions 
are also no longer absolutely confined along racial divisions, but are emerging 
along class lines as well. Further polarization in perspectives are also evident 
between owners of capital and government, between government and trade 
unions, or even between different political parties, for instance the ANC as the 
ruling party and the Democratic Alliance (DA), which is the main opposition 
party. The process is understood differently depending on one’s inclination, and 
this determines how one visualizes its impact and risks or the costs and benefits 
associated with it.  
To understand empowerment as a political and economic process in South 
Africa also requires an understanding of the history of South Africa in totality. 
There have been arguments that empowerment efforts in South Africa are not 
taking shape for the first time, but comparisons could be made to previous 
processes during apartheid. The difference now, as mentioned earlier, is on its 
scope, since previous practices that were geared toward white empowerment 
focused on a minority. Conversely, black empowerment tilts the trend to benefit 
the majority population group. Secondly, and arguably, there is an element of 
negotiation as opposed to coercion and disenfranchisement of one group to favor 
another, as happened during the period under apartheid. For businesses for 
instance, adhering to the BEE codes of good practice is a voluntary activity but if 
the business transaction involves the public sector, then interested parties gain 
mileage and are advantaged during the tendering process if they can demonstrate 
compliance to BEE requirements. 
The BEE debate thus far perpetuates two controversial arguments. On one side 
is the individualist view that maintains that the creation of a few influential and 
rich black business people is instrumental in advancing BEE. Complementing 
this view is the notion of targeting and creating a black middle class to compete 
with established white business. The emancipation of the larger black constitu-
ency would be done largely, not via the BEE route, but through other poverty 
alleviation strategies and improved service delivery. This individualist view of 
empowerment is different from the one Rowlands (1997) discusses, which places 
primacy on the notion of ‘power to’, in other words, power that is able to 
improve people’s capacities without necessarily undermining another section of 
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the population. Rather, the individualist notion promotes the concentration of 
power in the hands of a few influential individuals from the larger population 
group formerly on the margins of the economy. The individualist perspective 
also presumes that having a few black business people in a realm that is still 
largely white somehow validates white business, especially when engaging the 
predominantly black government. For the white business, supporting efforts of 
transforming and deracializing the economy, even if in a narrow sense, becomes 
part of a survival strategy and their continued relevance and legitimacy. 
The individualists further argue that for the proper dismantling of the old 
power structures dominated by whites, a few influential black business leaders 
are necessary at the macro-level where big economic decisions are made 
(Macozoma 2004). In other words, while all South Africans, especially those 
who were disenfranchised at apartheid, may require targeted economic programs, 
powerful individuals are necessary in the top echelon of business, otherwise 
these structures remain unrepresentative of the majority population group and the 
decisions made may not reflect the needs and interests of this group. In fact, the 
individualists rebut those criticizing the new rich black business people, and view 
their opposition to new black businesses as attempts to keep intact the privileges 
enjoyed by established white upper class. On the flip side of the coin, arguments 
that assume that rich black business people would be representative of black 
aspirations may also be misplaced, as these ignore the dynamics and workings of 
a capitalist system, which more often than not, promote class interests as opposed 
to interests based on race. Again the legacy of racial capitalism in South Africa 
complicates any rationalization that attempts to ignore race as a factor in its 
current politics and economy. 
The broad view of empowerment emphasizes and prioritizes a wider focus of 
empowerment targeting black people as a collective, as opposed to singling out a 
few for personal accumulation of wealth. Efforts at broad-based empowerment 
have not been absolutely absent in BEE transactions, although these were 
relatively minor and overshadowed in the media by debates around individual 
acquisitions and ownership. A broad-based BEE perspective finds favour with 
trade unions and left aligned political parties. Workplace based strategies such as 
employee share ownership programs (ESOP) are some of the models that are 
considered for a more far-reaching BEE.  
A more critical look at the process reveals a deeply contested terrain where the 
media too play a significant role in perpetuating a certain trend of thought within 
South Africa’s public debate. BEE transactions are selectively reported in the 
media, with issues of ownership often the aspect making headline news. At the 
same time, the so-called black elites receive enormous amounts of coverage, 
especially when they engage in equity transactions, while numerous other busi-
68 
ness transactions that take place, for instance in government procurement, 
command minimal mention. One could argue that the media, being a profit-
making business, selects stories that sell their merchandise; but one cannot also 
overlook the fact that the media is owned and run by individuals and conglomer-
ates that have specific interests in economic dynamics at play in South Africa. 
The power relations then take a complicated twist where each interest group 
seeks to consolidate their power, using multiple avenues that can validate their 
sentiments. It is within such selectivity and subjectivity that other aspects of 
empowerment that are equally significant, even when based on value of transac-
tions, for instance, procurement from government entities or those inherently 
positive long-term results like skills development, receive no attractive media 
attention.  
There are also perspectives that postulate that the contradictions and confusion 
posed by the BEE debate emanate from propaganda and power play that charac-
terize most business environments including South Africa’s (Terreblanche 2002). 
While criticisms of the concept of BEE are depicted to come from business, it is 
the same business community that headhunts the same faces of black business 
people who are already in multiple deals. Some have analyzed this phenomenon 
as informed by the need to minimize the risk to business posed by having black 
inexperienced partners, hence relying on the few experienced ones rather than 
testing new ground. Again, prominent black business personalities not only bring 
along their experience into the white companies, but also the political connection 
with which they are associated. The nature of engagement with the debate is 
nuanced, and often contradictory because as business voices its discontent, it has 
at the same time, engaged in individualist type of BEE transactions therefore 
promoting this model of BEE as the most attractive.  
Inasmuch as discussions on empowerment often reflect enormous amounts of 
emotional and subjective perspectives, the private sector within this trajectory of 
politics is at the same time recognized as having a significant role in the process. 
Thus government allays fears and inherent threats to the private sector through 
presenting BEE as good for business, and therefore an investment rather than a 
risk.  In addition, in the face of conflicts arising due to a disproportionate focus 
on the ownership component of BEE, there are attempts albeit minimal, in 
communicating other aspects of BEE, but these do not provoke as much intense 
debate as the issue of ownership.  
The empowerment process in South Africa unfolds amidst immense interest, 
debate and resistance. Resistance in this case has manifested itself through the 
media, political sphere, and through practices at business level that are fraudulent 
and camouflage non-compliance. Commonly known as fronting, businesses that 
are under pressure to comply in order to gain government contracts give false 
69 
statistics, which is a form of resisting transformation in their areas. The BEE 
phenomenon, and especially the way in which it is being enforced using political 
power to enact economic changes, has intensified the conflicts that already 
emerged because of the changing power relations since 1994. Businesses that had 
enjoyed protection during the apartheid period, either directly through access to 
government contracts or indirectly through benefiting from unfair labour 
practices, finds themselves in a new unfamiliar arena.  
Positioning BEE away from the influences of subjective politics is a protracted 
task. However, one significant element of BEE that is overshadowed in analyses, 
and which perhaps would be more integral to the success of the process is the 
issue of skills development. Focus has been on demands for direct economic 
redistribution, while economic integration of black South Africa, which would be 
greatly facilitated through aggressive development of skills for efficiency, is 
deficient in terms of debate. While black empowerment and affirmative action 
are an equity and distribution phenomenon, Economic integration would be best 
achieved through raising competence and skills levels of the populace. South 
Africa’s reality of unemployment, low skills base and general poverty requires a 
shift in focus away from middle class politics to strategies that place emphasis 
and resources on education and skills development. Empowerment or the 
creation of a black middle class remains without a basis if primary issues of 
encouraging innovation, and boosting the skills base do not receive as much, if 
not more emphasis. There also seems to be confusion between economic integra-
tion vis-à-vis economic empowerment, because the latter comes across as a 
forced redistribution and a quick-fix solution to deep-seated economic problems. 
4 
A background into the case studies 
The Eastern Cape study (Singisi Forest Products) 
The Eastern Cape province of South Africa houses the larger portion of forest 
assets held by Singisi Forest Products (SFP), the first beneficiary of privatized 
state forests. The assets that the state sold to SFP include about 60,000 hectares 
of forestland, mainly consisting of a 25-year rotationally planted pine trees and 
one sawmill at Weza, which is situated close to the eastern border with 
KwaZulu-Natal province. The state sold these assets to SFP for R45 million. In 
addition, SFP would pay the state an annual rent on the land of R6 million. While 
Singisi’s three sawmills (Weza, Singisi and Langeni) fall within the administra-
tive province of the Eastern Cape, their plantations stretch beyond the borders 
northeastward into neighbouring KwaZulu-Natal province. Map 2 shows the 
location of SFP’s forest assets that were previously managed by SAFCOL and 
DWAF. 
Areas of operation  
As mentioned earlier, SFP forests, including those that they have acquired from 
the state are not only confined within the administrative boundary of the Eastern 
Cape Province, but isolated plantations are also found in neighbouring KwaZulu-
Natal midlands. The districts covered by SFP in KwaZulu-Natal region are 
Sisonke, Ugu and Umgungundlovu. Patches of plantations extend west into 
Baziya, which is on the southwestern slopes of the Matiwane range near Umtata 
in the Eastern Cape (HMF 2004). In the Eastern Cape, SFP assets are found in 
Alfred Nzo and Oliver R Tambo districts. 
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Map 2 SFP operation areas 
SFP reports that they identified over 165 communities within these districts 
that would be considered as having certain user rights to the forest plantation 
areas, or potential legal rights that are being validated by the government’s Land 
Claims Commission. During the course of research it was difficult to gauge the 
definition of ‘communities’ as used by SFP when they held the identification 
meetings. It was used to refer to interest groups, such as taxi associations, and 
also groupings of villages according to clans. In the final organization of the 
community trust, these groupings have been streamlined, for SFP’s logistical 
operations, to only 16 geographic communities. The limits of the use of the 
concept of ‘community’ for the case studies are elabourated in the next chapter. 
History of SFP 
SFP is a company whose majority shareholder is Hans Merensky Holdings 
(HMH). HMH is the commercial arm of Hans Merensky Foundation. HMF was 
set up in 1972, 25 years after the death of Hans Merensky, a German settler and a 
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minerals prospector turned philanthropist. SFP is just one of several other busi-
ness ventures that function under the umbrella of HMH. There are timber opera-
tions elsewhere in Limpopo and Mpumalanga areas. In addition, an established 
agricultural arm of the company specializing in fruit processing and other agri-
business also operates in the same region, producing a range of fruits for both 
local and the international market. 
Prior to the new forest acquisitions from the state, SFP already owned two 
sawmills within the province namely Langeni and Singisi. Production fibre 
feeding into the sawmills was supplied from the same state forests. The existence 
of these two factories and a history of fibre supply from the state motivated SFP 
to compete for the surrounding forests and assets when they went on sale. The 
implication for failure in acquiring the forests would have been that SFP would 
lose its fibre supply base, and probably remain with two highly mechanized 
sawmills and a significant number of employees to lay off. SFP in this respect 
did not follow the leading forest companies in South Africa like Mondi and 
SAPPI that place emphasis on specialization oriented towards processing. The 
more established forest companies were moving away from being vertically 
integrated towards more specialized and highly skilled activities, not only as part 
of their own restructuring processes, but also as a way of moving away from the 
complicated land tenure issues that South Africa was attempting to rectify. SFP 
had that option, to remain as a processor too and negotiate fibre supply with new 
forest owners. Against this current, SFP decided to hold on to the ownership of 
plantations as an assurance of a reliable supply base. 
The annual production capacity of the Singisi sawmill on average is 145,000 
m
3
, while Langeni takes in 170,000 m3. The newly acquired sawmill at Weza 
presents an additional capacity of 110,000 m3 (Somdyala 2004). At the time of 
the research in 2004, SFP reported that a total of 60,171 ha were under commer-
cial plantations, and the company had 1,845 employees. Before the acquisition of 
the forest assets from the state, the involvement of people living around the study 
sites was minimal, and where present, concentrated on casual or low paying 
positions, both in the sawmills and government forests. Also, those employed 
were not necessarily from the neighbouring areas, but were often brought in from 
other regions. Such practices may also explain partially the skepticism from the 
adjacent communities towards the creation of alliances with the private sector in 
the period after apartheid. 
SFP shareholding structure 
Due to forest operations being largely rural, changes in the forest sector also 
involved addressing the question of the role and rights of communities that reside 
in close proximity to areas of operation. While forest companies interested in 
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state forest assets could team up with partners of their choice, so long as they 
demonstrated that a certain percentage of the shareholding would go to an 
empowerment partner, SFP was the first forest company to opt for communities 
as partner. To SFP, such a move was groundbreaking and unconventional in the 
sense that business concerns often did not want to spend huge amounts of time 
and resources on issues that were basically developmental. On the other hand, it 
was felt necessary to be in tune with the broader transformation agenda, an idea 
that the state was continually selling to the industrial sector. The shareholding 
structure at SFP hence unfolded in the following manner: 
Figure 7 SFP shareholding structure 
What the state actually sold to Hans Merensky Holdings in this transaction are 
the forest assets, including plantations and a sawmill. The land on which these 
assets stand was leased out rather than sold, and this was due to the unresolved 
100% state forests assets 
(Eastern Cape North) 
25% retained by 
state 
75% for private sector 
(SFP) 
65% Hans Merensky 
Holdings + Eastern 
Cape Dev. Corp 
10% Singilanga 
Directorate Trust 
9% workers 
6% state 
10% National 
Empowerment Fund 
Langeni Trust Singisi Trust 
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land claims. Such claims have affected state land as well as private mainly white 
landowners in South Africa. 
As illustrated, 25% shareholding was retained in state hands, although this is 
meant to be a temporary arrangement until certain modalities were worked out to 
administer employee’s shareholding. At the time of this research, it was not yet 
clear how workers would benefit from the 9% shares held on their behalf by the 
state. The National Empowerment Fund, set up to facilitate loans to black entre-
preneurs in order to speed up the empowerment process also draws 10% share-
holding from privatized state forests. Over time, the state will only retain 6% 
shares in each privatized forest. Out of Hans Merensky Holdings’ 75% shares, 
10% were transferred to neighbouring communities through an established 
community trust called Singilanga Directorate Trust. 
The KwaZulu-Natal study (Siyaqhubeka Forests) 
Siyaqhubeka consortium (SQF) became operational in 2001 when it won a tender 
for a lease of state forest assets in KwaZulu-Natal. It is made up of Mondi 
Forests, already operating the forest business in the area, and partnered by an 
empowerment company Imbokodvo Lemabalabala Holdings (IL). Mondi holds 
the majority stake of SQF at 65%, while IL acquired the 10% empowerment 
shareholding (Figure 8). As at SFP, government holds employee shares and those 
earmarked for the National Empowerment Fund totalling 25%. On the other 
hand, IL, a wholly black-owned company, is 70% owned by a Traditional 
Authority Investment Company and Koti investments at 30% (Koti is a conglo-
meration of construction professionals).  
SQF as a company cannot be discussed without gaining an insight into Mondi 
Limited, one of South Africa’s oldest and largest forest, pulp and paper produc-
tion companies. Mondi owns and manages approximately 526,000 hectares of 
land in South Africa and Swaziland. Mondi’s annual production output stands at 
6 million tons of timber, or a third of South Africa’s total production7. With the 
vast forest knowledge and market share, it did not come as a surprise that Mondi 
was interested in acquiring the state forests that were up for sale. Because these 
assets are close to their operation areas in KwaZulu-Natal, it also made logistical 
sense that they incorporate these into existing business. However, the fact that 
the bulk of state forests are geared towards the production of saw logs, while 
Mondi concentrates on pulp making posed limits to Mondi’s interests in most of 
the assets up for sale. Their motivation therefore, was their proximity to assets in 
KwaZulu-Natal, hence areas under pine will slowly be converted to eucalyptus 
trees for pulping purposes.  
                                                                 
7
  Source: http://www.wetland.org.za/sponsors.htm 
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Figure 8  SQF shareholding structure 
 
SQF then came forth out of a partnership between Mondi and Imbokodvo 
Lemabalabala Holdings, a black owned company. IL is the empowerment partner 
in this transaction, in line with government requirements when they dispose of 
state-owned enterprises. According to an agreement between Mondi and IL, 
Mondi undertakes the daily management at SQF through redeployment of its 
existing and experienced staff. Mondi has assumed this role due to its technical 
know-how and long time experience in managing forest operations. The owners 
of IL on the other hand, have more experience in the construction industry and 
also some interests in eco-tourism. Hence, although SQF has been incorporated 
as a separate company, there is only a thin line that separates it from Mondi’s 
organizational culture and policies. Mondi Limited is itself a part of the Anglo-
American group of companies, and its activities are also guided within the 
broader Anglo-American framework. One relevant example of this is their 
approach towards transformation imperatives as discussed in the latter parts of 
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this chapter. Because of the nuanced nature of these companies, it was difficult 
during the interview for SQF respondents to speak directly about SQF as an 
independent company. However the focus of the research remained SQF and 
references are only made to Mondi or Anglo-American when it is necessary for 
the validation of certain facts and perspectives.  
Asset base and SQF unique features 
The SQF forest assets cover an area of 26,783 hectares. The assets were bought 
at a cost of R100 million and as with SFP, the land is leased from the state and 
therefore commands an additional annual rental. While SQF operates from 
Mondi’s offices at Richards Bay, the assets spread from Kwambonambi and Port 
Dunford areas and up till the mouth of the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park, a 
world heritage site. Map 3 shows three main SQF forest blocks. SQF forest 
activities are an addition to Mondi’s core business, intended to increase supply of 
mostly hardwood eucalyptus for pulp and paper products. 
SQF combines conservation and commercial forestry. In conservation, they 
have undertaken to restore the wetland areas encroached upon by commercial 
forest activities, at the same time allowing free movement of wild animals into 
the forests. This activity presents SQF with a unique feature not found in other 
forestry areas. During the transfer of the forests, an agreement was undertaken 
involving various role players in public and private spheres that certain areas of 
the commercial plantations would be discontinued and reclaimed back into the 
wetland ecosystem. At the time of the research, SQF reported that a total of 9,000 
hectares had been added to the wetland area. 
An additional unique nature of the SQF areas of operation is the amalgamation 
of commercial forestry and wildlife activities. This exercise has involved an 
expansion of the park’s boundary into the forests by 15,000 hectares to allow 
more space for movement by wild animals. Thus there are different kinds of 
relationships emerging within the SQF areas, and these include those between 
commercial forestry, a world heritage site and eco-tourism, public and the private 
and, of more relevance to this study are those associations between local 
communities, public and the private sector. These varied relationships may 
qualify as competing interests on one hand, and as mutually reinforcing ones on 
the other. The expansion of eco-tourism activities for instance, may be argued to 
have stimulated additional small-scale trade in local crafts as well as other spin-
offs, while eco-tourism and conservation imperatives per se, may shift attention 
away from community development and empowerment demands. 
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Map 3  SQF operation areas 
Source: Siyaqhubeka Forests (2007) 
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The major difference between the two case studies is that SFP in its business 
collabourates with a community trust that is also a shareholder in the enterprise. 
SQF on the other hand, opted for a straight business partnership with a black-
owned company. SQF engages the larger community that lives within a 5km 
radius of their operations in a more traditional relationship in which certain of 
their activities take place within the local community to fulfil their social obliga-
tions and responsibilities. In both cases the identification and prioritization of 
community groups or groups of individuals to work with has been complicated 
by the unresolved land tenure issues.  
The story of Mandlanzini land claims in SQF areas 
For SQF, neighbouring communities have successfully claimed almost the entire 
area leased out to them. In early 2004 for instance, the KwaZulu-Natal land 
claims commission declared as valid a claim by the Mandlanzini community 
(Legalbrief 2004). They were forcibly removed from the Richards Bay area 
between 1975 and 1976 to make way for the creation of a harbour and the expan-
sion of the city of Richards Bay. Like other black communities who were 
displaced in different parts of the country, the Mandlanzini community was 
considered as an island in between the white suburbs, and this was considered 
inconsistent with apartheid land laws that required black people to live in their 
own isolated neighbourhoods. Hence they were removed from Richards Bay and 
transferred 45 kilometres away into Mtambanana, a rural area. In the meantime, 
Richards Bay grew into a modern coastal city also boasting the largest deepwater 
harbour in South Africa. The city is also home to industries like Mondi Kraft, 
and Richards Bay Minerals. The land claim covers an area of 4,856 hectares 
valued at R390 million and the Land Claims Commission report this as the most 
expensive claim that has gone through their validation process. The claimants 
initially covered 570 families but overall, the beneficiaries are now estimated at 
about 6,000 people. 
The entire area of SQF forest assets fall under claimed areas. While SQF does 
not own the land but leases it from the state, the outcome of the claim is not 
likely to affect its contract with the state. The same also applies to the city of 
Richards Bay, and all the business and activities that the city entails. This is 
because the Land Claims process provides for alternative compensation where 
there is already advanced development in areas that have been successfully 
claimed. The properties leased from the state, such as the forests, are also 
guaranteed by the state as they hold the land in trust for the full duration of the 
contract. Like the SFP case study, legitimate landowners would receive a rent 
that is commensurate to the value of the land in question.  
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The success of one such claim by the Mandlanzini community substantially 
raises their community’s stake in the forest areas too. Had Mondi brokered a 
partnership deal with them, the issue of financing may not have been as difficult, 
as they would have had the option to finance their shareholding using their 
potential ownership rights or rentals that accrue from it. The implication for SQF 
plans for community engagement arises when we consider that Mandlanzini is 
but one community that resides in close proximity to SQF areas. Hence, as in the 
SFP case, the complexity that SQF would have to deal with would be how to 
engage communities, some of whom possess ownership rights, while the rest are 
simple beneficiaries based on their local residency.  
5 
The forestry sale: 
History and hurdles 
Perfection is the enemy of the good. If you want a deal to be perfect, it probably won’t 
happen. If you are prepared to compromise, then you can achieve the deal. 
(Pitcher 2004) 
This chapter concentrates on the role and position of government during the 
divestiture of its forest assets. It discusses government actors, their roles and how 
these fast-tracked or delayed the restructuring process. Causes and effects of the 
delays are sought and explained, as well as their bearing on the start-up and 
progress of SFP and SQF. The chapter starts by retracing the immediate policy 
processes8 that led to forest restructuring. 
Toward forest privatization: The immediate policy changes. 
The Department of Forestry has been in a gradual change since the early 1980s as 
the state explored ways of intensifying the commercialization of its forests9. It 
started in 1983 with the apartheid cabinet recommending the establishment of a 
committee to assess options for transferring commercial aspects of forestry to a 
corporation. In 1985, the state introduced a trading account, which was meant to 
enable more accountability and clarity in terms of income and production costs. 
A Draft Bill on National Forestry Corporation followed this in 1989. By 1992, 
                                                                 
8
  More details on the policy background are given in chapter 3. 
9
  Information on the policy process in this chapter is partly sourced from an internal paper by DWAF 
(2001), History of the restructuring of state forests in South Africa: The Story so far.  
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these efforts had culminated in legislation that would commercialize state forests 
under an incorporated public entity SAFCOL (South Africa Forestry Company 
Limited). All state forests in the then Republic of South Africa, excluding those 
in the former homelands, were placed under management of SAFCOL. SAFCOL 
started active operations in 1993, with the bulk of its expertise drawn from the 
National Department of Forestry. In 1994, at the beginning of the new political 
dispensation in South Africa, the forest policy had to change to conform to the 
new political and economic order. This involved reformulating a new policy 
through a consultative forum whose products were the following: a Forestry
Green Paper in June 1995, a White Paper for Sustainable Forest Development in 
1996 and a National Forestry Action Plan (NFAP) in 1997. It was during the 
same year that, as these policy processes were taking off, the new government 
approved a new SAFCOL board. The former forests in the Bantustans were 
brought under the management of DWAF, while the ones in the former Republic 
of South Africa remained under management of SAFCOL. In 1995, another 
agreement was signed between the government and SAFCOL, which reaffirmed 
that state forestland would be transferred to SAFCOL’s management.  
Amidst all these changes taking place in forestry at this time, community 
forestry, which was previously relegated in policy decisions in favour of com-
mercial forestry, for the first time received special attention in the discussion 
document, the Forestry Green Paper of June 1995. Later, in August of the same 
year, a National Forest Policy Conference was organized solely to discuss 
community forestry issues, and how the interests of women could be included in 
the new vision for forestry. 
The forest policy paper, the White Paper on Sustainable Forest Development 
was approved by cabinet in 1996 and aimed to promote sustainable and equitable 
forestry practices as well as reconcile existing discords between commercial, 
community and indigenous forestry. Around this time as well, SAFCOL was 
realizing profits from its operations, although there were increased concerns from 
other sectors of the industry about SAFCOL’s monopoly in sawn timber produc-
tion. The combined SAFCOL and DWAF plantations were producing about 4 
million cubic meters that translated to 66% on the total national supply (Dlomo 
& Pitcher 2002). 
Intentions of a complete privatization of SAFCOL-held forest assets were 
made clear as the White Paper indicated a reduced role of government in the 
industry, and in the same year a committee was established at SAFCOL to 
discuss the fate of government shareholding in forestry. The White Paper on 
Sustainable Forest Development (1996, section 2.5) stated: 
The Government recognizes the important role of the industrial forest sector in South Africa, 
including the wood processing industries. It currently has a major stakeholding in Industrial 
forestry, as the owner of SAFCOL and the former homeland forests. Restructuring or priva-
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tization of these holdings will be treated in line with overall government policy, in consulta-
tion with all interested parties. 
While the White Paper on Sustainable Forest Development voiced the policy 
intentions, another important document the National Forestry Action Plan
(1997), presented strategies and tools for implementing these policy objectives. 
In the NFAP, the government reiterated its intention to move out of core forestry 
operations and give way to the private sector. This was a fairly straightforward 
intention, especially for the SAFCOL assets that were in good condition and 
were realizing profits. The situation of the forests in the former Bantustans that 
were separately managed by DWAF was more complicated, as they were loss-
making and overstaffed. In addition, significant portions of them were degraded 
and would prove difficult to transfer to private interests.  
Apart from the poor state of these assets, there were interests that were uncom-
fortable with the decisions that government had taken pertaining to forestry. The 
labour unions for instance, were concerned that their unionized workers would be 
laid off as a result of government’s withdrawal from forestry operations. So as 
preparations were underway to privatize, there were parallel discussions with 
labour to reach a compromise on privatization as well. 
In 1998, a new Chief Director was appointed to head the forestry department. 
Within the same year, significant strides were made towards the forestry sale, as 
an agreement was reached between the labour unions and government that 
provided for a moratorium on retrenchment of existing unionized employees. The 
agreement stated that they would remain employed by the new owner, at least for 
the first three years, but there were also options for voluntary severance pack-
ages. The DWAF employees who were managing the assets that were now 
merged with SAFCOL were absorbed into the SAFCOL workforce as well. A 
decision was further made to introduce Employee Share Ownership Plans 
(ESOPS) as a vehicle to enable employees to have partial ownership of the forest 
companies for which they worked. A 9% shareholding in each sold asset was 
reserved for this purpose, although the details of these had not been finalized by 
the time of the research.  
During the same year, a new National Veld and Forest Act (1998) was insti-
tuted and this created a regulatory framework that was needed to move forward 
with plans for privatization. It also paved the way for the development of certain 
criteria, indicators, and standards for sustainable forestry management. In the 
meantime, the viable DWAF forests were categorized as A and merged with the 
SAFCOL ones. They were initially repackaged into seven different geographic 
units, but these were reduced to five when the Northern and Mpumalanga, as 
well as the western and Southern Cape units, were respectively merged into two. 
The five forest assets were offered to the market in 1999. At this stage, DPE 
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entered the process as the government department with the mandate to sell and 
restructure state owned enterprises. In essence, where the sale of forests was 
concerned, DWAF was reduced to a support-role for DPE.  
Policy changes and influence on actors 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry  
From 1999, DWAF’s internal structures included a Restructuring Unit that had 
been created to deal with its role in the forest sale process. Heading this unit was 
a director in charge of restructuring, who reported directly to the Chief Director 
of Forestry, who in turn, reported to the overall Director General of DWAF. 
Under the Chief Director of Forestry, there were four other directorates dealing 
with policy, regulations, technical services, and participatory forest management 
respectively. With at the helm, a powerful Chief Director Ms Lael Bethlehem10
who was quite active in the sale process, DWAF’s Regulation Unit was over-
shadowed in the process, as the Chief Director took part personally in most of the 
crucial negotiations. The Regulations Unit got directives from the Chief Direc-
torate during the early processes and in the end, the first two leases signed with 
SFP and SQF had minimal input from this unit. This meant that they were in 
charge of monitoring a lease in the negotiations for which they had not taken part 
and being the legal experts, they found certain inconsistencies with the first 
leases. In the later leases signed after the internal reorganization of DWAF, (as 
shown in the organogram later in the section) in particular the Amatola forests in 
the Eastern Cape, the Regulations Unit was involved throughout the lease nego-
tiations.  
The Restructuring Unit on the other hand, benefited from external support 
through attachments from United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID). DFID’s first project started in 1996 and its role was to 
support government in putting in place a new forest legislation that was in tune 
with South Africa’s new democracy and new constitution. DFID was first 
involved in the drawing of the NFAP (1997), in which it was explicitly declared 
that government’s forests would be sold.  
With the NFAP complete, DFID became involved in drafting another docu-
ment called the Strategic Options Study for the Forests of the Former Home-
lands. The focus of this document was to highlight ways in which DWAF could, 
as quickly as was possible, divest itself of the loss-making former homeland 
                                                                 
10
  Ms Bethlehem had been a member of the task force that was mandated with drafting the new forest 
policy that culminated in the White Paper on Sustainable Forest Management (1996) and the subse-
quent National Forestry Action Plan (1997), the latter in which plans for forest privatization had been 
confirmed. She therefore came into the department with ample knowledge about the policy direction 
for the department. She was Chief Director of forestry from June 1998 to June 2002. 
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forests under its management, and concentrate on its core business, which was 
now understood as regulation and policy-making. Although DWAF needed to let 
go of these forests, it had to find ways of meeting the developmental demands 
that would fulfil its policy requirements. A balance needed to be found between 
the different competing interests, some of which were developmental such as 
fostering black empowerment, partnerships, and rural development. Others were 
purely economic, aiming to revitalize the business and enhance its efficiency and 
profitability by divesting to the private sector. Initially, there was also an 
assumption that there would be increased competitiveness in the sector if privati-
zation took place, an intention that has not been realized in this particular 
process, as shall be discussed later. These objectives were seen as conflicting and 
there was no straight, single solution that could please every interest. At the end, 
the process involved trade-offs to balance these competing demands. It was after 
this study was completed in 1999 that DFID got approval to set up and join the 
restructuring office within DWAF.  
DFID was under the impression that restructuring of these assets would follow 
their recommendations. DFID assumed that the SAFCOL forests would be 
treated separately from the former homeland forests. This was not to be, as the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) had also commissioned its own study 
through Jaakko Poyry, a consulting company, to look into special development 
issues in the Eastern Cape Province. It is this latter study that recommended that 
the DWAF viable forests be merged into the SAFCOL ones and sold as a unit, 
the packages only differentiated according to regional blocks and quality rather 
than the artificial DWAF/ SAFCOL divide. 
Government accepted IDC’s recommendations and the two processes were 
combined. This move confused DFID whose mandate was to support DWAF. 
SAFCOL entering the equation meant that the cluster of actors that DFID had to 
deal with had expanded. In addition, in order for DFID and DWAF to make 
progress, SAFCOL and DPE both needed to give the same process due attention 
and priority. In as much as the move to merge the two categories of forests 
brought in more interactions for DWAF, its role was already reducing even 
before the real sale took place.  
DWAF has maintained the mandate as the government department in charge 
of forest policy and regulation, and also continues in a monitoring role, ensuring 
that the lease conditions, particularly those that relate to land and infrastructure, 
are adhered to. It is monitoring the new leases through a new monitoring cluster, 
the Forestry Land and Management Unit (FLMU), which operates under the 
directorate of regulation and was created when DWAF underwent an internal 
reorganization.  
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The reorganization of DWAF has seen the restructuring unit, now called 
National Transfers, moved away from the chief directorate of forestry to DWAF 
Operations Unit, but directly under a newly created Chief Directorate of National 
Transfers. The Chief Directorate of Forestry is no longer managing the restruc-
turing of forests, but only maintains an interest through its policy and regulation 
unit. Indigenous forestry, which in the old DWAF structure was under the direc-
torate of forestry, has been brought under the new directorate of National Trans-
fers. 
The recent changes at the department of forestry coupled with the departure of 
the former Chief Director, saw a slow down in the transfer process. All forest 
related matters were previously managed under one Chief Director who reported 
directly to the Director General. Under the new structure, forestry alone (not 
including the Water department) now has three different Chiefs for Forestry, 
Forestry Support, and National Transfers.  
DWAF (2004), in an issue paper, admits that its internal reorganization, which 
was intended to streamline the functions of the department, instead confused the 
various roles of the Chief Director for Policy and Regulation and the Chief 
Director in charge of National Transfers. Hence the forest transfers were further 
delayed. 
Figure 9  DWAF new organizational structure 
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Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the state forests 
The DPE is the government department responsible for all state-owned enter-
prises, in terms of ensuring that they remain financially viable, competitive, 
sustainable, and contributing to development objectives in their respective 
regions. Its mandate is “to coordinate with policy and regulatory departments and 
ministries and provide oversight and strategic direction for the SOE (state owned 
enterprises) reporting to the department”.11 DPE is a fairly new department 
having been established in 1994 with the main purpose of organizing the 
restructuring of SOE’s. It was then upgraded to a fully-fledged National 
Government Department in 1999 headed by a Minister.
In the case of forest restructuring, DPE became fully involved at the beginning 
of 1998 with the appointment of transaction advisers that would assist SAFCOL 
in preparing for restructuring. Initially, DPE did not put in a lot of resources in 
the process, as even its forestry cluster was working on this privatization only on 
a part time basis. For DPE, there were other more lucrative transactions under-
way, such as the partial privatization of the telecommunications giant, Telkom.  
The inadequate amount of focus on forestry by DPE worked further to 
frustrate efforts of DWAF and DFID whose interest was to get rid of the home-
land forests as quickly as possible. Apart from the homeland forests being loss-
making, there were various forest-related court cases that the DWAF was dealing 
with, and these became part of the motivation for DWAF wanting the assets out 
of their hands.  
DFID on the other hand, was growing uncomfortable at the pace of restruc-
turing, in part of which they had been involved as donors. Due to the inactivity at 
DPE, DFID had to move strategically and invest part of the resources earmarked 
for its work at DWAF to DPE in order to harmonize and fast-track the process. 
This resulted into DPE dedicating a project manager who was solely responsible 
for the forest project. 
It is only after these DFID-supported moves that in 2002 the DPE finalized the 
transfer of two of the forests to SFP and SQF. All the other forests that were 
incorporated into SAFCOL awaiting transfer to private actors had not been sold 
by 2004. The transaction of Komatiland forests, the biggest and most lucrative of 
the Category A forest assets spread across Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces, 
has been aborted thrice. During the initial offer in 2000, no suitable bidders were 
identified; after that government decided to re-bundle the two packages together 
as one. The second offer in 2002 was cancelled after there were allegations of 
corruption and tender irregularities at DPE. Zama Resources, a fully black-owned 
consortium, had won the tender. These allegations led to the resignation of the 
Director of Restructuring at DPE, again putting a strain on an already overdue 
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  http://www.dpe.gov.za/home.asp?id=1 
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process. These assets were re-advertised in 2003, and successful bids received 
and awarded to Bonheur consortium in 2004. Once again, South Africa’s Com-
petition Commission, on the basis of possible future uncompetitive behaviour by 
Bonheur, cancelled the transaction after due scrutiny. They were especially 
uncomfortable with the future of softwood saw log production. The fact that 
Bonheur was vertically integrated was understood to place the other actors at risk 
of unfair competition. 
These cancellations have prolonged the existence of SAFCOL, which had 
already reduced its staff in anticipation of exiting the management of state 
forests. These cancellations have also overstretched the role of DPE and DWAF. 
DFID on the other hand, was aiming to refocus its attention away from forestry 
support to concentrate on policy, institutional change, and forest enterprise 
development.  
In the sold assets, DPE still has the role of providing after-service to their new 
clients. In the lease agreements that they signed with the two new entrants, 
several conditions were included that were meant to ensure that certain relevant 
laws and standards were adhered to. These were, among others, laws regulating 
labour, occupational health and safety, the environment as well as the Forest and 
Water Acts. In areas where the DPE had included certain clauses, for instance, 
the moratorium on retrenchments, it still has that responsibility, with the help of 
the Ministry of Labour, to ensure that such conditions are not broken.  
The roles of DWAF, SAFCOL and DPE in the sale process were meant to be 
complementary. DPE as the agency in charge of state owned enterprises has the 
mandate to dispose of SAFCOL assets. DWAF on the other hand deals with 
policy, regulation, and other technical issues. SAFCOL as well have the technical 
knowledge necessary to guide the transaction process, although their role in this 
was seen to have the potential to pose a conflict of interest (DWAF, 2004: 26) 
“between the interests of management and the wider national interest in the 
restructuring of a State Enterprise”.  
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and its influence on forest restructuring 
The DLA engages the issue of land in South Africa by working to fulfil three 
main objectives as stated in the White Paper on Land Policy (1996, section 2.3): 
It conducts land redistribution aims “to provide the disadvantaged and the poor 
with access to land for residential and productive purposes”. 
Second, there is the land restitution which “covers cases of forced removals 
which took place after 1913”. This element is steered by a separate Land Claims 
Commission and Court. 
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The third and final objective is the land tenure reform that is meant “to 
improve the tenure security of all South Africans and to accommodate diverse 
forms of land tenure, including types of communal tenure”. 
The main role of the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) in the restructuring 
process is related to the third objective and aims to protect community land rights 
where these are implicated in the on-going sale processes. Part of this involve-
ment has been necessitated by the presence of numerous claims on forest land 
that were recorded at the Land Claims Commission, the body that was set up to 
deal with issues of restitution.  
Ideally, DLA needed to work ahead of the other line departments that were 
involved in restructuring the forests, but the processes often overlapped. Due to 
the difficulties in synchronizing privatization and land claims procedures, certain 
agreements had to be reached, especially between DLA, DWAF and DPE. 
Existing land claims on DWAF and SAFCOL land, coupled with the slow pace 
of DLA in resolving tenure issues, led to an agreement between these depart-
ments that privatization of forest assets, excluding the land, could go ahead even 
before DLA finished its processes. At the same time, tenure rights would be 
protected, and as soon as DLA finished their identification and restoration 
processes, these rights would be transferred from the government to the new 
rights holders. The lease benefits that would have accrued to government from 
claimed lands after privatization would also be reverted to the new landowners. 
In other words, the new owners would receive the land with the privatized trees 
on them, protected by a 75-year lease arrangement. The yearly lease benefits 
would be transferred to the new owners, including the lease benefits from before 
the land transfer.  
There were also government and regional bodies that had direct interests in the 
fate of the forestland that had been claimed. In a key issue paper, DWAF (2004) 
identifies two other actors, apart from the DLA, with a direct stake in these lands. 
The Department of Public Works (DPW) is the custodian of state land while the 
Ingonyama Trust Board,12 like the Minister for Land Affairs, also holds some 
land in trust for communities. In making forest transfers through leases these two 
bodies had to be part of the overall consultations as well. 
Although the agreement between DWAF, DPE and DLA worked to the extent 
that privatization occurred, there has been community pressure on private actors, 
especially SFP, for the process of land claims to be finalized so that communities 
can benefit from the money that until now, government has generated from the 
privatized forests. Before this can take place, it is up to DLA to finalize the 
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  The Ingonyama Trust Board holds over 2.8 million hectares of land in KwaZulu-Natal. This land was 
previously held under KwaZulu authority. The land is held on behalf of communities. 
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legitimization of the valid claims by completing the identification of boundaries 
and rightful claimants. 
Reasons for restructuring delays  
Problems of capacity, regulations and labour 
Apart from overlaps in responsibilities13 across government departments during 
preparations for sale of the forest assets, certain issues re-emerged to affect the 
forest assets already disposed to the private sector. These had been compounded 
earlier, first by a situation of low staff capacity versus a complicated regulatory 
framework. Second, they had been affected by a high staff turnover that under-
mined continuity of implementation knowledge, and third, by a strong labour 
union who was opposed to privatization. 
Where DLA was concerned however, its problems were rooted in post 1994 
departmental strategies that worked to slow down implementation of key poli-
cies, especially on land reform. One observer at DFID explains that the personnel 
mandated to roll out land reform for instance, often worked within the legislative 
sphere that specifically guided land reform, but they were less conversant with 
other laws that were in conflict and that would impact on the same process 
(Interview 2004). Secondly, he argued that idealists who failed to produce 
workable strategies for the sector headed the department.  
We had the former Minister Hanekom (the first post-apartheid Minister for Agriculture and 
Land Affairs) and he had a team characterized by white liberals, who were well educated and 
allied to the ruling party ANC. These were the people who developed and created quite a 
complex procedure for land reform that might work in developed countries where law and all 
the offices involved understand the law and are well-trained. On the other hand, these set of 
academic and very legalistic procedures were being implemented on the ground by employ-
ees who were highly motivated but very poorly trained, with no legal background whatso-
ever. All they wanted to do was achieve the policy goal and give the land back to the people. 
They were not objective and not competent to do the necessary research, and they were just 
guys who were still very young at the National Land Commission (NLC) and the DLA. At 
the end, because they lacked the basic legal knowledge, they contracted the work out to 
companies who might do a good job but then the people who commissioned the work don’t 
know what to do with the report. So the land claims and land ownership dynamics in South 
Africa to this date remains terrible. 
Unlike forestry, where the government wanted an exit as quickly as possible, 
the land question was different as the ANC government was politically motivated 
to redistribute land and solve tenure issues, but at the same time they were 
constrained by legal necessities. Due to such implementation setbacks, other 
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  In a self-evaluation, DWAF highlights some of these problems and lack of clarity in roles and respon-
sibilities of different internal functional units. I discuss how some of these issues impact on post-imple-
mentation difficulties especially those emerging at the case study levels.  
For the above report, see DWAF (2005). Forestry Change Programme: Business Process Analysis 
Report: Forestry Transfers Process, Version 5.0. 
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departments, whose functions depended on the success of NLC and DLA, had to 
work in a vacuum, or resort to other measures like land leases, as in the forest 
case. The leases served to defer inherent obstacles that may have prevented the 
private sector from taking ownership of the state forest assets, but they did not 
serve to prevent post-transfer issues, especially with SFP, as discussed in the two 
subsequent chapters. Other development agencies such as DFID who were 
interested in refocusing on issues of local entrepreneurship involving local 
people, land, and forests felt affected and distracted by the numerous unresolved 
tenure issues.  
In addition to the land question, labour and their unions were reported as 
another major hurdle for government attempts to rid itself of the forest sector. 
Despite the moratorium on retrenchment that enabled the first forest assets to be 
sold, many at the DFID and DWAF were of the opinion that the labour issue 
stayed unresolved for so long because of their political position within the ANC 
alliance. The confederation of South Africa’s Trade Unions (COSATU) is a 
member of the tripartite alliance that together with the left-wing South Africa’s 
Communist Party (SACP) and ANC make up the ruling alliance. Due to this 
relationship, negotiating with the trade unions commenced, but often stuck along 
the way, and agreements were seldom made. The sale to SFP got the green light 
from the trade unions because they [SFP] had agreed to take over existing 
workers and retain them on their salaries.  
There was also a lack of political will in privatizing forests. Inasmuch as 
government wanted to rid itself of forestry, regarding it as non-core to its opera-
tions and responsibilities, the process of disposing it had to be driven within 
existing laws and legal structures, but once the process became connected to the 
emotive issue of land, this ignited a lack of political interest in the process, as the 
land question is perceived to be of relative symbolic significance in the psyche of 
the new dispensation.  
The management turnover at DWAF, especially the departure of the Chief 
Director of forestry who had facilitated the process that saw the sale to SFP and 
SQF, also affected the process, as her successors had not been closely involved in 
the process. In fact, the reason for renewed interest of DWAF in restructuring in 
the latter part of 2003 was understood to follow concerns that there was so much 
money being lost in the plantations, at the same time there were too many legal 
disputes that were a hassle to DWAF and they no longer wanted to manage them 
(Pitcher 2004, pers. comm.). 
With the restructuring of the category A state forests, the government depart-
ments remain with post-transfer roles that mainly include after-service and 
monitoring duties. It is this aspect of the implementation process that is defining 
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the direction of the relationship between the new private entrants, SFP and SQF, 
with other actors such as local communities and government agencies. 
The relationship created between government and private forest sector during 
this restructuring exercise has been on-going for four major reasons: first, owner-
ship of the forest assets were transferred, but the land is still owned by the state, 
hence the state maintains a monitoring role on how this land is utilized. Second, 
the state still maintains a minimal shareholding in all the forest assets that it has 
sold. Third, in divesting these assets, certain developmental roles, such as the 
advancement of BEE, were entrusted to the new private entrants, and related 
progress keep the government interested in these activities. Finally, the lease 
agreement was signed under certain conditions that have a bearing on labour and 
safety, as well as certain environmental standards. These conditions call for 
continuous monitoring against set objectives and keep government in the forest 
business in a regulatory role. 
Whilst the role of government in forestry has significantly changed, its rela-
tionship with private enterprise has been redefined. Government is no longer a 
competitor but chiefly a regulator and advisor. In this relationship, there are 
mixes of new and old anxieties, expectations as well as unfulfilled objectives. 
Impacts of government withdrawal on commercial forestry 
The case of forest research 
Whilst forest private sector in general supported the state’s withdrawal from core 
forestry activities, at the same time they were of the opinion that government 
needed to maintain a very strong role in research. A manager at Hans Merensky, 
the parent company of SFP said: 
The government has, to our disappointment, moved out of forestry all together in the 
following sense; South Africa is a semi-desert country and timber is a strategic resource. All 
projections say that in the future timber is going to be scarce. The other issue is that govern-
ment is not issuing planting permits while timber has a strategic role. It takes 25 years to 
grow the forest again so the government must ensure that the country is well provided into 
the future and that we have forests with the right genetic material, so they should play a very 
active role but DWAF has largely pulled out of forestry. 
Hans Merensky’s sentiments are echoed by Forestry South Africa (FSA), 
which is a national association of forest owners and timber growers. They too 
report that the state has withdrawn from forestry more than is necessary. A 
respondent from FSA opined: 
The issue of the state and its role in research is an absolute disaster. We are at rock bottom in 
terms of funding and everything else to enable proper research. The budget has been cut left, 
right and centre from all over the place. We have probably had a reduction in our research 
expenditure by 60-70% and that is bad because if you don’t research and you don’t innovate, 
the industry is not going to grow.  
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FSA depends on members’ contributions for its activities that include sup-
porting research efforts at selected institutions. SAFCOL, and by extension the 
state pulling out of forestry ownership has apparently posed direct financial 
impact on FSA through loss of membership fees and levies. As a result of priva-
tization, FSA reported that their research budget is reduced by about R3 million 
per annum, a contribution from the state that FSA still hoped to maintain even 
though the state was no longer a forest owner. These contributions to FSA could 
be replaced by those of the new entrants, if they decided to be members of 
FSA14, which SFP and SQF already are, but the fact that the process of privatiza-
tion has been slow means that the money FSA used to get from these assets will 
be fragmented over time, and hence have a reduced impact on FSA research 
initiatives. 
In the government policy paper, the White Paper on Sustainable Forest 
Development (1996: 11), the inadequate focus in research activity is acknowl-
edged way before there was certainty on the path to privatization that forestry 
would follow. The paucity in research was seen as existing more in community 
forestry as opposed to industrial forestry. The concern government raised in the 
policy document was that, despite the amount of “purposeful research and tech-
nology development” that had occurred in the sector for many years, community 
forestry, indigenous knowledge, and technology had not been harnessed. Hence 
while science and technology had benefited forestry, ignoring one facet of 
forestry meant that these gains were “valuable but not equitable”. Government 
identified a lack of a cohesive vision in the forest sector and one that was exclu-
sive and not sustainable for the long term.  
The double stance of the private forest sector as to the role the state should 
play is a result of possible oversight during the early policy processes and when 
the decisions to privatize were made. The role of the state was reduced to regula-
tion and policy making, a mantra that private sector used in order to have the 
assets transferred to them, but the participants at these policy forums (which 
included both public and private sector actors) failed to push for the state’s 
continued central role in research. Little attention was paid to the fact that when 
it came to forestry, unlike other sectors such as arms manufacturing or transport 
and telecommunications, the state regarded these as non-core and not strategic to 
its operations, and wanted to opt out as much, if not more than the private sector 
wanted them out.  
                                                                 
14
  FSA is a voluntary association of forest owners and timber growers. It focuses only on commercial 
forestry, (and) acts as the coordinating body in the industry, and the interface between government and 
other organizations that have an influence on what happens in the industry. It is the body that sets 
priorities research or planning activities. It also acts as an information and reference source for the 
sector. Funding is drawn from a levy, where members are charged according to how many tons of 
timber they produce annually.  
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The case of management deterioration 
The attention of the forest industry was diverted to the broader debates about 
privatization per se, and did not take time to discuss the intricate details that 
pertained to forestry as an area in which the state had very minimal interest. The 
eagerness of the state to let go of these assets can be seen also in the way the 
other assets, especially those smaller forest units categorized as B suffered 
further neglect when all management resources were focused on the sale process 
of the more lucrative A category. As a result, FSA as an observer views this 
degeneration as an outcome of the privatization process. He says, 
The mismanagement or the non-management of the plantations is partly due to the privatiza-
tion process itself because what happened is that the process started 6-7 years ago, it created 
an awful amount of uncertainty not only from the industry’s perspective but from the 
individuals who were working for DWAF on those forests. They were asking if their jobs 
would cease because of the sale and because it took long, people became very insecure and 
management suffered. DWAF itself has been preoccupied with the privatization process that 
has deflected their attention away from managing the forests that they still own. So the state 
of the plantations has deteriorated. They haven’t performed their pruning, thinning and 
planting activities. There are a whole lot of technical issues. Some of those yet-to-be sold 
assets are not viable anymore and they need rehabilitation urgently. 
As mentioned earlier, some of these forests were already dilapidated even 
before the transactions. The forestry private sector was only interested in the 
commercially viable assets, and did not support the state disposing liabilities. 
One option advised by FSA was that government could rehabilitate the assets 
back to levels that are economically sustainable before transferring them to 
smaller entrepreneurs or communities. The idea behind packaging the B forests 
into smaller units was to make them accessible to small-scale, and in particular 
emerging, black entrepreneurs and local communities.  
The case of planting permits 
It would be incomplete to talk about impacts on South Africa’s commercial 
forestry if this excludes the issue of water consumption, the regulations around it, 
and why forest owners get uncomfortable with this particular legislation. First 
time planting of commercial trees requires a planting permit that is issued by 
Water Affairs, which interestingly, falls under the same ministry and administra-
tion with Forestry Affairs. Previously, the directorate of forestry itself issued the 
permits, which was a conflicting role since they were also the custodians of 
forest plantations.  
The afforestation permit system (APS) is not new having been instituted back 
in 1972 to regulate forestry, and to try and create a balance between industrial 
forestry’s water needs and other environmental and industrial demands. Impacts 
of industrial forestry are reported to differ from region to region, depending on 
the amount of rainfall, the concentration of forests in that particular area, as well 
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as the silvicultural practices that are employed (NFAP 1997). Generally, due to 
South Africa’s low rainfall patterns that average 450 mm annually, the fact that 
vast forest monocultures occupy areas with at least 800 mm per annum has 
contributed to the increased need for regulation.  
In the National Water Act (1998), the Ministry’s mandate to regulate water use 
was renewed. The Ministry is also required to allocate water based on the policy 
of optimum water use, to strike a balance between the competing demands for 
water, and charge appropriately. In addition, the Act provided for a category of 
water use called the Stream Flow Reduction Activity (SFRA), implying that 
where an activity adversely reduces the level of stream flow or intercepts it, the 
department of water affairs would declare such an activity as an SFRA and 
subject it to certain controls. 
Forest owners have particularly regarded the part of the regulations that 
demand that forestry be controlled, unlike other agricultural land uses, through 
permits, and may only commence new planting on their land through a successful 
application to the Ministry. The permits are only given on the regulator’s satis-
faction that the activity will not pose any dire consequences to stream flows and 
other water catchment areas.  
The basis for continued control of afforestation is a 1986 analysis that esti-
mated the forest industry to have been consuming about 1.2 million cubic meters 
of water, thus diverting these from rivers and streams (White paper on Sustain-
able Forestry Development, 1996). The amount of water forestry alone was 
consuming was reported to be about 30% of the combined urban and industrial 
consumption.  
The FSA, agitating for its members, views the permit system as part of a 
victimization of the forest industry without any sound scientific benchmark. They 
argue that forestry has been automatically categorized as an SFRA because 
before the National Water Act of (1998), forestry was the only land activity that 
had an existing permit system in place. When SFRA was introduced, only 
forestry could validate the immediate existence of SFRA, as no criteria had been 
developed for other sectors. To date, no other agricultural activity has been 
declared a SFRA because there has not been any scientific research to support 
such a move. SFA reasons: 
There are other activities that are SFRA. The biggest water user is the agricultural irrigation 
systems that take up 51%. From dams, sugarcane, maize farming, all qualify as SFRA but 
why aren’t they declared as such? It is because the Water Act (98) section 36 says that to 
declare an SFRA, it has to be proven that there is significant impact on other water uses. By 
declaring forestry as SFRA is saying we have a significant impact on other water uses. This 
is a fallacy of the highest order as in some places we do and in other places we do not. It also 
says that the Minister may also declare other activities as SFRA. We are now years down the 
line and no other activity has been declared because they cannot scientifically prove that a 
certain activity has a significant impact on other water uses for the simple reason that they 
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have never kept hydrological data and they have never done hydrological research. So they 
can’t for instance go to the sugar industry and say you are declared SFRA because they don’t 
have the data to do so and if they did this without the data then they would be in contraven-
tion of their own Act. 
The second argument against planting permits calls for a consideration of the 
returns from an activity to justify the amount of water it uses. Forestry activity 
per unit of water consumed, FSA reports, gives a higher return than almost any 
other agricultural crop,15 and this fact has not been taken into consideration.  
The main issue with the permit system, apart from the fact that the forest 
industry feels discriminated when compared to other water users, is the slow 
speed of issuance that has delayed new plantings, hence disrupting plans and 
schedules of forest owners. In each province there is a License Advisory Com-
mittee whose sole purpose is to adjudicate and make recommendations on appli-
cations for SFRA. This body involves DWAF and DEAT (Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism) from the national level, The Department of 
Agriculture in both national and provincial capacities, as well as Local Govern-
ment, the Department of Housing, community representatives and a whole load 
of stakeholders.  
The process of application involves submitting soil surveys among other 
requirements and then DWAF conducts a hydrological assessment to indicate if 
there is potential for the application to proceed. If results show an impact on a 
water catchment zone then the application is denied. If it succeeds, it proceeds to 
the departments of environmental affairs and agriculture for comments after 
which there are site visits that also extend the application period. 
The application exercise costs the applicant about R7000 per hectare. So apart 
from being an expensive exercise, the prolonged time it takes to go through the 
whole process and the bureaucracy is a disincentive to forest owners.  
The problems that the forest industry faces are due to its general poor image in 
the public sphere. Coupled with the perception that plantation monocultures do 
not allow for any other land use: the fact that it is also increasingly understood to 
compete disproportionately for water, which is very scarce in South Africa, 
serves to further dent its image, even though forestry contributes to employment, 
and also significantly to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which stood at 1.3% 
of the total in 2002 (FSA 2004).  
The organizational structure at DWAF16 that has had the forestry executives 
report to senior officers in charge of water affairs has also not helped the image 
of forestry. Water affairs regulate forestry at the planting level; and they, as well 
as the environment affairs (DEAT), regard forestry as an impediment to the 
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  No hard statistical data to support this assertion. 
16
  See organogram at beginning of chapter. 
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environment. Plantation owners on the other hand, view this as an unfair playing 
ground. 
Increased efficiency in devolved assets (SFP and SQF) 
In the National Forestry Action Plan (1997: 77), the problem with the structure of 
industrial forest sector and its influence on competitiveness was summed thus: 
There is a concern that the existing pattern of ownership in the industrial forest sector may 
be incompatible with the achievement of an efficient and competitive industrial sector, which 
fully contributes to national goals and provides new economic opportunities, particularly for 
the previously disadvantaged. 
The idea to enhance competitiveness of the sector, through diversifying and 
opening up to more players, was envisaged to take place through restructuring. 
The stated objectives of the privatization of forests were; “to create a framework 
for high value-added processing activities, to create a globally competitive 
forestry products sector, to stimulate exports and develop the level and quality of 
employment while at the same time advancing community empowerment and 
development and; to achieve an optimum return on the sale of the assets” 
(Chalmers 1999). 
Concentration in the forest sector can be attributed to the nature of activities 
involved. The industrial production is predominantly for pulp and paper, which 
requires high amounts of capital and skills and relies on hardwood17. The second 
main area of production is for sawn timber or solid wood, with less capital inten-
sity and skills, and consumes softwood especially from pine trees grown on long 
rotations. The state plantations were geared towards the production of saw logs 
for the saw milling industry and the state has not been directly involved in pulp 
and paper production.  
The existing segmentation in the industry meant that parties interested in state 
assets would continue in the production of solid wood. Due to the high capital 
outlay needed for the pulp and paper sector, not many entities have the capacity 
to enter the business; hence the established Mondi and SAPPI have dominated it. 
The concentration of these two companies in pulp and papermaking might 
remain so for a long time, and with no likelihood of serious competition.  
Opportunities for intense competition are therefore limited to solid wood or 
the sawmilling sector of the forest industry, but generally greater domestic 
competition did not emerge from this particular privatization exercise. Changes 
have only occurred, to a small extent, in ownership rather than in activity. SFP is 
majority owned by Hans Merensky, which was already a saw miller in the same 
area. SQF on the other hand, is an extension of Mondi, an established pulp and 
paper manufacturer. The only newcomers to the forest business, within the case 
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  Eucalyptus is the most common hardwood used in South Africa’s pulp and paper industry. 
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studies, are the minority shareholders Singilanga Directorate Trust and IL for 
SFP and SQF respectively. 
In terms of production or activities, Mondi’s SQF have plans to convert to 
eucalyptus production existing pine plantations that they acquired from the state 
plantations. This is necessary since Mondi requires hardwood for its operations. 
Recent trends in Mondi have seen them move out of saw log production, having 
sold their assets in Komatiland area to Global Forests, an American company. 
Hence there are no changes either in terms of products, activities or the market 
place. The remaining and biggest state asset, Komatiland Forests is also predomi-
nantly a monoculture under pinewood.  
Komatiland Forests presents the best opportunity for increased competition in 
the sector, but only if government decides to divide its 130, 000 planted hectares 
into numerous medium sized units. The Competition Commission in 2004, at the 
request of other forest players, particularly Yorkor18 Timber, refused the third 
attempt at selling Komatiland off wholesale, citing disadvantages this would pose 
to existing smaller saw millers who were already reliant on the same resource for 
supply of logs. This dissolution of the offer to the Bonheur consortium, the then 
preferred buyer, helped to extend the time needed to explore other ways of 
ensuring that such concentration would be minimized when government decides 
to re-float the package for sale for the fourth, and hopefully in the interest of the 
industry, final time. 
Other observers viewed the opposition to Komatiland Forests as not about 
competition, but rather it was about security of access to the same resource. 
Bonheur Consortium consisted of Global Forest Products, who already owned 
the biggest sawmill in the country. If they were going to also have sole control of 
the forest resource, other saw millers in the area who also relied on government 
forests for logs would face an uncertain future. What the opposition was imply-
ing when they used the argument on competitiveness of the deal was that they 
would lose entitlements to logs. A director at FSA opined: 
What those people are actually saying is that it must not go through because then they, 
because they are also already involved, their resource would reduce if the sale was allowed 
to go through. So it was not an argument against concentration but rather, that they would 
lose access to logs and their sawmills would probably close down. They would be dealing 
with a company that could decide to increase its output, change its product mix and do what-
ever they wanted in a very short space of time as the market grows and demands change. If 
the state really wanted to introduce competition into the market, then what should have 
happened was for them to keep the sawmill owned by Komatiland out of the package and put 
it separately on the market and then look for 5 or 6 entities to move into the sector and 
perhaps start saw mill operations.  
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  Yorkor is a listed forest company (on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange) at the forefront of the 
opposition of sale of Komatiland Forests to a single entity. They won the arguments at the Competition 
Commission. Government through DPE appealed against the judgment. 
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The uncertainty caused by the attempted wholesale privatization of Komati-
land Forests was also believed to have affected the sawmilling industry in other 
ways. Sawmilling, with the state being the dominant player, had long lagged 
behind in terms of technology upgrade and skills development. This stagnation 
had started to change with saw millers beginning to move toward increased 
investments in technology and skills. With the sale process having been on for 
eight years, saw millers slowed down on these investments because of the possi-
bility of risking capital in the event of loss of saw log supplies.   
Komatiland Forests is a good example of the failure of government to live up 
to its objective of enhancing competitiveness in the sector. It is a large asset, in 
good condition and makes sense for economies of scale. Out of the 130,000 
hectares that went for R396 million, the state would also be collecting R14 
million in rent annually. This was a money-spinning option for government and 
other objectives were easily traded off. 
In terms of attaining efficiency, the already privatized areas have been able to 
surpass government’s previous performance both in production and in profits. 
SFP reported to have intensified activity in both areas reversing assets that in 
government hands were making losses of R100million a year, and had over 
10,000 hectares destroyed by fire. Three years into taking over the assets, SFP 
reported replanting the 10,000 hectares and the company had become profitable.  
SQF who inherited some 26,451 hectares of forestland had by 2004 an annual 
turnover of R135.8 million, was directly employing 29 people and outsourcing 
most of its operations with more than 1,263 people. It had paid a total of R1.2 
million in taxes to the public sector in 2004 (SQF 2005). 
Sacrificed objectives 
The enactment of any sector policy, like the forest policy, works within the frame 
of a broader national economic policy. Operationalizing the forest policy had to 
take into account bits and pieces of other legislation and work in alignment with 
them rather than in opposition.19  
The broad-based BEE is one transformation instrument intertwined in almost 
all the other sector-specific policies. In the draft Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Framework (2004: 6), BEE means “the economic empowerment 
of all black people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and 
people living in rural areas, through diverse but integrated socio-economic 
strategies”. Simplified, one of the objectives of BEE is to; “increase the extent to 
which black women own and manage existing and new enterprises, and to 
increase their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training”20  
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  See chapter 3 for the cross-sector policy linkages in the new South Africa. 
20
  http://www.southafrica.info/public_services/citizens/travelkit-bee.htm 
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The White Paper for Sustainable Forestry Development (1996: 20) also recog-
nized the need to mainstream women in all aspects of the forest economy. It says 
the “Department will incorporate measures into all its policy instruments to 
ensure the empowerment of women.” 
One recurring theme in most policies is not only the transformation impera-
tives and emancipation of black people, but specifically the role and position of 
women both in the short and long-term visions. The process of divestiture of 
state owned entities to private interests was also assumed to take on some of 
these objectives as pre-conditions of sale. What has happened in the forestry case 
is that it was very difficult to respond to all the sale objectives, because some of 
them were in direct conflict with each other. If the government wanted to realize 
the best price from the forests, then other objectives that were more develop-
mental and not price-oriented would suffer. The South African forests initially 
attracted foreign investors who did not want a sale with too many developmental 
conditions attached to them, and these are just some of the reasons given for the 
withdrawal of a big company like American-based Weyerhouser. 
It is evident as well that, although government had the upper hand on how to 
sell their forests assets and what conditions of sale to attach, it was still difficult 
in this process to achieve all the objectives they had set out. For instance, it 
managed to push for a minimum 10% shareholding by black entities in each of 
the assets they sold, but it was not easy to insist on the composition of the 
consortia to reflect government’s ambition to include women. The same way 
government hoped that in these processes rural dwellers would come on board. 
Although SFP managed to include a community Trust in its shareholding, the 
other private entities have found it easier to have a black entity instead. Hence 
these objectives have somehow managed to work against each other due to the 
complexities they would pose if there were no flexibility to drop some of them in 
favour of others. One respondent who observed the forest sale process had this to 
say: 
Consideration of gender balance as part of actual empowerment is found in the Constitution 
and even in the empowerment shareholding strategy but in reality, the economy and the 
forest sector in particular, is largely a male dominated structure. If you look at the new forest 
cases, the SQF one that has a traditional authority as part of the BEE entity would have more 
implications by virtue of the paternalistic nature of traditional authority. The SFP case and 
the Singilanga Trust within it could be said to be broader based but I suspect it is also still 
largely male. One comment was made to me that in the community Trust, it is generally the 
men who made the decisions, signed the documents and are responsible for the budget and 
anything financial. So men take credit. It is a broad generalization but it still seems to do. 
On the implications of pushing for gender balance during the sale, he argued: 
Empowerment and black empowerment in itself is a difficult thing to achieve. To private 
entities, imposing even greater conditions such as gender sensitivity leads to situations where 
trade-offs have to come in. It is difficult to achieve everything and the more conditions you 
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place on the deal, the more you limit the scales of possibility. If you insist that the forest 
must be taken over by a female-owned black empowerment firm, it becomes very difficult as 
this is still very rare. I need to take a view on whether they could have done more but my 
sense of it is that the economy in the rural environment is not mature enough to start picking 
and choosing. If you can get a single deal you appreciate that that alone was possible. It is 
unrealistic at this stage of South Africa’s history. 
It must be said that the element of gender has been difficult to insist on, espe-
cially during privatization of SOEs; employment in the public sector has been 
better driven, with DWAF for instance having, a staff profile which is about 50% 
women. Other government departments have reported exceeding their employ-
ment equity targets (Department of Labour 2003). The parliament of South 
Africa and the cabinet are good examples of representation targets having been 
exceeded and ranking among the best by international standards.  
While ownership patterns in the private sector still reflect a male bias, a trend 
that is difficult to change even when government transfers its assets, there are 
other practices to which employers have to adhere, such as employment equity. 
So while transformation objectives may not be met at certain levels, there are 
other areas where missed opportunities can be redressed. 
Efforts toward transforming the economy seem to prioritize and confront the 
race-based nature of the companies first, while the question of obtaining a gender 
balance lags behind. The many demands that are placed on business have led to a 
situation in which some objectives are ignored, based on their perceived weight 
and importance, as well as certain realistic factors like capital and education. It is 
also a question of history vis-a-vis available capacity that makes it difficult to 
push forward certain agendas. The nature of apartheid was such that black people 
were denied access to ownership and management of productive assets. Gener-
ally, the position of women was not any better. 
The public sector has changed its image and organizational profile to reflect 
the country’s demographics a lot faster than the private sector, partly because it is 
in the driving seat of the change process. The private sector on the other hand, 
has to deal with its own entrenched organizational culture, coupled with the fact 
that its acceptance of government policies is not uniform across the spectrum. 
The said change has been relatively easier to achieve at the level of employment 
rather than in ownership, due to resources and structures that have to be consid-
ered when ownership is diversified. 
Concluding note 
This chapter has discussed the events leading to forestry restructuring and how 
the responsible government agencies coped with new roles that came up. The 
weaknesses in the agencies approach to restructuring, the problems of capacity, 
labour concerns, poor cross sector networks, and delays in implementation of 
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land policy all impacted on the forestry process. There were also post-restructur-
ing impacts on the forest industry, such as the loss of government’s funding to 
research, the paucity in issuance of planting permits, and the residual tensions 
caused when some original objectives of restructuring were dropped in favour of 
others. These findings, as elaborated later in chapter 8, reveal that in this 
particular policy arena, those who made gains through privatization were those 
present, and who wielded power to push through their objectives. The losers 
were sidelined either by inadequate information, inability to be present at nego-
tiations, and a lack of financial capacity. On a more positive note, the privatized 
areas both increased in efficiency and became more competitive and profitable 
when compared to the days of state ownership and management. 
6 
Analyzing management models: 
The ways of SFP and SQF 
This chapter discusses, in two respective sections, the management models 
employed by both SFP and SQF in the light of additional policy objectives of 
community involvement and black economic empowerment (BEE). It examines 
the strategy of each company as well as issues of representation of community 
interests. It also gives an account of community organizing, roles of actors/-
interest groups and the processes of establishing business relationships with 
target communities.  
The notable difference is the way SFP and SQF approach their developmental 
objectives. While SFP put a significant emphasis on community as business 
partner, SQF opted for the tried and tested route of business-to-business, hence 
creating an alliance with an individual black business group rather than a black 
community. On a secondary level, there are reverse actions as SFP also experi-
ments with other individual entrepreneur models of business. SQF on the other 
hand, also attempts to establish business relationships with groups of communi-
ties. The main basis of this chapter is SFP and SQF’s primary approaches to 
forest management, which are considered as core to their empowerment actions.  
SFP and target communities 
The initial process of building rules and relationships 
As reported in the previous chapter, SFP relationship with groups of communi-
ties neighbouring their forests started in 1999 at the beginning of the negotiations 
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for the sale of forests between government and several private sector actors. The 
building of this community-company relationship preceded the actual sale of the 
forests. It was started way a head in anticipation of a successful acquisition of the 
Eastern Cape forests from government by SFP. In fact, the pre-negotiation for a 
business relationship with communities and their inclusion as partners in the SFP 
bid for government forests was meant to make SFP‘s proposal stronger and 
attractive as part of meeting the developmental objectives that government was 
advancing as they privatized. SFP’s broad commitment where communities were 
concerned as outlined in their first post-sale business plan for the period 2001 to 
2006 was “to use reasonable endeavours to contribute to the socio-economic 
upliftment of the community” (SFP 2001: 7). 
Bringing in communities required that SFP made known their intentions but 
this also demanded that they identified and defined the groups of people as well 
as the boundaries of work. Hence before the sale from government was won and 
contrary to conventional business partnering, SFP in a strategic move organized 
meetings with several community groups to sell out their forest business idea. In 
2001, after four years of negotiation, the process culminated in the creation of 
Singilanga Directorate Trust (SDT), an umbrella Trust representing all identified 
communities.  
SDT is further made up of the two regional trusts called Singisi and Langeni 
that represent the two geographic ends of the project area. Both sub-trusts repre-
sent residents in several magisterial districts in their areas. The larger Trust 
Singisi covers of Harding, Umzimkhulu, Bulwa, Imbedle and Harwick magiste-
rial districts. Langeni on the hand comprises Tsolo, Umtata and Ngcobo districts. 
Being the larger of the two trusts, Singisi commands a bigger share of the 10% 
shareholding but these are also commensurate with the amount of forests each 
region possesses. 
Both Singisi and Langeni consist of a team of trust members and are headed 
by a chairperson. Both chairs are members of the SFP board of directors, but 
only the overall SDT director has voting rights on behalf of the community. 
Three other non-voting members also sit at board meetings as observers and are 
allowed to influence proceedings by raising issues of interest and areas of 
concern. All trust members are volunteers and are only paid sitting allowances.  
The selection of SDT leadership 
The creation of the main Trust SDT and its subsidiaries Singisi and Langeni went 
through certain related steps. SFP went out to find and define the communities 
they wanted to work with. They found groups of more than 165 communities 
around their plantations. These groups distinguished themselves based on several 
attributes such as kinship ties, chiefdoms and even according to certain func-
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tional clusters e.g. taxi associations. SFP considered these groupings as too 
numerous and fragmented. Since they preferred to work with a smaller number of 
groups, SFP came up with a criterion that saw these groups amalgamated into 
only 16. These 16 were not communities in any substantive sense nor did the 
strategy follow existing definitions preferred and understood by the communities 
in question. The new groups were each represented by two members, who con-
gregated under a task team. 
The main responsibility of the 32-member task team was to help establish a 
stronger relationship between residents and SFP. The task team continued with 
what SFP had started, explaining to neighbouring communities what SFP was 
about and how they could in turn organize a Trust as a legal representative unit to 
administer its shareholding as well as their engagement in business opportunities 
that would emanate from SFP operations in the area.  
The task team was the building block of the streamlined Trust officials. It is 
out of the 32 members of the task team that respective communities each elected 
one Trust leader during open forums convened by area chiefs. Hence 16 Trust 
officials, all picked from the task team represent SDT. The Trusts are legally 
recognized bodies and are registered under the Deeds of Trust. The Trust there-
fore qualifies to hold and redistribute to its members money and other benefits 
that accrue from the forestry deal. 
The basic problem posed by this criterion that SFP used to convene the Trust 
is that the “community” having been reduced to a smaller number ignored the 
sense of community that members understood. As a result, those picked as 
community representatives were not necessarily known or trusted by most of the 
people that they purported to represent.  
The primary objectives of the Trust as contained in their ‘deed of trust’, a legal 
document, indicate that they:  
Would hold the SFP shareholding and administer the flow of benefits deriving from the 
shareholding, for and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Trust; distribute the benefits 
deriving from the SFP shareholding according to the agreed benefit percentage to the benefi-
ciaries; ensure that the benefits accrued from the SFP shareholding are applied to improve 
the quality of life of the beneficiary communities; and to appoint a Director, annually, to 
serve on the SFP Board of Directors as agreed upon at a meeting of Trustees”. (Section 4 of 
the Deed of Trust, Establishing the Singilanga Directorate Trust 2001). 
Thus the Trust has specific responsibilities and it does try to act on behalf of 
the community through promoting their interests at the SFP board of directors for 
instance, ensuring that they are prioritized in terms of job opportunities that come 
up at SFP. They also facilitate ideas for investment of dividends to the interest of 
beneficiaries. SDT plays a double role and acts as a link between SFP and the 
local community through communicating SFP’s ideas and intentions to the bene-
ficiaries. It does the same on behalf of beneficiaries as well. 
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Part of SFP’s motivation of having a local community as partner was to 
acquire some sort of security for their forest assets. The forest plantations, in the 
past, have been prone to fires and destruction that were sometimes considered an 
expression of dissent from local inhabitants who felt isolated from business 
operations in their own localities. SFP therefore considered it important to 
enhance, amongst local communities where they work, a sense of ownership of 
the assets in return for security of the plantations. SDT was part of this scheme to 
protect the forests against deliberate destruction.
SDT and difficulties of organizing 
Engaging the community was a difficult and time-consuming process as the area 
under consideration is vast. The combined forest and vacant land under SFP 
amounts to over 60,000 hectares. The Singisi forest area neighbours different 
groups of people and individuals who, as previously mentioned, do not necessar-
ily consider themselves as a community in the sense SFP could have initially 
understood them to be. As one local leader stated during an interview:  
The problem we faced in our area [Umzimkhulu] alone was that the community is so big and 
we do not necessarily know each other. So selecting a representative to the Trust for 
instance, was a difficult exercise given that only a few would represent us. In the end, the 
persons who were elected are not necessarily known to most of us. The people here do not 
know the Chairperson [Singisi Trust Chairperson] very well and hence the problem of trust 
arises. This meant that we had to do a lot of convincing and explaining and that took a lot of 
time. It also involved holding several meetings to find clarity on such issues (Interview 
25/03/04). 
Due to the vast area that SFP was operating, part of the problem was logistical 
in the sense that as a business, it was easier to deal with as few representative 
Trusts as possible but this meant ignoring the geographic, cultural and social 
differences that characterize the region. As indicated earlier, SFP ended up 
deciding on only two community Trusts and the reasons as given by one respon-
dent at SFP was that: 
the diversity was so great and we knew for instance that the Pondo people would not sit at 
the same table with the Zulus and the same between the Baca and the Sotho…there would 
always be a power struggle so we devised a method where they could share in the profits 
according to the size of the land that they previously owned (Interview February 2004). 
Although it made sense for SFP to have only two community Trusts working 
directly with them, this approach only minimized challenges for SFP that would 
be posed if they were interacting with numerous entities. It did not solve logisti-
cal problems for communities themselves in terms of building new, or strength-
ening existing relationships in their areas for purposes of engaging SFP. Because 
the membership of the Trusts expanded over large areas, communication at the 
community level itself was difficult since the distances between community 
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groups under Singisi Trust alone amounts to over 70 km. This did not work to 
boost the building of social bonds that would accelerate a more successful 
engagement with an external private entity.  
The idea to set up community trusts came from SFP and not from the target 
groups of communities. Because SFP was looking to the local residents for a 
business partner to compete for the state assets, they ended up being the facilita-
tors in this process that also involved understanding the complexities that would 
emanate from such an unconventional business partnership. As the previous 
employee indicated: 
We [SFP] went out and identified stakeholders in this forest resource including the owners of 
the land or those who had certain rights to it thereafter we started our consultations and 
explained to them what we wanted to do and what was involved in the process. We decided 
to set up a vehicle that would hold the community’s shareholding in our company but from 
there we had to set up other two regional trusts - Langeni and Singisi community trusts 
(Interview 2 February 2004). 
Part of the problem with this arrangement emanates from the idea to have 
local residents as partners and the model of that partnership was initiated by SFP 
and then sold to the local residents. Because SFP is a business and was working 
within certain time limits, the time they set to do this did not take cognizance of 
the complexities and diversity in the local areas. 
Hence there were difficulties in having the locals not only to understand what 
SFP was proposing but also to accept it as a an idea that was desirable to them. 
Problems faced in gaining the confidence of the local people were not only 
hampered by their internal differences. Within the locality, as in many other rural 
areas in South Africa, there were contextual issues based on a history of mistrust 
especially where government projects or private sector interests were concerned. 
These emanated from policies and events during apartheid years that culminated 
in displacements to make way for plantation forestry. To convince the same 
peoples that the new enterprise would benefit them was met with scepticism. As 
the previous respondent further reported: 
It took us three years to negotiate with various interests, employees and communities. We 
would have meetings every Sunday where we answered questions from communities and as 
much as there was interest, there was also a lot of mistrust and uncertainty (ibid.) 
Some individuals within the local areas themselves saw their lack of experi-
ence in collective organizing as part of the problem that undermined their efforts 
to engage SFP. One particular respondent noted that their history in organizing 
locally, especially when it came to running small enterprises, had been dismal; 
motivation to join the SFP was quite low as a result.  
Some people in my area [Ngujini village] had attempted a candle-making project before. 
They had a market as the stores were ready to buy the products but the project was not 
successful due to misunderstanding amongst members (Interview 26/03/04). 
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Project ideas that required involvement of groups of communities were often 
reported to be unsuccessful: part of the reason being that the more affluent mem-
bers of the local society were not interested in taking part in group initiatives. 
The same respondent opines; 
Local projects are problematic and in most cases they are not successful. Problems arise 
because it is only poor people who do not have the means who are interested. People who are 
better off are not interested due to their relative independence (ibid.) 
The reported reluctance by the local elite to engage in such initiatives also 
works against efforts to deal with issues of capacity and skills within the same 
areas. At the local level, there are nuanced responses to elitism and the same 
could be said of the private sector. On one hand, the problem of capacity and 
skills at the local level is attributed to the less than adequate engagement with 
enterprise, but in instances where there are skilled and educated individuals, they 
are again perceived as self-seekers who like to be at the forefront for individual 
gains, and not as genuine representatives of other local residents. Hence one 
respondent, a representative of Langeni Trust summed it thus: 
Within the context of village politics, we lack enough people with skills that can take on 
affluent businesses from outside such as SFP and relate with them more constructively. But 
there is also a problem with local residents here, there is a fear of the few capacitated people 
by the incapacitated (Interview 25/05/04). 
A respondent, an employee of SFP concurred with the above view, saying that 
the reasons why certain sections of the communities they were dealing with were 
not as interested in the business ventures, was because of the self-seeking 
agendas of individual members, who “have their own aspirations and when they 
are in positions of authority, they work to advance certain interests some of 
which are political and not conducive to the good management of the company” 
(Interview 25/03/04). 
The Langeni Trust, whose majority members come from the peri-urban areas 
near Umtata, were more aggressive and decisive in the nature of the relationship 
they wanted with SFP. They had proposed, among other things, that they have a 
say in the way contracts resulting from Langeni operations were awarded. The 
enthusiasm of Langeni Trustees was attributed to their exposure to the urban 
areas, hence the relative availability of educated and skilled individuals: in 
contrast Singisi Trust is further in the hinterland. Langeni members also demon-
strated a more united front when agitating or presenting their grievances to their 
partner, SFP. Such attributes sometimes worked against the expectations of SFP, 
and even local members represented by the Langeni Trust. During the re-
searcher’s second visit to SFP in March 2006, the leadership of Langeni Trust 
had been dissolved due to alleged non-accountability of funds remitted from their 
shareholding at SFP. 
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Generally, processes that involve selling new ideas to large differentiated 
groups of people inherently pose challenges of a varied nature. In this particular 
case study, trust leaders said that attendance at community meetings was irregu-
lar, and completely new people often appeared at subsequent follow-up meetings 
in the same area. Hence it was difficult to achieve progress and continuity on 
issues that SFP was trying propagate. One respondent remembered those prepa-
ratory meetings: 
It was very tedious to hold those meetings not only because of the size of the areas but also 
because it is not always easy to get people together to convince them of a totally new idea, 
and more so if it is something they have never heard about before. The meetings we held 
would go on for whole days and still people would have questions and more questions. The 
biggest concern was how this venture would impact on stock rearing since so many people 
here keep cattle and how they would benefit from it. They saw it as one new way of dispos-
sessing them of their grazing lands and so they were reluctant to commit the area for the 
planting of trees (Interview March 2004)  
Since attendance at meetings was often low and inconsistent, there was a lack 
of quorum at meetings when the elections of Trustees were conducted. Despite 
their apathy in attendance, some residents still voiced dissatisfaction at the 
outcome when elected representatives were people from other areas not known to 
them. Such concerns are a product of inaccurate definitions of community, and 
attempts to streamline diverse geographic residents into smaller but non-cohesive 
units for easier communication with SFP. They have also arisen due to the vast-
ness of areas where SFP assets are located: this poses administrative and logisti-
cal challenges especially where community power-sharing and leadership is 
concerned.  
Some of these challenges arise out of unique local dynamics that private forest 
interests from outside seldom immediately understand, while others fit in with 
private companies’ attempts to consolidate their influence in a way that is less 
threatening to its business. A particular example is a case where one of the lead 
members of the Trust is also an employee and on the payroll of SFP. For some of 
the community members, having one of their own Directors to the Trust also 
under the payroll of SFP seemed to pose a conflict of interest, as they argued that 
he would be compromised in effectively representing his own community’s 
needs and vision. However, others were of the opinion that having a Trust 
official inside the daily operations of the company could enable insights that the 
community could use to strengthen its position in the alliance. Such sentiments 
reflect some of the paradoxes that afflict such collaborations. 
Unfulfilled expectations and the perceived role of government in community 
organizing 
Although SFP responded to policy sentiments by including black businesses in 
their privatized assets, government’s facilitation remained at the level of policy 
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decisions rather than at the roots, where actual processes of implementation take 
place. Hence SFP decided to work directly with the relevant communities 
without much direction from respective government departments. Respondents 
both from government and SFP understand this minimal involvement to be a 
result of very low capacities in relevant government departments at the time the 
sale process was taking place. One SFP member of personnel, who also origi-
nates from the area, described the early processes that brought the area commu-
nities on board and the lack of participation of government; 
Initially they [government] did not play a role, and this was a concern since we as commu-
nity were under the impression that government would ensure that both its interests and our 
community interests would be covered. It did not happen then and we understood it more as 
a question of capacity. At the DLA for instance, only one lady deals with this eastern side of 
the Eastern Cape Province and that is a large area. The DLA is the one that has the mandate 
to ensure that the rights of communities, especially in relation to land, are upheld when 
privatization takes place (Interview 29/03/04). 
Local communities remained unsupported by the government as well. They 
were not informed beforehand of the intention of government to sell the forest 
assets lying close to their environments, or the government policies related to that 
sale. The result was that local residents failed to explore how they could organize 
themselves both legally and financially to enable a stronger position during the 
sale of the assets. The result was SFP running the process according to its own 
vision and on its own terms.  
SFP actually facilitated the community process by employing consultants, and 
also conducted the identification of those with certain rights to this land, a 
process that the same under-capacitated DLA said they would not recognize 
because they found it flawed (ibid.). 
For the local communities in the forest neighbourhood, who use part of these 
lands for pasture and other purposes, the efforts of SFP to enlighten them on the 
sale notwithstanding, the sentiments, as the previous respondent intimated, were 
that: 
The impression created by the events during the sale was that community assets were being 
sold without them being consulted and without their rights to these lands being secured 
upfront (ibid.). 
Government’s lack of facilitation at the time was attributed not only to low 
capacities within the relevant departments, but also to confusion and loss of 
information along the chain of cross-sectoral networks between several depart-
ments that were either, directly or indirectly, concerned with sale of the forests. 
In fact, the lack of clear linkages across departments, or even along the various 
levels within departments, especially on issues that overlap, is reported as a 
hindrance to service delivery. As a DWAF personnel succinctly observed: 
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We have many government institutions looking after the same agreement. My view is that 
we should have one government unit looking at all related issues, for instance issues of 
leases, labour and other contracts that are signed with the same people. In one contract, 
certain promises are made to local communities such as ensuring that they get businesses 
from these ventures to improve their situations but it is not clear who or which institution has 
the mandate to ensure this happens (Interview 6 July 2004). 
A good example during the forest privatization exercise pitted the Department 
of Public Enterprises (in charge of restructuring/privatization) against the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (as custodians of the forest resource), 
as well as the Department of Land Affairs (as protectors of people’s land rights), 
local government (for regional development issues), and Department of Public 
Works as custodians of land in the areas formerly under the Republic South 
Africa21. Whilst the major roles and responsibilities of each department in terms 
of the main forest transaction were defined, there was a lack of coordination 
between these major government departments on non-core issues, such as the 
role of rural communities; hence the inaction, especially in terms of which of 
them should have been responsible for local facilitation and which would address 
the discontent of local interests that followed in the privatized areas. The DLA 
explained that inasmuch as certain issues extended to several departments, the 
schedules of these offices were rarely synchronized. 
We use certain criteria to prioritize our work especially when it comes to community work 
and particularly those related to issues of land. These priorities are not similar across 
departments…sometimes DWAF may have access to some information that DLA does not 
have and vice versa but legislation requires that we consult with the people…(Interview 1 
April 2004) 
Traditional authority and elected local councils 
In seeking access to local residents, SFP worked through traditional authority, 
particularly the local chiefs. Although the influence of traditional authority coun-
cils has waned in most of the Eastern Cape Province, their role in successful and 
timely convening of meetings and mobilizing local residents is still unrivalled. 
However, when it comes to development issues at the local level, the local coun-
cils, which are headed by elected leaders, are placed in a more influential 
position. Local councils have the mandate, the personnel, and the finances neces-
sary to oversee and sanction the introduction of economic activities in their areas. 
In this regard, it is assumed that issues, such as those of financing community 
entities and creating networks with outside actors and donors, would have been 
better addressed through liaison at least with the local councils. SFP concentrated 
more on traditional authority and their mobilization capabilities, and in a way 
neglected the opportunity to work with the local councils. Hence, they missed out 
                                                                 
21
  As opposed to the Bantustans that under apartheid were considered as separate black states (away) 
from white South Africa. 
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on resources and perspective of the local councils that would have complemented 
the community’s participation. SFP officer reports,  
Initially we interacted more with local Traditional Authority while there was minimal 
contact with the local elected leaders like the councillors. Lately, we realized that their role is 
also important because in as much as money could be flowing to the Trust, this alone is not 
enough and the local councils has a critical role to play in the process especially through 
supporting local structures and using the resources that we have to liberate more funds 
(Interview 29/03/04). 
SFP then acknowledged the role of local authority and tried to consult local 
councils where necessary, and benefit from their input and networks. SFP’s 
earlier scepticism on working with elected politicians resonated views that 
preferred that government should have no role in business. From interviews with 
SFP officials, the feeling was that elected politicians did not necessarily share the 
vision of the company, and their ideas would often be in direct conflict to that of 
business. In the process, the developmental role and input from the regional 
authority, especially in facilitating funding for the community Trust, was over-
looked during the early phases of creating contacts and building relationships. 
Competing activities and resistance to forestry 
In selling the idea of an alliance to a local, albeit, diverse community, it was 
crucial to employ a strategy that would counter the numerous questions and 
concerns that the residents were raising. Since forestry would be exercised not in 
isolation but as one of the various local, although small-scale economic activities, 
one of the areas of concern was how additional forestation would impact on de 
facto communal cattle grazing fields since these are intertwined inside the leased 
areas. The solution to this particular issue is a contradiction of sorts, especially 
coming from a business firm that operates within market principles that lay 
emphasis on individualism. SFP, through the Trust leaders, emphasized the 
collective benefits that would accrue from community involvement in a private 
enterprise and argued that this was essentially better for the community as a 
whole, especially since individual activities like stock rearing benefited specific 
households rather than everybody in the ‘community’. Some community mem-
bers did not support further forestation on communal land, and did not think that 
the rest of the members would agree to plant more trees to feed future SFP’s 
increased demands. One community member opined: 
People around here would not agree to forestation due to the uncertainty this would raise 
about that particular land. There is a place nearby called Lutu where they tried in 1993 to 
plant more trees. There was confusion and some politics, so the communities destroyed those 
forests. The company that planted them said that local people would be employed in those 
forests. Right now, there would still be voices who would say no, but again if they manage to 
plant, the likelihood of the forests being destroyed is low as people now understand the bene-
fits better (Interview 26/03/04) 
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In the kind of business alliance that was created in the SFP case study, empha-
sis is placed on shared objectives of the various actors, but there were more 
disparities in expectations of the community and SFP than there were similari-
ties.  Within the context of a legacy of discrimination, low skills base, and lack of 
financial might on the side of black people, and specifically the community as 
partner in the private enterprise, the case presents a scenario in which the com-
munity has developmental needs that they expect that SFP can fulfil. SFP on the 
other hand, prefers the community to instil a sense of ownership and contribute 
toward building the enterprise that operates on land to which they have legal 
rights. At the same time, SFP hopes that this sense of entitlement would in turn 
help to minimize the risk of deliberate fires caused by communities in the forest 
assets, as is reported to have happened in the past. They expect active support 
from the communities, in this respect through heightened security and a willing-
ness to watch out for members who could pose security threats. Inasmuch as SFP 
would hope to have a set of reconciled goals with the community Trust, certain 
contradictions manifest themselves as they also find difficulties in considering 
the Trust as partner. Instead, they view them as recipients of benefits that 
emanate from their compliance to government’s affirmative action policies. As 
the SFP forest manager stated: 
We [SFP] paid for our shares and we are still paying for it…but they [community trust] are 
living on a gift at the moment. They are getting a dividend without putting anything in 
(Interview 25 March 2004). 
Again this particular statement contradicts other sentiments from SFP, as 
elsewhere they acknowledge that the land they work on belongs to the 
neighbouring communities, and hence can be considered as part of their stake in 
the business. In addition, SFP, like any other business, has certain social respon-
sibilities in areas where it operates. It also perhaps ignites a debate about the 
value of land as a resource, and how SFP or private enterprises view it; but given 
that they pay rentals to the state, money that is meant for compensating rightful 
landowners, should they again be obliged to deal with community issues? 
Land, rentals and implications for SFP-Community relationship 
The process of building relationships between SFP and neighbouring communi-
ties is on going, with certain gains made and potential difficulties envisaged. One 
recurrent cause for concern emanates from the criteria used when the idea of the 
Trust was conceived.  
In a Briefing Document titled Transfer of 10% of the shares in Singisi Forest 
Products (PTY) LTD (“SFP”) to Black Economic Empowerment entities 
(“BEEs”) that was drawn up by SFP soon after, they were declared as the 
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preferred bidders of these state forest asset, SFP indicated that the shareholding 
that they had earmarked for their local partner would go to communities with 
“historic rights to the land on which the plantations were originally developed”. 
It went on to say “of the 10% BEE shareholding, 70% will be offered to commu-
nities with beneficiary land rights and 30% will be offered to others who are 
local, and have interests in the forest sector”. The actual process of singling out 
which groups of communities to engage was not as clear-cut as expressed in the 
article. Because the process of identifying rightful land claimants was under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Land Affairs, and was yet to be conducted in 
the Eastern Cape area, the (mis-)timing did not suit SFP who, in order to present 
an effective bid to the government, had to outline clear strategies on how they 
would involve local inhabitants. Because SFP had an agenda and a time table that 
did not correspond to the DLA one, SFP went ahead, and using its own criteria, 
identified groups of communities to incorporate into the new Trust.  
The SFP model of ownership has mandated SDT, the community Trust, to 
become the administrator of the 10% shareholding by community members. In 
principle, all the people residing within the geographic area identified by SFP are 
beneficiaries. On another level, there are people within these areas that had 
officially claimed for restoration of entitlements to land from which they were 
unjustly displaced during the apartheid regime. Should these claims be validated, 
such groups of people or individuals would become the legal owners of the land 
on which the forests stood. The annual rent of R6 million that SFP currently pays 
to the state will be channelled to these successful cases. The implication for the 
already functional community trust, whose primary purpose is to administer the 
10% shareholding would be a situation where individuals or groups with both 
legal claims to the land, but currently having use rights as they await the restora-
tion of their titles, are likely to insist on more influence in the running of the 
Trust, or would want to see a different representative body for legal owners and 
not simply people with use rights. Legally, the Trust has no basis to administer 
compensation payouts or annual rentals that SFP pays, since it was instituted for 
the purposes of managing community’s shareholding only, but on the ground, the 
story around rentals was conflicting and different depending on the affiliation of 
the respondent. 
SFP and SDT preferred that SDT should, because of its already existing legal 
position, take over the administration of the rentals once the state started remit-
ting them back to rightful communities. At a meeting with one community near 
Umzimkhulu town, a Trust official attempted to clarify the issue of rentals albeit, 
in contradiction to DLA’s procedures: 
SFP rents land from the communities around here and they pay rent. The rent is supposed to 
come to SDT and then be transferred to the communities. Everyone has to benefit equally.  
As it is a government department that is holding the rent that SFP has paid them so far and 
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we need as a community to organize so as to address this issue. The company pays R6 
million each year and they have done this for the past four years since 2001.  We need to 
know when they are going to start using the funds to the benefit of our communities. (Part of 
speech, SDT leader on 25 March 2004). 
The quote above corroborates the opinion of SFP as it relates to the rentals. An 
SFP manager had this to say about the rent they pay to the state: 
The government is waiting for DLA to identify beneficiary communities but what we (SFP) 
are saying is that why can’t government pay back in areas where identification has taken 
place? By delaying these payments government wants the relationship between us and the 
community to be troubled. (Interview 25 March 2004)
The subsequent impression of local residents that was partly caused by inaccu-
rate information from the SDT and SFP was that everyone would be a benefici-
ary of the land compensation scheme that the rentals would cover. The second 
misconception was that SDT would also be the custodians of the rentals when 
they are remitted back to rightful groups of communities. On the contrary, the 
response from the relevant government departments indicted that the leaders of 
the Trust (SDT) would not be endowed with any mandate over successfully 
claimed land, unless with clear permission from the successful claimants. The 
department of land affairs (DLA) in particular supported these sentiments, 
clarifying that inasmuch as there could be plans to re-channel rentals back to 
local communities, the process should not be confused with the land restitution 
which targets individuals who had actually lost property and had subsequently 
submitted successful claims. DWAF reinforced the view of DLA with one 
respondent explaining that 
They [SFP] want us to take the rentals and pay it to their Trust but that Trust is not the 
rightful owners of the land…We do not argue with the fact that Trust members are from the 
communities but they are not the rightful owners. DLA has a process of identifying those 
communities and legalizing it and before that process is completed, no money will be paid. 
(…) SFP knows very well that this is the procedure hence the impression that has been 
created out there is wrong and one that may backfire later as people will be expecting certain 
things from SFP. The Trust is their business partner and they seem to believe that the Trust is 
their answer to their problems with the community but it is not. SFP needs to go out and 
create a relationship with these communities, a conducive relationship with communities that 
stay around them. The Trust is a business arrangement and some of them do not even stay 
close to these areas. (Interview 6 July 2004) 
The view that SFP and SDT have taken toward the rentals, and that has gener-
ated such strong reactions from the government side, is not entirely accurate if 
one scrutinizes the procedures that guide cases of compensation. The question of 
rentals has been manipulated and politicized; hence it presents a good example 
where the relationship between SFP, government and the community Trust is 
tested. While it is clear that compensation arising out of successful claims on 
forest or other lands goes to applicant communities or individuals, SFP have 
pushed for the return of the rents they pay to the state, back to communities 
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through Singilanga Trust, which is their business partner. In this way, SFP hopes 
that SDT would be in a stronger financial position and a better-resourced partner. 
The anxiety has sprung forth of the government decision that the money be held 
in a suspense account, as opposed to the treasury account, so that it can eventu-
ally be given back to forest communities without too much bureaucratic proce-
dure. Secondly, inasmuch as a number of people understand that only successful 
claimants eventually benefit from compensation, and that other people in the 
neighbourhood may only benefit if the beneficiaries decide to engage in commu-
nal projects, government indeed did not explain what happens when there is a 
situation where the money they receive each year from these areas is more than 
what is due to claimants. This is likely to happen since just a portion of the 
forestland was claimed.  
Simplified, the story is that the land where the forests lie is either state land or 
community land. The state leases to SFP and also holds the community’s land in 
trust, awaiting finalization of claims. Therefore, part of the state land will be 
given back to both successful individual and communal claimants. Hence there 
will be less rental money going to the state and more to claimants. Where money 
goes to groups of claimants, there are certain legal procedures to which the state 
expects them to adhere, and includes establishing a legally recognized entity and 
drawing up their plans. It could be a Trust or a Communal Property Association. 
SDT as it was convened did not qualify to represent claimants, but the business 
interests of SFP communities. Some SDT members are not necessarily affected 
by the land issue; hence they are not entitled to rental returns. SDT officials are 
not elected by those affected by the land issue and are not mandated to act on 
their behalf. They could only act on behalf of the claimants if they got express 
permission from them 
Why the tension then and debate around rentals at the local level? Policy and 
practices that are intended to transform South Africa’s economic sector have 
redefined the way that business relates to the state. The macro-economic path 
that South Africa has chosen requires that there is less government say in the way 
the economy is run. Hence the state has used the few options it has, especially 
while it sells its assets to the private sector, to ensure that the private sector 
respond to some degree to the development challenges that are present in South 
Africa, particularly among the black majority. Some in the business sector, 
caught in these development dilemmas, feel obliged to create the impression of 
compliance, even when they know certain promises (such as having community 
as business partner) would run into logistical problems. Hence SFP hopes that by 
sensitizing the community around them to push for faster delivery of rents and 
other services, this would help ease the pressure that they face daily, given that 
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they are a lot closer to the local areas and to the people, more even than the local 
government itself. 
For communities who may have historic rights or current use rights to SFP 
land, the question of land also means that they have a lot more stake in the area, 
and by extension at SFP. They are the de facto landlords and their new status not 
only brings them some dignity but power as well. While the leaseholders (SFP) 
are protected for the period of the contract (an initial 35 years), the new owners 
of the land will decide whether to let them continue, or repossess the land and 
reconvert to other uses than forestry. These potential difficulties posed by 
unresolved tenure issues were envisioned earlier on, when the state was planning 
the sale of the forests and were a disincentive to investors, some of whom are 
believed to have withdrawn interest because of the complicated land tenure 
situation. This was the major reason why the state decided to lease out the land, 
forest assets and property on it, rather than sell them outright. The state sold use 
rights rather than the land and property on it. Regardless of the politics around 
land in the study areas and the position of the communities in question, getting 
into a business venture with SFP still required that these interested groups of 
communities came up with ways of funding their shareholding. 
On a general level, the question of land tenure in South Africa is a convoluted 
issue given the history of dispossession and displacements with apartheid. At the 
end of apartheid and the beginning of the new dispensation in 1994, the question 
of land and how to restore rights to affected black people became one of the most 
discussed issues of the decade. It is estimated that between 1960 and 1983 alone, 
over 3.5 million black people were removed from their land with the support of 
state apparatus and policies such as the Group Areas Act of 1913 (Kariuki 2004).  
While various new policies since 1994 have been written to support the 
processes that aim to restore or address people’s land rights, there are three 
separate but interrelated practices that have been sanctioned in order to address 
the post apartheid land question. These are: the Land Restitution, the Land 
Redistribution and the Land Tenure Reform. 
Through the Land Restitution process, the idea has been to identify through a 
national claims process, those individuals or groups who were forcibly removed 
from their lands. The claims were done through submitting applications to a Land 
Claims Commission, a process that ran for a few years and ended in 1998. The 
Commission has the mandate to process cases and declare them valid when there 
is sufficient proof that a displacement occurred. Successful applications are then 
either compensated financially, or where possible people are restored to their 
original lands.  
Land Redistribution on the other hand, aims to address the skewed nature of 
land ownership in South Africa through enabling the landless to gain access to 
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land. Kariuki (2004) observes the intricate link that exists between land redistri-
bution and the extension of socio-economic rights to black South Africans. 
Redistribution in itself therefore, is not simply concerned with equity but is a 
political response to a large section of the electorate who are mostly poor after 
years of systemic subjugation.  
Lastly, the Land Tenure Reform seeks to find solutions to problems of inse-
cure tenure. Examples of people in this category are those who live and work on 
private or state lands but who did not, under the previous regime, possess any 
legal land rights.  
Processes of this nature are seldom devoid of constraints, regardless of how 
well thought-out strategies and procedures are. The land question in South Africa 
is a political issue but one that is being addressed within a neo-liberal economic 
context where the market is given primacy. This poses contradictions where the 
land reform process may be seen to interfere with private property rights. Having 
to deal with such historical issues within current economic paradigms, has posed 
many legal problems that have in turn contributed the slow-pace, or in certain 
cases, failure of the reform process.  
Within the study area there were numerous land claims by individuals or 
community groups, and these had not been finalized by the time the lease was 
signed over to SFP and SQF. Several groups of communities and even individu-
als in these areas have lodged claims to these state lands. The outcome is still 
awaited, due to long and protracted procedures by the relevant government 
departments. On top of that, there is a general acceptance that communities have 
rights of access to their environments and that they need to benefit from proceeds 
arising out of the exploitation of local resources. Hence, there is a claimed formal 
ownership for some, plus an informal right of each community that neighbours 
the forest. This is the reason that the community Trust recognizes both categories 
of people as residents. It is around these sentiments that concepts of co-manage-
ment and empowerment are being refined to suit the South African development 
challenges. When the land claims are finalized and the successful claimants are 
notified, they would assume legal ownership of the land. Because this same land 
is already contracted out to SFP and SQF, they regularly pay rental to the state. 
The agreement between them and the state stipulates that the state will receive 
the rentals from SFP and SQF. The state will then re-channel these to the rightful 
owners. In the meantime the state holds the land in trust on behalf of identified 
owners until the agreement expires.  
At the time of the research, SFP had paid to the state three years worth of 
rentals, but these had not been disbursed back to the local communities, as the 
real owners had not been determined yet. There are various reasons to explain the 
delay, the first one being that inasmuch as the government, through the then 
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Minister of Public Enterprises, had made the commitment to revert the money to 
communities, modalities and structures of giving the money back had not been 
worked out both in government, and at community level. In addition, the depart-
ment of land affairs (DLA), the government department responsible for identifi-
cation of right landowners, had not commenced its work in these areas. Money 
could not therefore be released. The big issue out of this whole debate springs 
from the fact that some members would be rightful owners and therefore qualify 
to be paid rent on their land as individual entities. The rest of the community 
expected to benefit too, based on what the Ministry of Public Enterprises had 
declared at the local meeting. Despite these statements, it was difficult to 
ascertain how the non-claimants would benefit from the rentals. What was 
evident was a high level of anticipation and anxiety amongst residents, given that 
the Minister had publicly promised to deliver.  
For SFP, the debate around rentals served as an opportunity to ease off 
pressure of the contentious demands arising from their alliance with the commu-
nity trust. The sentiments expressed by SFP were that there was not much they 
could do in communities until government remitted the rentals. The argument 
advanced was that SFP was a business and it was up to government to address 
developmental and social concerns. Again, this position somehow contradicts the 
commitment SFP made to community involvement at the time it was gunning for 
the state assets. The strength of the SFP bid to buy the assets was invigorated by 
their keen interest in neighbouring communities and the idea of their empower-
ment. At the time SFP made these promises, government had not made public 
any commitment to remit the whole amount of rent coming from the leases, other 
than for those who would win land claims. In other words, government’s 
decision to give back all the money that would accrue from the leases did not 
have to directly influence plans that SFP might have had in regard to their 
engagement with Singilanga communities. While having an integrated approach 
and pooling resources for community enhancement would be a workable option, 
and government needed to spearhead this strategy, the issue of rentals has gone 
political, with SFP seeming to use it to point to government failures as they 
deflect the community’s attention away from themselves. 
The political dynamics between SFP and their partners, both government and 
communities notwithstanding, there are numerous attempts that SFP have 
initiated to intensify their contribution to the socio-economic needs in the project 
area. Some of these initiatives respond in part to commitments made in the 
business plan that SFP submitted to government as part of their contract. These 
are discussed in the next chapter on empowerment. 
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The problem of financing for communities 
The creation of SDT as detailed above involved numerous meetings at different 
venues with the vast number of neighbouring communities, aimed at convincing 
them to appreciate forestry and work together with SFP not only as neighbours 
but also as owners of the land on which the assets stand. However, SDT needed 
to purchase the shares offered by SFP. This idea ran into problems due to a 
number of reasons; SDT was a hastily convened entity and although SFP 
indicates that the wooing process took almost four years, most of this time went 
into formation and organization, rather than exploration of funding avenues. 
Secondly, the community had no money, and financing structures favourable for 
deals like these were few. Although government had indicated they would facili-
tate the creation of such funds, some like the National Empowerment Fund 
(NEF) were still in the early stages of conception at the time SFP was estab-
lished. Existing financial institutions such as Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) and the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) were considered for 
loans by SFP on behalf of SDT, but either the interest rates repayable on the 
loans were too high, or the applications were unsuccessful against the criteria that 
the banks use to advance loans.  
When SDT could not get financing, SFP offered to purchase on their behalf 
through the Land Bank, the 10% shares that had been earmarked. The value of 
the 10% shares was calculated at R3.2 million. Repayment is deducted in stages 
over a period of about 10 years from annual dividends that would be due to SDT. 
These decisions by SFP may demonstrate their commitment to the empowerment 
process that they had started, although the idea that SDT by themselves could not 
come up with financing may exacerbate a situation of dependency of the commu-
nity Trust on SFP, which in the long run could be detrimental to the whole idea 
of empowerment and the business partnership. 
SQF’s management approach: Business to business 
SQF does not directly involve community groups as partners in the business but 
separately conducts community outreach programs. Their primary approach in 
opening up their forest business for empowerment involves Imbokodvo Lema-
balabala (IL), a black business group. IL directly purchased 10% worth of shares 
and partnered with Mondi to create SQF. This is a straight business-to-business 
partnership, unlike the SFP model. Apart from being a shareholder with voting 
rights at SQF, the main contribution of IL is manifested in its mentoring program 
called Fukamela, a business-mentoring program that trains individuals from their 
target community. A detailed discussion on Fukamela is contained in the next 
chapter on empowerment practices. The business partnership between SQF and 
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IL was fairly straightforward at start-up and avoided a lot of organizational chal-
lenges that SFP experience with communities as business partner. 
SQF and community outreach 
Unlike SFP that preferred an alliance with a whole community for purposes of 
fulfilling their empowerment targets, Mondi’s chose a black business group who 
had the capacity to negotiate, and also look for financing to purchase their own 
shares in the new company, SQF. Although Mondi opted for a straight business 
deal instead of going the community route, there is still a substantial amount of 
community outreach that SQF undertakes.  
SQF view the relationship they are creating with communities as going 
beyond just forestry activities. They regard themselves as facilitators, and the 
link between local communities and other public and private actors in the imme-
diate region as well as those outside. During the research, SQF was holding 
meetings and conducting needs assessments in communities who reside within a 
5-kilometer radius of the areas that they work. In outreach activities, the problem 
of community boundaries was not a problem, since it did not involve a lot of 
resources. Unlike SFP, SQF approach to community issues was specific, clear 
and not loaded with ambitious targets and promises. As the SQF manager for 
transformation explains: 
We go to them [local communities], hold meetings and together we identify their needs, then 
we sit down and work out how we can assist. We emphasize that we are not going to fund 
everything but that we just initiate. We have started small, but as time goes on we would be 
doing bigger things especially as relates to job creation. When and if we initiate a project and 
fund it, we say this is how we are going to recover a portion of our money, it is not all a 
grant. (Interview 20 May 2004) 
SQF cites two main reasons for their reluctance to have the community as 
business partner. They found it difficult, in light of several outstanding land 
claims in the area, to discern which community group had a more legitimate 
claim to the area. Thus they took the decision to wait for the completion of 
government’s land claims process, as this would not only point to the legitimate 
communities with which to work, but also delineate boundaries or place physical 
limits to their areas of operation. 
Second, SQF claimed that local communities were not organized and prepared 
to do business when the state made known their intentions to sell. On the 
contrary, some local residents interviewed also cited a lack of information on the 
intentions of government and Mondi when the assets were advertised for sale. As 
one IL interviewee reported: 
The announcement was made even to local communities here and the process was not an 
overnight thing. IL was interested in another deal in Mpumalanga but when they didn’t 
clinch that one, they were advised by the then Minister of Public Enterprises that they could 
still have a chance at the KwaZulu-Natal deal so they came here and teamed up with Mondi 
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because no one from this area was interested. One person who works for Khulanathi also 
told me that people here were disorganized until the last minute. (Interview 21 May 2004). 
The quote above also opens up another side of the debate that reflects the 
tensions between empowering business people who have access to capital and 
political connections, versus peripheral local communities who lack access to 
such power structures.  
Like the SFP case, one other significant reason for non-involvement of neigh-
bouring communities was a lack of access to financing. The 10% shareholding 
that was eventually sold to IL was valued at R10 million and IL was able to find 
its own financing. This amount, unlike that of SFP, was too great for low 
resourced communities to obtain in the absence of proper financing structures 
targeting such kind of deals. As mentioned earlier, institutions such the National 
Empowerment Fund, in 2001 were still in the early processes of being estab-
lished, and the only option was to go through existing banks or development 
financing bodies whose interest rates were considered to be too high. 
The other issue which local respondents were concerned about was in regard 
to the origin of Mondi’s partner at SQF. Although IL is a black business and their 
interest in the assets does not in any way violate the empowerment practice, local 
communities voiced dissatisfaction with the make up of IL that is made up from 
a Traditional Authority Investment Company (TAIC). TAIC, which controls 70% 
of IL Holdings, represents communities who are residents of the neighbouring 
Mpumalanga province, and not northern KwaZulu-Natal where SQF operates. 
Apart from encouraging transformation in both the public and private sector, 
most policy pronouncements emphasize the prioritization of local people in terms 
of jobs and other spin-offs in cases where there are investment activities. As said, 
the explanation for the local people’s missed opportunity in this particular deal, 
as given by SQF staff, pertains to their lack of cohesion and preparedness to 
venture into the business environment. However whilst the lack of organization 
into entities that could legally engage the private sector is due to a range of 
factors mentioned already; Mondi, as the major shareholder at SQF, has a history 
of engagement at the local level through a once successful outgrower timber 
scheme (Ojwang 1999). One would assume that similar communication and 
logistical structures that Mondi used during their outsourcing scheme would have 
been applied to mobilize communities during privatization. Mondi had ample 
logistics to partner with communities had they been interested, or if it had been a 
strict condition of the sale exercise 
Although Mondi avoided considering local communities in a direct business 
deal, it employed other alternative means in outreaching communities in whose 
environments they operate. SQF classify these as community social investment 
initiatives. These include key business initiatives like Fukamela, but also encom-
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pass support of smaller projects, mostly undertaken by the youth, such as block 
making, honey production, poultry and horticulture. Other support that SQF 
extend to these communities includes bursaries, donations to NGOs that target 
poor children, donations to school libraries, and assistance in school projects 
such as extension of classrooms. 
Such activities are guided by a socio-economic assessment toolkit. The toolkit 
is a product developed by Anglo-American Group of which Mondi is a member. 
SQF views these activities as mutually reinforcing to the idea of BEE. Hence the 
decision to intensify their facilitation of smaller economic activities with 
communities, rather than pursue a formal business partnership with high transac-
tion costs. Trends in South Africa’s larger business environment portray a shift of 
emphasis away from such conventional social investment activities. Instead, such 
activities are viewed as a smaller component of empowerment as companies look 
to the bigger picture through diversifying access to activities such as procure-
ment, ownership, management, and a concerted transfer of skills to the less elite 
citizens. Both case studies reveal that there is still a thin line, and sometimes 
obfuscation, between what should be considered as social investment and what 
constitutes empowerment practice. More significant business activities, like 
procurement at the micro-level, are understood as reinventing corporate social 
responsibility, and taking the concept to a higher level. These are done by intro-
ducing the target population to mainstream business, as opposed to merely 
boosting their strategies for better livelihood.  
Mondi’s non-core business activities have always been clearly defined within 
the parameters of what such activities contribute to the company’s bottom line. In 
an earlier study by Ojwang (1999), while the other giant forest company SAPPI 
was keen to market their socially relevant activities as such, Mondi maintained 
that their involvement, even with local communities, was counted not in terms of 
what it was giving but on what it was getting out of such ventures. Mondi’s once 
successful Khulanathi outgrower scheme, where individual growers were given 
incentives under contract to sell back timber to Mondi, is one such example. 
SAPPI at the time also ran a similar outgrower timber project called Project 
Grow but, unlike Mondi, they categorized it as part of their social responsibili-
ties. The Anglo-American social investment framework that Mondi and SQF 
apply in their community engagement programs also limits this relationship, as 
they indicate, to one that is mutually beneficial. 
As indicated earlier, the major shareholder, Mondi, through a seconded 
management team carries out SQF daily operations. The agreement was drawn 
up with IL because of Mondi’s vast experience in forestry and IL’s lack of it. But 
IL as a junior shareholder indicated their interest in getting involved in some 
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way, even if it was not in technical operations of SQF. Consequently, a training 
arm of SQF called Fukamela was established to train potential black contractors. 
Beyond community outreach 
SQF, having made progress with Fukamela, as discussed in the next chapter on 
empowerment practices, is trying to expand the shareholding to community 
groups as well. Like SFP that started its empowerment initiatives through a large 
group of communities and later mixed this with certain individual strategies, as 
detailed in the next chapter: SQF is doing the same, but in reverse. SQF started 
out with an individual black enterprise as partner, but lately it is trying to offer 
another 10% shares to a community group in its area of operation. In this new 
attempt to diversify the way communities can benefit from their operations, SQF 
has run into problems that are of a similar nature to the ones SFP went through 
during the creation of the community Trust.  
SQF’s parent company, Mondi, for many years has been situated in the 
Richards Bay area of KwaZulu-Natal. During this time, it has established a 
tradition of creating a relationship with local communities through the local 
traditional authority structures. SQF, since its inception, has also followed the 
same system of entry. While SQF used traditional authority structures to get to 
the broader community, they, unlike SFP, did not use this as a springboard to set 
up autonomous committees or task teams to represent the interests of communi-
ties. Four years into its existence, Mondi’s decision to offload another 10% of its 
SQF shareholding but this time to surrounding communities, is challenged by the 
individual interests of the traditional authority. The problem for Mondi and SQF 
has been how to access the whole community without being bogged down by the 
red tape that exists within the structures of traditional leadership. The traditional 
leadership on the other hand, claims a portion, say 40% out of these 10% shares 
to go to them directly. This would translate to individual ownership, which is in 
contradiction to Mondi’s intentions of broadening the ownership base via the 
collective route and offering communities another option for contributing and 
benefiting from the forest economy. The logic behind the traditional leadership 
preferring private ownership rather than one on behalf of or together with their 
‘subjects’ contradicts their own role as custodians of land, and also exemplifies 
further their own role in the erosion of traditional authority system. In the same 
vein, for Mondi and SQF to seek to engage a community organized under the 
customary tenure system, and bypassing the leadership structures, makes more 
difficult an already complex situation. 
Both SFP and SQF interact with traditional structures, especially to gain an 
audience with the rest of the area residents. SQF are experiencing a lot more 
problems in negotiating with the leadership than SFP. The explanation lies in the 
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fact that the traditional system in KwaZulu-Natal where SQF works is still 
potent, stronger, and less eroded than that on the Eastern Cape, the base of SFP. 
SQF therefore faces obstacles in overcoming the local red tape of traditional 
authority in engaging the people. Hence nothing real, in terms offloading part of 
ownership of SQF to local communities, has materialized. 
Common issues for SFP and SQF: The concept of community  
Generally in this study, the application of the concept of ‘community’ reflects a 
problem that has been cited in most critiques of community studies. Murphree 
(1999) argues that since the application of the concept of ‘community of place’, 
‘community of interest’ or ‘community of use’, all pose challenges for common 
property theory, the definitions should be more functional, while still recognizing 
the significance of boundary delineation in Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM). The arguments that underlie the struggle with the con-
cept of community are based on the knowledge that generalizing communities, 
and thus creating an image of homogeneity, masks real differences within such 
population groups (Turner, 2000).  
In SFP case, they chose to work with a ‘community of place’. This has made 
greater the issues that SFP, as a private entity, had to deal with when engaging a 
community as partner rather than an established business outfit. The community 
concept in this case was conceived to fulfil a certain function i.e. to help win the 
state-owned forest assets, and at the same time create the opportunity for the 
mostly rural residents to enter into the running of the local economy. Because the 
forest assets are scattered over a large area covering parts of two provinces, as we 
illustrate below, and because the criteria for identifying communities depended 
on location of the forest assets, this meant that the communities were scattered 
and found in different corners of the project area. SFP reports that this factor is a 
barrier to effective engagement. Secondly, wide differentiation exists in these 
areas determined by factors such as language and culture. Such issues later 
affected the way that the community trusts functioned. 
Attempts at definition of community for both SFP and SQF did not take into 
account social boundaries. In the SQF area, local residents considered social ties 
rather than spatial ones to define their identities. Hence many people identified 
with others beyond their geographic boundaries, but who had similar social ties, 
rather than those within their neighbourhoods. Among the Zulu people, the 
surname is retained along the lineage, and clans are organized under a traditional 
system governed by a chief. In most cases, these communities can be found 
within one geographic area. However, there has also been significant movement 
in the past especially during apartheid, and the haphazard nature of these move-
ments interfered with such spatial units. It is now common to find certain small 
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communities with similar familial ties located in other spaces away from their 
traditional lands. Although there has been some degree of integration, the 
tendency to identify with the original social ties is still greater than the geo-
graphic ones. In fact, in Zululand for instance, when people meet for the first 
time, the older person would normally ask for the others surname rather than his 
or her place of origin, as the surname itself is supposed to tell not only one’s 
place of origin, but kinship ties as well 
External actors on the local scene may not all need a detailed understanding of 
groups of people to execute their business, but when it comes to engaging 
communities, relying on geographic boundaries alone is inadequate to understand 
the local social dynamics. Such knowledge is necessary in projecting what 
activities can be successful at the local level, and which ones are most likely to 
face difficulties due to certain local beliefs or preferences. The differences in the 
Eastern Cape for SFP were more numerous than those in northern KwaZulu-
Natal. Although, as mentioned before, the traditional authority is still more 
influential in KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape north forest region managed by 
SFP is characterized not only by numerous administrative boundaries in certain 
areas, but by different languages and cultures as well. The eastern side of SFP 
area lies on the flexible borders between Zulu land and Xhosa land. Even 
administratively, these borders were not clearly defined and one could drive one 
direction from an area designated as being in KwaZulu-Natal province, move 
farther west into the Eastern Cape Province and once again come across bill-
boards welcoming you to KwaZulu-Natal. The overlapping nature of these 
boundaries does not pose any unmanageable logistical problems for SFP, but 
may serve to illuminate the possible issues that inform the manner in which 
groups of communities may define themselves.  
In the SFP area, dissatisfaction of the relationship between local people and 
SFP has sometimes emanated from the feeling that only some areas or social 
units are considered for employment, bursaries, or other benefits that spin off 
from this alliance. Within the area falling under Singisi Trust for instance, there 
is a specific clan called KwaJali. A lady chief who is known by her title name 
Ndabezitha Jali leads this area. During an interview with Ndabezitha Jali, she had 
this to say about their involvement with SFP: 
SFP approached us as a community that they wanted to have a joint venture. They thought it 
necessary to tell us what was going on emphasizing that it was important for us to know 
what would go on in our area and on our land. But when they mentioned job creation, we got 
interested as this has been the main concern for this community. After this, our community 
meetings were well attended and even our hall became too small and we would sit outside. 
The people were particularly happy about this venture and job creation and they were also 
hoping that they would be supported by the company (SFP) whenever they had projects that 
need funding support. This community had been concerned that previously, they were not 
considered for jobs at the saw-mill (when it was run by the state) and they wanted to know if 
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this would change and they inquired this from the company. The company (SFP) indicated 
that they were going to give the people from our area first priority when jobs were available. 
But things have not happened as it was initially promised by the company. Our community 
members are still unemployed and there are no job opportunities for them at the company. 
Those who had jobs have lost them and most of the people who are getting employed are 
people from outside our community. These people could be from other places like Singisi. 
Washington Jali, a member of the KwaJali chieftaincy and a principal of the 
local secondary school and also his community’s representative at the Singisi 
sub-Trust corroborated Ndabezitha Jali’s perspective: 
KwaJali is part and parcel of Weza (where SFP saw-mill and main operations offices are 
located). So we wanted to have something from Weza that could help the community in 
terms of development. Of course we got promises from SFP that they would work together 
with us on some of these issues. In our area we have problems of capacity especially 
finances and this is what brought us closer to the company (SFP) because we wanted to get 
financial help that could help us fulfill some of our needs as a community. They, SFP, also 
told us of the 10% shares and that we would receive annual dividends so we had an idea 
what we were entitled to. Also there is the issue of scholarships and bursaries from SFP. This 
is a thorny issue for me because I had a child who had applied for a bursary and who quali-
fied to go and do engineering so he applied to a technology institute. I followed up with SFP 
but nothing came out of it. The only person I know who got it from around my area is one 
person whose father works with SFP. About working with other communities, the area 
targeted by SFP is big. In our case, we have our neighbors at Weza. When I talk about Weza, 
it is composed of two traditional areas meaning two chiefs but so far we work together. If it 
was to go beyond Weza, that would be too big and some people would want to have more 
power, too many people spoil the broth. SFP is situated in KwaJali area and the other area I 
am talking about is KwaMaxhi.  
From the two statements above, the term community refers to a much smaller 
unit from which the members draw their identity. The sentiments expressed 
above also suggest that their trust is built and confined within this cluster of 
relations. The KwaJali are ready to extend a working relationship to the people of 
KwaMaxhi, who together with them occupy the Weza area, but any relationship 
beyond that is believed to expose the community to domination and power 
dynamics of other areas. The Singisi Trust, of which they are but one among 
several communities is one such entity that according to KwaJali, such power 
dynamics are manifest. Secondly, because SFP’s operations offices are located in 
Weza, which is home to KwaJali and KwaMaxhi, there are feelings of entitle-
ment, hence the requests that they be prioritized for jobs and bursaries. The main 
reason for the complaint is because so far they have not received the benefits 
such as jobs that they had anticipated; but the forest operations extend to areas 
further west into Singizi and as far as Langeni in Umtata, hence the people in 
these areas could also claim similar entitlements. It is due to this extensive scope 
of the forest assets that SFP’s understanding is not confined to social units alone, 
but covers a much larger area consisting of several autonomous groups. 
127 
As a result, SFP’s relationship with these communities around Weza has not 
been cordial. One SFP forester clustered them under ‘problem communities’ also 
indicating that fires arising as a result of arson are more frequent in this area than 
other forest areas. While SFP’s assessment of this community may be accurate, 
based on their investigations and knowledge, the KwaJali readily band around 
their own in solving issues that commonly affect them. Such a militant and 
united stance may be a problem for SFP whom the KwaJali have accused of 
making false promises. 
Concluding note 
Although there were logistical challenges and incapacities within communities to 
engage with the forest companies, the community-company axis discussed here 
acts as another arena where power relations predicate the kind of relationships 
created. Outstanding government policy processes also cause tensions. It is a case 
of unfulfilled expectations by communities, and for the private forestry, a 
problematic and complex environment, where they cannot deliver what they had 
indicated to communities in their operation areas. What is important in both cases 
is that actors have the opportunity to learn from these new processes, and due to 
the flexibilities in these relationships, ideas with good potential can be strength-
ened while poor ones are discarded or replaced with better ones.  
Finally, Figure 10 summarizes the key management styles as discussed, of 
both SFP and SQF. 
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Figure 10  Comparative summary of SFP and SQF  
 SFP - Eastern Cape SQF - KwaZulu-Natal 
Primary approach 
to empowerment 
Community as business partner Black entity as business partner 
Secondary 
approach to 
empowerment 
Individual focus in skills transfer 
through outsourcing activities such 
as transportation, silviculture and 
cleaning contracts  
Business skills training focusing on 
individuals from the community 
through Fukamela incubation 
scheme 
Community support activities 
geared towards improving local 
businesses such as craft making 
Community 
representation 
Umbrella community Trust (SDT) 
and two sub Trusts- Langeni & 
Singisi 
One Trust director sits on SFP board 
of directors 
Local committees 
Community stake 10% shareholding None 
Motivation for 
community 
outreach 
To reduce cases of arson and 
improve security around forest 
assets 
Improve on corporate social 
responsibility 
To reduce cases of arson and 
improve security around forest 
assets 
Improve on corporate social 
responsibility 
Local challenges Identification of local communities  
Defining local boundaries 
Unresolved land tenure issues 
Identification of local communities 
Defining local boundaries 
Unresolved land tenure issues 
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Empowerment in the case studies 
Considering development without power and relationships is like analyzing irrigation with-
out considering water and its distribution 
(Chambers 2005) 
The previous chapter presented a discussion of the organizing models of various 
actors in the case studies and how they create and maintain their relationships 
within the context of a forest business.  
This chapter,22 whilst loosely reflecting on the key areas that the national 
empowerment framework outlines,23 will analyze how these actors approach the 
concept of empowerment. Four key issues are explicitly discussed in this chapter. 
It first presents an understanding of empowerment and how the case studies 
actors perceive it. The second and third sections discuss respectively, the two 
related elements of employment equity and skills needs. Fourth, I highlight the 
subject of entrepreneurial ownership, especially by community groups and supra-
local individual actors and the challenges that they face in their quest to engage 
in the forest business. The final section in the chapter revisits SFP and SQF 
approach to empowerment, as seen through certain entrepreneurial activities that 
they develop.  
                                                                 
22
  Whilst this chapter relies on combined stories and evidence from both SFP and SQF, there are more 
empowerment actions at SFP hence more frequency of citations from the SFP case. Comparisons are 
made between the two cases where they occur, but this is not a strict approach to the chapter. 
23
  The BEE Act (2005) indicates six targeted areas for action. These are: first, ownership, management 
and control of productive assets by black people, second by collective black entities such as commu-
nities, workers and co-operatives, third developing human resources and skills, fourth, ensuring em-
ployment equity in all occupational categories, fifth, access to procurement, and lastly, improving 
investment in enterprises managed or owned by black people.  
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Empowerment: Diversity in views at supra-local level  
In an interview with the SQF Social Responsibility Officer in February 2005, he 
gave a realistic view to BEE practice, especially where rural people were con-
cerned. He explained: 
Our understanding of empowerment is that the process should be able to create opportunities 
especially jobs. We live in a remote area, people are not enlightened, and they don’t jump 
and take up business opportunities when they arise. They need certain support structures, and 
they need to be pushed. There may be only two enlightened people around here and you find 
that opportunities rotate amongst these same people, just like the ‘big five’ often talked about 
at the national level. People here wait for something or someone to wake them up. Govern-
ment should introduce some rollout program or some tools for the rural areas to meet the 
local challenges. The BEE elite approach has not worked in the rural areas. The rural people 
have problems of language and can’t read or write English. English is a ‘murder’ language 
here in rural Zululand. Even provincial reports are written in English. You don’t get things 
written in Zulu. I have seen articles, plans, and preparations on BEE for KwaZulu-Natal 
written in English but most of the people here are not educated. 
SQF’s emphasis on jobs is shared at the community level, where respondents 
gave meaning to empowerment based on what their immediate needs were, and 
what steps they thought could be taken to increase opportunities toward improv-
ing their lives. In the study areas, jobs were perceived to be one of the most 
urgent needs for most people. The inability of the people to take up available 
opportunities as the interview above suggests, is directly linked to their relative 
state of incapacity due to inadequate or non-existent education. This view further 
suggests that any meaningful attempt at transfer of power to the people through 
exposure to small enterprises or attachments to larger businesses should be 
preceded by finding solutions to the problems of illiteracy and incapacities that 
hinder them. This solution-based approach is likely to work better for the youth 
and those in their early productive stages, but how then does empowerment work 
for those who are illiterate, living in the rural areas and no longer of school going 
age? I revisit this element in the discussion section. 
Unlike the pessimistic quote above, other respondents who were enlightened 
about the government’s perspective on BEE were more optimistic and idealized 
what the BEE practice should entail. An SFP employee, who is also an official of 
the community Trust (SDT), reported: 
Towards the end of 2005, I attended an empowerment meeting in Durban. The government’s 
intention is for black people to also own some businesses. Companies should look beyond 
employment but also include ways of facilitating such ownership. At SFP for instance at 
management level, according to the new government regulation, we should have some black 
people in top management who also have shares in the company. The directorships also 
should reflect the same. These people should have power to make decisions. In local areas, 
people must feel that they own these processes and be able to express themselves without 
fear and nobody should be dictating to them. If you go to Natal, there are women holding 
large forests of between 150-200 hectares and they are fully responsible for their manage-
ment. This is a good example. 
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The local dimension in defining and operationalizing the concept of empow-
erment was also advanced by SFP. This view postulated that benefits and oppor-
tunities that arise from businesses such as SFP should first and foremost, be 
targeted at those who live closest to that environment.  
Our position [SFP] is that if you got a mass of forests here and you have communities 
residing around these forests, you may have a choice to get contractors from elsewhere to 
come and do the available work but we give such opportunities to the local people. Our view 
is that we must develop the local people and the local area. 
Implementing policies to enable more access by black people to mainstream 
economic structures, whether they are individuals or groups, residing in urban or 
rural areas, was not intended to be an antagonistic process, but one that would 
contribute toward the mutual goals of transformation. SFP and SQF, both 
operating in the rural areas, reported that it was much more difficult, compared to 
the urban, to operationalize certain elements of BEE. Despite the challenges, SFP 
managed to partner with communities. They regarded this process as ground-
breaking and pushing the limits of innovation by veering off from conventional 
BEE practices that target elite partners. One SFP forest manager advanced this 
line of thought stating that: 
At SFP, we emphasize that there must be black equity but we make a distinction and we say 
local black equity. We are not interested in NAIL or Johnnic (examples of big, urban corpo-
rate owned by black elites) with money but we want bona fide Eastern Cape participants. 
The local people who are part of this BEE discourse feel entitled to the 
empowerment process, both by virtue of their proximity to the forest assets and 
due to their history in relation to the land on which the assets are located. The 
sentiments are also a result of the customary nature of land tenure in these rural 
areas, and the fact that some of the black communities and individuals were 
dispossessed and now feel the need for redress and justice. In this respect it 
becomes an issue of rights and social justice. While in principle, voices from the 
surrounding communities and those of the forest company agree on such an 
entitlement, there was still significant dissatisfaction, especially from the 
community side, on the way available jobs had been awarded and on the amount 
of time it was taking to realize gains. One community member, a trustee who 
represents communities living around Weza sawmill, acknowledged that they 
viewed empowerment practice as a joint effort between SFP, as the private 
operator in their vicinity, and themselves as residents. In this respect, he adds, 
Because we recognize our role in dealing with our local problems, we approached SFP for 
some assistance. Our major problem is the unemployed youth and because we are the closest 
community to the company, we felt that we should have more access and be given prefer-
ence when jobs arose. The problem SFP indicated was that these youths were not skilled to 
the level that they would be taken on by SFP. So we asked them to provide us with certain 
avenues that we could use to train and impart skills to those who need them so that they 
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became employable. SFP said they would organize workshops and that our youth would get 
preference but these have not materialized. 
The big question is whether the dominant understanding of empowerment and 
its operationalization from the existing policy perspective, can equally address 
the rural challenges, or whether its approach and meaning should be refined, 
particularly to meet the needs of rural people. SQF and SFP empowerment 
actions, as discussed in the next sections, suggest that with creativity and a 
degree of flexibility, it is possible to find solutions for the rural areas. Because of 
challenges specific to the rural context, these actions are a hybrid between the 
requirements of BEE policy and traditional forms of corporate social outreach, 
with mentoring as a common element in most processes.  
Employment equity 
In the SFP quarterly report24 for January to March 2004, employment in the sala-
ried positions was skewed in favour of white employees, who held 16 of the 18 
combined positions in the top executive and upper-level management category.  
The skewed25 distribution, to the advantage of white employees, is pronounced 
similarly at the mid-level categories but drastically drops at the entry level and 
casual categories (Figure 11).   
Figure 11  Distribution of jobs according to gender and population groups at  
 SFP in 2004 
Level 
White 
male 
Black 
male 
White 
female 
Black 
female 
A) Top executives 3 1 0 0 
B) Upper-level managers 13 1 0 0 
C) Mid- level officers 38 23 2 1 
D) Admin staff  1 12 16 7 
E) Casual labourers 2 949 0 529 
TOTAL 57 986 18 537 
Source: HM/SFP (2004) 
The composition of SFP employees for the salaried positions is not only 
skewed according to race, but inequality exists along gender lines as well. While 
the problem of specialized skills, especially in the black population group, was 
                                                                 
24
  Singisi Forest Products (PTY) LTD. Meeting of the Directors, Parktown. 25 May 2004. 
25
  The distribution of positions is skewed considering that whites constitute only 9.2% of the South Afri-
can population [www.Statssa.gov.za/census01/html]. 
133 
cited as the major reason for the disparities, the skills angle does not explain why 
white female employees in this case study are less than a third of their white male 
counterparts.  
The unequal gender distribution of positions amongst white employees at 
Hans Merensky and SFP emanates from the organizational culture of the com-
pany. The evident general male advantage in employment is not necessarily a 
skills problem, but a reflection of how broader societal and specific organiza-
tional attitudes affect redistribution of opportunities. The fact that these attitudes 
are not only about gender, but race-based as well, may then discount the popular 
reliance on the problem of skills alone to explain why the composition of private 
companies is still mainly white male. While the crisis of skills is a reality, the 
extent to which it is used as the argument for lack of employment equity, often 
masks entrenched attitudes. These attitudes work towards promoting and main-
taining white male dominance in the upper echelons of management. 
One black manager gave his opinion on the trend and state of employment 
equity at SFP. 
Employment equity is not happening and to me the problem has been that when it started, the 
Human Resources Department would be the ones in the driving seat, but other people who 
are at the heart of the company are now active as well and this includes people in finance and 
marketing, hence the focus has been diluted and overwhelmed from all sides. Secondly, we 
tend to be content with the usual reasons why it is not happening and I don’t think we go 
beyond that, take an extra mile and seriously ask ourselves how do we change this? You 
raise such issues at higher-level meetings and immediately people’s body language change, 
faces change. All of a sudden, depending on what you raised, if it is perceived as right or 
wrong, you are the popular or unpopular guy.  
Major inactivity and apathy towards transformation was reported to occur in 
the middle level management. While they are the ones who were targeted to drive 
these processes, it is also at this level that there was considerable amount of 
insecurity, and fear of the potential threat that would result from successful 
change and integration of more black people into the company. Because the 
number of positions was not necessarily expanding, especially due to the volatile 
international timber market and the need to stay competitive, transformation was 
understood to place white managers at risk of losing their jobs to clear the way 
for black managers. Those in top management positions on the other hand, were 
more confident and secure in their positions, as they are the ones who would 
make the final decisions. They were reported to be more positive about change, 
but then left this process to the same reluctant middle managers. As one senior 
level employee said: 
There is realization at top management level that there is a need to change in terms of policy, 
focus and drive. And the company’s view of BEE is that change should be reflected at the 
company management level, key positions, training and development. So in terms of focus, 
things have changed. But I think there seems to be a blockade somewhere along the line as 
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most people actually targeted for employment equity positions leave. The bigger companies 
such as Mondi and SAPPI grab them. The argument has been salary but really we need to 
question this more. Why spend a lot of money training but be unable to retain? At the top 
management level, there is an understanding but little movement, because even that layer is 
still very white male and those are the people who are supposed to set an example for the 
other levels to follow.  
In some cases, it was reported that people from designated groups who had 
found employment in the company received inadequate support from the 
company. Hence there was a tendency for such people to look for employment 
elsewhere, or to stay dormant in lower positions without any movement upwards. 
Psychological war of racism persists in the workplace, and the mental war of 
perceived superiority vs. inferiority between the races has continued. Often using 
race-based perceptions and stereotypes, there were reports that often employees 
were judged by these attitudes rather than purely on individual merit and capa-
bilities. One respondent from SFP gave an example to justify this assertion, 
There is a black guy holding a Masters degree in one of our branches. He has been told over 
and over that he is not a manager material. The truth is that he has believed that he is not. If a 
company gives you a job but does not accompany this with meaningful responsibility and 
decision-making, then it is futile. If that guy were given more responsibilities and support, he 
would perform. He has been on the employment equity list for long and he remains a 
statistic. Other people opt to leave. 
Another white respondent, also from SFP, had this to say: 
The whole transformation process is a tough one. Talking about attitude change, we not only 
have the task to transform the African people but you also realize that we have to transform 
whites to accept African people because everyone perceives the other as a threat. It is a threat 
to your job and that type of thing. Things are deeply rooted in perceptions and you know in 
business you don’t have much time to do this, it becomes a special task and not an easy one. 
Those who belong to the dominant office culture may project a sense of confidence but if 
you look at it keenly it is also often very shallow. 
SFP also report that their low success in changing the composition of their 
employees to reflect the demographics is also due to a prevalent practice by other 
employers to headhunt already trained and experienced personnel. SFP regards 
itself as a training house in the forest industry that has been the target of other 
bigger forest actors. One SFP manager explains why their retention approach 
failed: 
In our apprenticeship program, all the institutions that train apprentices accredit us. These 
include wire-makers, welders, electricians and all the other areas relevant in our plants. We 
have about 25 apprentices and all of them do qualify. A guy finished recently and the oppo-
sition [competition] offered him R4000 more and he accepted. The way we conceptualized 
our learnership program was faulty. When a student goes on a scholarship, there is a six-
month practical period when we support them, pay bursaries and when they qualify, we 
always take them into the lowest first line management and leave them there for two years. 
What happens is that our competitor’s takes them into middle level management and pay 
him at that higher rate. That is the reason we have lost people. They would come back to us 
if we would pay them more. 
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SFP further explains that their solution to the drain of people that they have 
trained and instead boosting their own skills base, will involve moving the focus 
away from university graduates down to matriculants thus concentrating on 
traineeships: but this will not solve the skewed distribution of positions at the 
management level. In light of the factors that SFP management cited as under-
mining their efforts, they understood the concept of empowerment in the areas 
that they operate through the lens of the National Empowerment Charter (see 
chapter 3). One manager stated: 
Empowerment is not only at director/management level but we also look at training. We 
consider the response to the charter by our sources in other words, where we buy our equip-
ment from, who supplies us with diesel, food and services like that. And our sub-contractors 
have empowerment targets also that they need to achieve. We consider people who come to 
us to look for contracts if they are registered and meet all the legal requirements.  
In other words, whereas public emphasis has been on directorships but with a 
slow impact, SFP intensified their focus on areas where they have a leverage to 
exert change as their internal processes stagnate or slow down. It appears from 
this study that it is much easier for SFP to put across to their contractors and 
suppliers a list of demands for transformation, as a condition to qualify for 
contracts. So depending on how much the contractors want the job, they are 
bound to comply. Contrary to SFP that employs casual labourers, SQF only 
directly employs management and administrative staff. For their forest activities, 
they work through several contractors who employ semi-permanent and casual 
labourers. Figure 12 shows data on SQF staff only. 
Figure 12  Distribution of jobs according to gender and  
 population groups at SQF 2004 
Level 
White 
male 
Black 
male 
White 
female 
Black 
female 
Top executives 1 0 0 0 
Upper-level managers 1 1 0 0 
Mid-level officers 4 2 0 1 
Admin staff 3 6 7 3 
Total 9 9 7 4 
Due to the small number of employees of SQF relative to SFP, and because it 
was a company newly created to purchase state forests, it was at an advantage in 
terms of attempting to achieve equity in employment. This would have been 
easier in the sense that they were starting from scratch, and had the opportunity 
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to balance employment to reflect the demographics of the country. This was 
unlike what other companies from the apartheid era had to deal with in order to 
be in tune with policies of transformation. However, SQF did not hire new 
management at inception. Instead, they seconded existing staff from their parent 
company, Mondi, already an established player in forestry. The idea was to kick-
start the company by relying on available experienced expertise. SQF had insti-
tuted a 5-year skills-transfer plan to train and capacitate more black personnel 
into management. 
SQF do not directly employ casual labourers but contract-out all their on-farm 
forest production activities. The company has a policy of encouraging black 
contractors to apply for available jobs. Contractors who are wholly white-owned 
are also obliged to comply with principles of equity both in employment also in 
ownership. SQF does this through a process of appraisal. Existing contractors, 
normally on three year contracts, are required to extend at least 25.1% equity to a 
black individual or entity. Reviews on progress are done in two stages, and in the 
absence of results at end of year three the contractor becomes ineligible for a new 
contract.  
Despite these gains in awarding contracts to new black entrepreneurs, SQF in 
its self-assessment for the year ending 2005 acknowledges that for their empow-
erment efforts to improve, they need to increase, not only the number of black 
contractors, but the value of contracts as well. In this process, SQF also intends 
give more opportunities to supra-local entrepreneurs. At the time of the research, 
most of the contractors were old Mondi contractors and did not necessarily 
originate from the neighbouring areas.  
Skills and Training Needs  
In the SFP Business Plan for the period 2001-2006, the problem of inadequate 
skills is recognized and SFP declares 
The Company will also establish a Skills Development Centre in the geographic areas com-
prising the Eastern Cape North Package, to provide skills development training not only for 
employees but also for selected members of the communities represented by SDT. The 
Company shall (…) encourage the upliftment of the community by making the Company’s 
training and facilities available to communities, and by contributing toward projects aimed at 
improving the education, health care and the general standard of living of the communities. 
These statements of intent had not translated into many tangible or visible 
results by the time the research was conducted, and some respondents from the 
neighbouring areas still counted them as examples of the many empty promises 
that SFP had made at its inception.  
Most discussions on empowerment, its meaning and process were also closely 
interlinked with the issue of skills and capacity in the study areas, and in South 
Africa in general. Education and skills acquisition were prioritized as prerequi-
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sites to a successful empowerment process, but while there was a general short-
age of people with the right qualifications for particular industrial sectors, for 
instance in saw milling which requires specific expertise, there was little 
commitment by private forest companies to aggressively head hunt, train and 
retain available personnel. Few companies in the forest industry were willing to 
train, while most were ready to hire trained personnel from their competitors. The 
winners, as reported by one SFP manager, were the bigger players in the forest 
sector such as Mondi and SAPPI, which were able to lure employees away from 
smaller players through exorbitant remuneration packages.  
We [SFP] got a very good track record of paying for people to study and be the learning 
house for others. If you look at the bigger forest companies, every section of their depart-
ments, especially in sawmilling and operations, they have African people whose studies have 
been paid by us and have done their practical work with us but they are working elsewhere 
because our competitors do not train but lure them with better salaries. So we have become 
known in the industry as the training house. 
The question that remains is to what extent a small company like SFP could 
compete, in terms of training and retaining staff, especially when pitted against 
bigger companies like Mondi and its affiliate SQF. One SFP employee was of the 
opinion that a lot more effort was necessary for smaller companies to retain the 
staff that they had already trained.  
Losing skilled black employees to more established companies could be 
reversed, if there was a clear strategy to counter the onslaught by the bigger, 
more established companies. One employee at SFP argued that it is not enough to 
simply blame the bigger competitors but that it should be a question of fine-
tuning the employment and retention strategy. He said, 
It is not a good answer to just say there is a lack of black employees. It should also be a 
question of strategy because then a company keeps training and people continue leaving. 
Companies should consider giving out bursaries and although we are already doing this, on 
top of the educational support, we can sign contracts with them upfront so that they can 
come back and benefit the company through working here for a minimum period. For 
instance if the company assisted a student for three years, the minimum period to work for 
that company could be pegged at three years as well. 
Inadequacy in skills and qualifications of those disadvantaged at apartheid has 
sometimes been used as a reason and often as an excuse, especially in cases 
where owners or managers of companies are opposed to legislation that enforces 
employment equity. For smaller companies like SFP, while they may be 
committed to such policies, the bigger companies who poach those that they have 
trained undermine their motivation. There are also mixed sentiments as to whose 
responsibility it is to equip productive people with skills, whether it should be 
government or the private sector. The government has emphasized the symbiotic 
role of the public and private sector in ensuring that the ends of empowerment 
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are achieved, and despite the challenges mentioned, both SFP and SQF have 
made attempts to meet these objectives in their own way.  
The lack of skills among the productive segment of people from historically 
disadvantaged backgrounds is often cited as the reason behind private compa-
nies’ failure to transform and have a balanced composition of employees to 
replace the traditional white dominance. These skills are hard to come by in rural 
areas, according to SFP forest manager who argued that this is the reason why 
black people are a majority at the unskilled bottom pool, and not in middle and 
upper management level. He challenges legislation on employment equity in the 
absence of relevant skills to make this happen. 
It is one thing being a good worker on the ground but it is a totally different thing to 
managing a business like SFP. You need to have business management skills; you have to 
legally comply with the government law on business compensation, occupational health and 
safety among others. There is a big difference between being able to produce 150% a day 
and you look at this employee and he is doing everything you want him to do, but this would 
be different if he were to be put in a management position. We have learnt that if we were to 
help such a person set up a business for instance, we would not let him do it alone but we 
would support him and put him up with a business manager. It is a totally different ball game 
and people do not realize this. As a business manager and owner, you have to pay the 
creditors before your salary and sort out a whole load of things. 
Ownership: Challenges at the rural level 
Although ownership by black entrepreneurs has been a core part of the BEE 
debate in forestry, emphasis on BEE is increasingly understood to be more than 
holding shares in existing businesses. Part of the argument against simple trans-
fers of ownership as a central focus of BEE is due to its inability to enhance 
skills and knowledge transfer to new black shareholders. Also, when such share-
holding is extended to a large group, the higher denominator lowers the impact of 
the benefits. At SFP for instance, one respondent opined that the 10% community 
shareholding was insufficient to change the economic status of the members. For 
the communities around the forests to feel an economic impact arising out of 
their relationship with private forest sector, the SFP personnel opined: 
The real impact would be more at the level of engaging in businesses that are created 
through tapping into the company’s outsourcing activities, transport, harvesting and silvi-
cultural contracts. If you look at SFP, we are looking at an average of not less than R20 
million per annum that goes into outsourcing and currently, these contracts are 70% owned 
by white businesses. Our challenge now is how to engage our communities meaningfully.  
The idea of ownership or having stakes in new or existing business appears 
appealing and lucrative on the surface, but such transactions do not always result 
in significant benefits, especially when they are small but spread over a large 
community, as seen with SFP. As the previous respondent observes, there is 
much more money to be made in the micro-business and spin-offs that emanate 
from activities and services in which the forest companies engage. For SFP, the 
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value of the community’s shareholding at R3.2 million pales in comparison to the 
annual value of R20 million that SFP spends on outsourcing alone. The out-
sourcing side of business, as opposed to being a passive investor or shareholder 
in the company, requires active participation in the daily running of the ventures. 
This route has the potential to create more opportunities for small businesses, 
contribute to skills acquisition, and also their transfer, and may also serve to 
reduce the problem of unemployment. The constraints for procurement as a fast 
vehicle for empowerment lies in the fact that many of these outsourced services 
and activities require a high capital and skills outlay at start up, resources that are 
not often immediately accessible to new entrants in the forest business.  
Community ownership, as evidenced in the SFP case study, qualifies more as 
a symbolic undertaking rather than a financially beneficial one. It is symbolic in 
the sense that communities, especially black communities who have a history of 
disenfranchisement, are now able to take part, even if sometimes passively 
through shareholding entities like Trusts, in economic processes alongside their 
fellow privileged white countrymen. It is part of the restoration of a people’s 
socio-economic rights, albeit within a peculiar and contested policy atmosphere. 
While ownership, as a form of empowering potential business people and groups 
of communities, has the chance to succeed if soundly designed, as already 
evidenced in other sectors elsewhere in South Africa: in the SFP case, certain 
opinions maintain that their model is feasible if only the shareholding can be 
increased from the current 10% to a larger figure. As explained during one inter-
view:  
Our view (SFP) is to empower local inhabitants that they can share meaningfully in our 
business and this means that the 10% shares they already hold is not sufficient for them and 
we foresee that 10% will grow to 49% over the next five years. 
At the time of the research, SDT had not finalized the modalities of redistrib-
uting the benefits to the respective communities. As said, each community would 
get an amount commensurate with the size of the forest assets near them. These 
proceeds varied each year depending on the company’s profit. During the 2003-
2004 financial period for instance, SDT 10% share of the company’s profits 
amounted to R470, 000 before their loan repayment to SFP. SFP pegs the rate of 
repayment at 10% of the profits annually until such a time that the initial loan of 
R3.2 million is completely paid. Initial calculations showed that out of the total 
final amount of R423,000 after annual loan repayment, some communities would 
get as little as R1000 as their share of the proceeds, an amount that would make 
little difference to a community.  
The issue of ownership is understood as keystone in the mainstream dis-
courses of economic change in the broader South Africa. In the study areas, the 
ability to own is understood to have a considerable amount of relevant literacy 
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and knowledge as a prerequisite. At the same time, respondents opined that the 
processes of acquisition of skills and wealth should run concurrently toward 
mutual goals of transformation. Hence, the understanding of empowerment from 
any perspective, whether from SFP side, community representatives or individu-
als, was always linked to the problem of skills, education, and training, and on 
rare occasions on financial resources. One respondent from Singisi community 
plays down the emphasis on ownership and sees the hand of politics in the senti-
ments of people, especially the youth. He emphasizes the relationship between 
education, knowledge, self-efficacy and the ability to own and manage an enter-
prise. He opined, 
Our youth want to own their businesses irrespective of whether they have gained the knowl-
edge or not and that is a problem which is not quite practical. The youth are influenced by 
politics but education must come first. Without knowledge, little can be achieved. Our youth 
must be equipped with knowledge and skills, be ready to commit their time and possess the 
discipline necessary to run a business. They need these things but often they look for short-
cuts. Politics should emphasize education, discipline and respect. 
Whilst the black youth despite existing implementation challenges, now have 
relatively better chances of getting an education and benefiting from relevant 
transformation policies, empowerment at community level and in the rural areas 
has not taken off at the same level as the urban areas. Other than problems of 
community ownership that are addressed through vehicles such as Trusts (see 
previous chapter), the reality of illiteracy in the adult and rural population 
inhibits the total implementation of BEE. It is practically more difficult to engage 
this segment of the population without the basic knowledge, skills and physical 
resources. One respondent from the study community said, 
The old and mostly rural populations who also have little or no education are left out of the 
BEE process. The only way they can benefit will be through community Trusts as being 
attempted by SFP. Other benefits might come directly for instance in cases where there are 
investments in schools, community halls or other local infrastructures. In some cases, 
especially in the Mining sector, beneficiation is apparently working a lot faster than it has 
worked in other sectors. For most adults also, if a difference can be made to their children, 
then they have also benefited even if by extension.
Another respondent argues that the illiterate adults and rural poor can only 
benefit from BEE’s “trickle down effect”. They only gain directly when tradi-
tional outreach actions of companies take place. She further maintains that BEE 
related documents were drawn with the middle class in mind and regardless of 
attempts to make it sound broad and inclusive, it still remains a tool for the 
middle class, and the use of the English language alone immediately excludes a 
significant number of people from understanding it (Tshoaedi, pers. comm. 
2006).  
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Despite such criticisms, the deputy President in her speech at the launch of 
JIPSA26 acknowledges the possible exclusion of the old and illiterate and says, 
Those adults who are illiterate and poor, particularly, need to be actively drawn into the 
economy. JIPSA will indirectly support the Department of Education’s work in Adult Basic 
Education and Training (ABET).  
While the minister’s view suggest that not all is lost for the adult poor and 
they can also gain some education, most of the sentiments point to a fundamental 
flaw, specifically with the whole BEE approach. Initially, the creation of a black 
middle class featured prominently on the national agenda, and BEE was 
premised on this viewpoint. The question of the position of the poorest segment 
of the population only gained weight after criticisms of the original concept of 
BEE.  
Outsourcing, procurement and models of sub-contracts  
The difference between SFP and SQF in the way they implement practices that 
support and enhance empowerment is seen in their approaches. According to 
their resource management styles, each company structures its shareholding in 
the main forest business differently. SFP entails a 10% collective shareholding as 
its empowerment equity, while SQF closed a deal with a black business entity 
also holding a 10% equity stake. In the outsourcing and procurement activities 
that are the backbone of small-scale enterprises in the forest sector: the focus for 
both companies is on the individual entrepreneur with a vision of a multiplier 
effect that eventually spreads out benefits to numerous others. The shareholding 
structure notwithstanding, both SFP and SQF still practice outsourcing and 
procurement the conventional way, but at the same time they try to promote local 
entrepreneurship. As said, outsourcing whether for forestry services or equipment 
for SFP amounts to an estimated R20 million annually. Although figures were 
not available for SQF, they engage in outsourcing forestry services in a bigger 
way, since they do not directly employ casual labourers. Both SFP and SQF 
promote the entry of new contractors through setting aside quotas and also 
encouraging established contractors to offer shares in their businesses to new 
entrepreneurs from black communities. In addition, both SFP and SQF have 
introduced certain activities in their areas of operation as ways of fostering the 
                                                                 
26
  A national agenda to counter scarcity of skills in South Africa, known as the Joint Initiative on Priority 
and Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) was launched in March 2006 by the country’s deputy President. JIPSA 
focuses only on scarce and critical skills and its task team has members from business, labour, higher 
education and civil society. JIPSA was introduced a few months after Cabinet unveiled the Accelerated 
and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (Asgisa). In her opening address, the deputy President 
states “nothing short of a skills revolution by a nation united will extricate us from the crisis we face”. 
The skills situation is threatening to cripple implementation of the many policies established in the cur-
rent South Africa including programmes like Asgisa, which is specifically meant to halve poverty and 
unemployment by 2014. 
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ideals of empowerment. The flexibility in what businesses can engage in to 
facilitate such ideals is manifested in some of these initiatives. A majority of the 
activities that are promoted in the two cases primarily target individuals with 
some entrepreneurial potential and interest in forest-related businesses.  
The SFP Dargle plantation 
As mentioned earlier, SFP has introduced its own strategies aimed at increasing 
opportunities to their employees and local communities. The two stand-alone 
forest plantations of 3,700 hectare and 500 hectare respectively at Dargle in 
KwaZulu-Natal midlands is one example where SFP has outsourced an entire 
plantation to the management of two new black entrepreneurs who were former 
employees. The Dargle trial is a pilot project: the contract runs for a 5 years and 
is renewable. It involves silviculture and harvesting activities. Transportation of 
raw timber to the mills is again outsourced to other private entities. The two 
managers were formerly employed as supervisors in the same plantations. So 
while they have a vast combined hands-on experience, they had to learn other 
aspects of management and incorporate business skills. Under the mentorship of 
SFP, the managers have employed the services of a business consultant who is 
responsible for ensuring compliance to the various state laws, such as those that 
regulate labour practices and the remittance of taxes. Silviculture and harvesting 
need costly equipments like weighting belts and tractors, which were financed by 
a bank, while SFP provided other equipment for start-up. 
At the time of the research, the Dargle operation had only been under new 
management for nine months, and within this period the number of job opportu-
nities had doubled from 35 to 77, with the same salaries as previously and it was 
still profitable. This indicated a reverse in trends that usually characterize privati-
zation processes where streamlining is almost synonymous with job cuts.  
A multiplier effect of the Dargle project 
Whilst the contract to manage the Dargle plantations was drawn up between SFP 
and the two black contractors, new initiatives have emerged from this contract to 
benefit other employees at Dargle as well. The employees, the majority of whom 
are casual labourers, are encouraged to buy shares in the enterprise. The con-
tractors report that the idea of buying shares was not very appealing to most 
employees at first, since it was their first introduction to the concept. Although a 
small-scale initiative, the two contractors, who were being mentored by SFP, 
were also already mentoring their workers. 
In light of the early positive progress with the Dargle project, the black con-
tractors aim at enabling a spin-off of other related activities capable of imparting 
business skills and creating even more entrepreneurs. The emphasis is also on 
ownership of equipment by local employees, such that if one is a chain saw 
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operator, the vision is to create ways of purchasing the machine rather than being 
in the employ of one established contractor who owns all the required equip-
ments.  
One of the two managers running this enterprise summarizes his experience 
from being a mere employee to a business owner as follows: 
If you are an employee you know your money is there period! At the end of the month you 
get paid. You don’t worry about how you are going to get paid. You can sit, chat and do 
nothing but unless someone is checking on you, you are remunerated. When you are on your 
own as a business person, you are the one who suffers. The employees do not worry. I have 
to pay the bank as well as pay the employees. Our policy is to pay the employees first and it 
doesn’t matter what happens, you just have to pay them at the end of the month and I am the 
one who makes sure this money is available. That is the big challenge from being a worker 
to being an employer. In addition you have to deal with the labour courts as you know South 
Africa, employees are protected and not the employer. The labour courts call you often and 
ask after some employees. I was not trained to deal with these labour courts as they cause me 
anxiety sometimes (…) I had a lot of pressure the first few months but things have settled 
quite a lot. Secondly, to work with people who were colleagues in the same company but 
now have to look at you, as their employer was difficult. We had to convince them that we 
would cope in our new role.  
SFP’s Owner Drivers’ Scheme (ODS) 
The ODS is similar to the Dargle project in approach but concerned with trans-
portation of raw timber. In this case the company targets drivers who have been 
in their employ and facilitates the purchase of new tractors by the drivers through 
bank loans. The bank loans are granted based on a five-year transport contract 
that SFP awards to individuals beforehand. In addition, each driver is linked up 
with an experienced business partner and manager to help run the enterprise. In 
2004, SFP already facilitated the purchase of six new transportation trucks and 
were working on the next phase of the project. By 2006, SFP reported that this 
had increased to 18 trucks and a similar number of contracts. As in other initia-
tives, the targeted individual employees are expected to grow and create opportu-
nities for others from their communities
SFP’s security and cleaning contracts 
One factor that has frustrated sub-contracting to black contractors at SFP is the 
huge capital outlay needed for certain forest activities such as harvesting and 
transportation. Other service-based contracts, like provision of security at the 
factories and around the plantations, or cleaning services at the company, only 
need a relatively small amount of start-up capital. It is also relatively easy to 
enforce compliance to service contracts, especially in terms of equity-based 
employment. In other words, the company gives out such contracts based on 
conditions that force the entrepreneurs to conform to the national legislation on 
equity, as well as the company’s internal practices.  
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At Singisi sawmill, SFP has contracted a security firm called Nyathi Securi-
ties. SFP awarded the contract on condition that the firm would only use local 
labour. Progress would have to be monitored periodically and the targets sug-
gested by SFP were that in six months the supervisory position needed to be 
occupied by a local person, and within one year the contract would also be 
managed by a person from the locality. In terms of shareholding, the contractor is 
expected to extend the same to the community members or employees at 30% of 
the shares in the first year, increasing to 40 and 50% in the second and third year 
respectively. Failure to conform to these transformation targets would result in 
ineligibility in tendering during the next round of contracts.  
In the second case at SFP’s Langeni mill, a 5-year security contract worth R10 
million was awarded to Indwe Security Company in 2003 (Ncedo 2003). Like the 
Singisi case, this team would concentrate on the transfer of skills that would be 
done through training and employment of community members as security 
guards. A specialized trainer from outside was employed to train local personnel 
to take over the operations within the next 18 months. Skills would have been 
transferred to the local people within the five-year contract period, and at the end 
of it, Indwe Security would not reapply for the tender but a local company should 
have been created to take over. Following the trends that Singisi is attempting to 
enforce, the Langeni community would get 20% shareholding in the first year 
and this would increase to 50% by the fourth year. The final year of the contract 
would reassess the community company’s readiness to take over the operations 
While it is relatively easy to introduce change in cases where contracts are 
simply labour-based, the same cannot be said of services that require the 
contractor to own expensive equipment and have huge amounts of operational 
capital. Many such contracts are still awarded to white established contractors 
who have accumulated capital over a longer period of time and have vast experi-
ence as well. The idea of seeking financing options for new entrepreneurs is one 
that SFP grapples with, but one that would benefit from closer collaboration 
between the private sector and government. As it stood at the time of the 
research, SFP were exploiting their own financing networks to support new 
entrepreneurs. Expanding the culture of transformation to their own contractors 
would be checked against targets say, in shareholding or employment equity that 
they had agreed upon, but SFP could only enforce these rules at the renewal of 
contracts through disqualifying non-compliant contractors.  
SQF’s Fukamela Incubation Scheme 
Fukamela, a Zulu word meaning to incubate, is the name of a separate project of 
SQF, directly run by the empowerment partner IL. As the name suggests, 
Fukamela targets potential contractors from previously disadvantaged back-
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grounds and coaches them on general business and specific contracting skills. 
Fukamela develops contractors and supports small businesses with a view to 
boosting and diversifying the procurement opportunities that emanate from 
Mondi and SQF. The development process involves learning basic financial 
management, the details of labour laws and issues related to taxation.  
The founding of Fukamela was based on a couple of reasons; first there was an 
acknowledgement of a lack of black skills to take on the spin-offs such as con-
tracting jobs related to forest activities in the area; there had also been minimal 
skills transfer from established contractors, and a reluctance to partner with low 
skilled black forest workers; and finally IL, a wholly black-owned but non-local 
company wanted to make a direct contribution to communities where their 
operations were based. The latter was especially crucial since IL was not directly 
involved in the technical daily management of SQF of which they were a partner; 
Fukamela was where IL could have its own role in showing that they were not 
only passive stockholders. 
Fukamela then designed training and mentoring model that secures a percent-
age of contracts available at SQF. At the time of the interview 20% of SQF forest 
contracts were allocated to Fukamela. At the same time, Fukamela would adver-
tise locally the available contracts and take in successful applicants for intensive 
inductive training. The mentoring program runs for a period of 2-3 years during 
which time the particular contract would be managed both by Fukamela and the 
trainee entrepreneur. At the end of the three years, the trainees are expected to 
have acquired significant business knowledge and skills to manage contracts on 
their own, and are able to secure bigger contracts without the help of Fukamela. 
For those who might still need the guidance of Fukamela after the three-year 
contract, there would be after-service available but without joint management of 
a contract.  
In terms of funding contractors, IL the founders of Fukamela, seeks funds 
from financial institutions such as the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC). In November 2005, Fukamela finally received funding from South 
Africa’s IDC’s Risk Capital Facility to the tune or R19.1 million and a further 
R4.3 million from the Land Bank, the latter going into Fukamela’s Niche Trust 
Fund. For a subsequent five years, the IDC would disburse a further R1.6 million 
from its Transport Business Unit (Business Report, 2005).  
Programmes like these identify business potential in local areas usually with 
little access to other infrastructures. While Fukamela has started on a small scale, 
it is hoping that their program would facilitate a transfer of skills that has been 
found lacking in the forest growing areas. In its own way, the Fukamela strategy 
attempts to address the common skills problem of black people in forestry-related 
economic activities. 
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The first three beneficiaries of the program: Zikode Forestry Engineering, 
Ezara Forestry Logistics and Kwambonambi Silviculture Contractors are locally 
black-owned entities, with Fukamela retaining minimal interest as the financial 
and training facilitator. SQF reports that the three new contractors have created a 
further 436 sustainable casual jobs in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natla and 
Limpopo provinces.  
At the time of research, Fukamela did not yet have the capacity to fully deliver 
the 20% portion of overall SQF contracts that was reserved for them. If 
Fukamela could meet the target to which it is already entitled, and train more 
contractors and reach for a bigger share of SQF contracts, then it would present a 
high potential for contributing, in a multiple way, to the objectives of BEE. The 
concept of Fukamela already responds to the ownership needs of black entrepre-
neurs, training and skills development, employment as well as broadening 
procurement activities to include local people. 
Concluding note 
In unfolding empowerment actions, the only remarkable difference in SFP and 
SQF approaches is found in their ownership styles. The community holds SFP’s 
minority shares, while a smaller entrepreneur, IL, holds SQF’s. SFP tried to 
reach as many beneficiaries as possible at once. Hence they started with a large 
target group. Within this group, the aim as seen through the numerous empow-
erment actions was to further identify potential individual entrepreneurs for 
mentoring. SFP has opted to experiment with several entrepreneurial options, 
some of which, like the Dargle projects, are pilot schemes where a significant 
amount of learning takes place as well. 
SFQ on the other hand, started small and through its business partner IL, 
developed the concept of Fukamela. Although a small focus, the vision is a 
knock-on plan where the few trained contractors are expected to create opportu-
nities for other people. For mentoring in entrepreneurship, both companies are 
more comfortable with selected individuals with potential, rather than experiment 
with large groups. The community route is complex and long, while the individ-
ual option allows a targeted transfer of skills and resources. The speed at which 
SQF’s Fukamela and SFP’s Owner Drivers Schemes were developed, are 
evidence of this. In contrast, targeting community for empowerment initiatives 
has dragged for both cases. While it took close to four years for SFP to establish 
an agreement with its communities, SQF was still unable to make progress six 
years later in 2006. 
In both cases, the concept of empowerment is only understood from an 
economic perspective. This understanding is derived not only from the economic 
emphasis of the National Framework on Empowerment, but is also due to the 
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reality of unemployment that is prevalent in the rural areas. The unemployment 
situation is a result of both scarce opportunities and a low skills base that hinders 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and self-employment. 
On a general level in the cases, respondents raised the issue of time as a factor 
that needed to be considered in the empowerment process. On one side were 
people who thought that change in the organization was too slow and needed to 
be fast-paced. The employers on the other hand, viewed the slow pace as neces-
sary since there were numerous structural problems that they had to deal with.  
Raising the levels of literacy, management and business skills amongst black 
people in the study area was viewed as an enormous task that required multiple 
approaches, and that successes could only show after several years of targeted 
training. This point of view implied that the amount of pressure from government 
with which many companies were obligated to comply, was unnecessary as it 
was not practical to meet targets when qualified black people were few and diffi-
cult to find, employ, and retain. Secondly, new vacancies were not created often 
as the timber market was increasingly volatile and companies were looking at 
ways of cutting costs rather than increase expenditure. Third, others argued that 
skills could be transferred through the willingness of existing businesses to take 
on people with some qualifications, but who might be low on experience and 
equip them on the job. Training on the job would fast track the change process, 
but some respondents from the communities believed that local contractors and 
other private entities were often reluctant to impart skills.  
Referring to the broader South African context, the reluctance by some 
established businesses to transfer skills is due to three major reasons: the fear of 
losing business in an increasingly competitive atmosphere in the new South 
Africa. Mandatory transfer of skills and enabling black equity in existing enter-
prises is aimed at broadening economic opportunities, but it is also threatening to 
a section of a society polarized along race lines, and more so when it is the 
minority group who has to share economic power with a majority. Secondly, it 
may be a subtle show of resistance from some business owners to empowerment 
policies, who believe BEE is a reverse form of apartheid that now sidelines the 
white population to the benefit of blacks. Finally, most businesses have very low 
ceilings on the amount of money they can spend on training; hence they prefer to 
employ people who already have some relevant experience. With a few compa-
nies opting to headhunt rather than train and keep, it is possible that only those 
who can afford higher salaries can win the game. At the same time, there is a risk 
of increasing the number of unemployed graduates when there is more emphasis 
on work experience rather than qualifications. The essence of this disconnection 
between education and skills acquisition vis a vis experience is part of the 
broader tension between politics and business. It narrows down to a question of 
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whose responsibility it is to prepare learners for the workplace. How much appli-
cable skill should learners bring to the production sphere, and what is the role of 
the employer in enhancing the skills pool that the country needs? The corporate 
side is in a war of existence, coupled with pressure to change the organizational 
culture to absorb diversity. This struggle includes opposing government policy, 
whether subtly or overtly, and through arguments that would otherwise be 
legitimate if they were presented in their totality. Government is responsible for 
providing education for its public, but in the end, scholars gain more of a theo-
retical than practical knowledge. Employers on the other hand, are expected to 
provide the more practical application for these skills. Therefore the failure for 
the organizations to transform cannot be solely attributed to the skills problem, 
and by extension, a failure of government to provide quality education. Rather, 
its success depend as much on the corporate will, necessary for enhancing the 
skills base, as it does on the political will to provide a sound educational base. 
Calls for organizations to change faster are as legitimate as those from the 
opposing side who prefer more time to get the process rolling. The process is 
marred by suspicion of non-commitment from some employers because, as some 
argue, the process should be allowed more time to spread out. At the same time, 
there have also been suggestions that a ceiling should be imposed on the empow-
erment process, and that government should indicate when the process would 
stop. The latter point raises more questions, as it is not practical to place a time-
frame when the rate of compliance is still below average, and the trend toward 
success still unstable. 
Closely tied to the idea of time in the empowerment process is that of se-
quencing. Evidence from both the case studies suggests that education and skills 
acquisition are prioritized as a prerequisite to successful mobility of people into 
mainstream economic activities. The two private actors studied understood their 
role as contributing to both local and national economy through the creation of 
jobs, and awarding these to those who could present the relevant education and 
experience. The provision of education rests with government although the 
private companies offer bursary schemes and other social amenities like schools 
and clinics to serve areas particularly where they draw their labour 
The problem of skills and capacities that hinder those from historically 
disadvantaged backgrounds are categorically addressed in the Black Economic 
Empowerment Charter. Other than indicating targets that companies should 
strive to achieve, individual forest companies have the flexibility to come up with 
different strategies to address these challenges. In fact, it is at the stage of opera-
tionalization that the meaning of empowerment is redefined, as flexibility in 
actions is not entirely dependent on government prescriptions, as actors have the 
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leeway to present unique initiatives, albeit loosely, within the categories outlined 
in the Charter.  
Translating the concept of empowerment into real actions especially at the 
rural level has been a daunting challenge, given the low skills base, general 
poverty, and inadequate physical infrastructures that characterize these areas. 
Most of South Africa’s population (about 60%) resides in urban areas where the 
infrastructural facilities are relatively more advanced and accessible. Of the 40% 
who live in rural areas, it is reported that unemployment, for instance, stands at 
70% (Somdyala 2004) in districts like OR Tambo and Alfred Nzo in the Eastern 
Cape where this study was conducted. The implications such problems pose for 
processes of empowerment or engaging the business sector illuminates far more 
issues than would be found in the fairly equipped urban areas. The most impor-
tant benefit for these communities faced with a high rate of unemployment, is 
their prioritization when there are vacancies for unskilled jobs and small 
contracts at SFP. In fact, the most prevalent understanding of empowerment 
during the interviews indicated that jobs were rated high as an avenue to 
economic empowerment. In the SFP business plan submitted to government, they 
pledged to first target the communities they work with whenever job opportuni-
ties arose. One other aspect of prioritizing communities and existing employees 
involves outsourcing and sub-contracting SFP activities.  
SFP and SQF both understood empowerment as a process that is also about 
building relationships both within the company with other employees, and also 
with communities living in areas where they work.  
8 
Reflections on theory 
and findings 
This chapter acts as an analytical synthesis of the three previous empirical 
chapters, and once again reflects on the closely related themes of policy imple-
mentation, management, and empowerment, all within the context of a newly 
privatized forest enterprise. In this chapter, the three concepts are analyzed as 
separate blocks, but in chapter 9, I attempt to show how they interconnect. 
Empowerment and collaborative management are existing concepts at the core of 
the ruling ANC transformation policies. The main purpose of the two concepts is 
to address issues of social and economic inequities that were entrenched by the 
combined practices of racial capitalism27 and paternalism, the hallmarks of apart-
heid. Empowerment has been legislated in South Africa as Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE). Collaborative business engagements are used as 
a strategic tool to advance the practice of BEE. This is necessary, particularly in 
the rural sphere (the site of this study), where people are characterized by poverty 
and low literacy, and hence need a springboard into the business arena. Debates 
on policy implementation are introduced for relevance and as a basis upon which 
both processes are executed. The way that forestry policy is implemented, in 
particular the forestry sale, has far-reaching consequences for the kind of 
empowerment and collaborative practices which unfold. The chapter also 
advances the argument that empowerment, if emphasized from a single objective 
                                                                 
27
  A term popularized by Sampie Terreblanche (2002) to explain the economic foundation that sustained 
apartheid: that of exploiting black labour (unfree labour) while excluding black people who provided 
that labour from the benefits to enable the white population to advance unfettered. 
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of obtaining ownership, serves to exclude or crowd out other important facets, 
such as improvement and creation of skills. For the sake of this argument, the 
study demonstrates this by exploring why one of the two case study models holds 
better potential than the other, and the implication of these findings on theory. 
The three concepts of policy implementation, collective management and em-
powerment are used as parallel theoretical lenses. Through these lenses, key 
issues from the case studies are highlighted. They also help to show similarities 
and points of convergence between the cases. 
Implementing the forestry sale: The fragmented balancing act 
Chapter 5 presented a detailed discussion about the forestry sale process upon 
which this study is based. The next section starts by briefly revisiting the empiri-
cal aspects of this implementation process before delving into analytical discus-
sions. In the later part of this section, certain key issues are discussed, either as 
outcomes of, or as influences on, the implementation process. These include a 
discussion on actors’ coordination (or lack of it) and its bearing on implementa-
tion. It also analyzes impacts on community readiness and involvement, the issue 
of exclusion as an outcome of negotiation, impacts on forest companies as well 
as the role and influence of power.  
The core of the implementation story 
The forestry sale was a result of government’s decision to relieve itself of the 
forest assets as part of a broader national privatization exercise. Forestry quali-
fied as one of the sectors considered not strategic to government’s core functions, 
and so since 1999 it had been under gradual transfer to private sector manage-
ment. 
There are two interesting aspects to the implementation story. First, the 
process involved numerous objectives that government lined up as achievable 
from the sale. The line-up of objectives included both economic and develop-
mental ones, some of which were not always complementary. How was it possi-
ble to achieve conflicting objectives through a single sale process? On a second 
level, there was a range of government departments that had an interest and a role 
in the process. These included departments of water affairs and forestry 
(DWAF), land affairs (DLA), public enterprises (DPE), the state forest corpora-
tion (SAFCOL), the department of environmental affairs (DEAT), and local 
governments in the forest areas. In approaching the sale, there was a lack of 
coordinating leadership between these departments. Coupled with government 
bureaucracy, the lack of a coordinating body, in part, resulted in a sluggish sale 
exercise. DPE, the office with the final say in privatization, had its own priorities, 
as it had more lucrative restructuring exercises in other state-owned enterprises. 
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Primarily, these were symptoms of a very low political interest where issues of 
forestry were concerned.  
Theory revisited 
Theoretical discussions on policy implementation, as detailed in chapter 2, revisit 
the persisting notion of the gap between policy statements and actual delivery. 
Along the continuum of crafting and implementing policy, initial objectives are 
re-defined, abandoned or advanced, but rarely in the way that they were intended. 
Such possible discrepancies are attributed to the different orientations of the 
policy maker and the implementer. The policy maker is theoretical and politically 
aligned. The implementer, on the other hand, is a manager who perceives policy 
statements in a certain way, and strives to break them down into deliverables. In 
this process, original intentions may be perceived differently and reconfigured. 
Such differences are understood to impact in varying degrees on actual policy 
implementation.  
As said in chapter 5, in the forestry case a number of objectives were lost 
while some survived. The reasons were not so much due to differences in how 
the policy was perceived, but were inherent in the conflicting nature of the 
objectives. Government was aiming to get the best price from the sale, enhance 
competitiveness of the sector, improve efficiency, and enable the transfer of 
skills and technology into the sector, and to inject private sector capital and 
expertise. Government withdrawal would also help reduce its expenditure, 
particularly in relation to the workforce, which was bloated even as most of its 
business continuously made losses. Finally, the sale would be used to facilitate 
entry of black businesses and rural communities into a sector long dominated by 
white industrialists. The introduction of the element of BEE meant an increase in 
the load of guidelines since BEE has its own line of objectives as well, which 
include the improvement of black representation in all levels of management, in 
ownership, procurement activities, and enterprise. All these needed to be done 
against a backdrop of a fair or an improved gender representation as well. This 
objective overload in turn was a reflection of the different interests in the sale 
exercise. Walt (1994: 35) poses, “is it possible to devise implementable rational 
policies if many different groups are insisting on their demands being met?” 
[emphasis added]. The central question in this thesis also focuses on how multi-
group interests and multiple objectives are reconciled within a single policy 
process.  
The next theoretical point is methodological, and partially answers the above 
question of multiplicity of actors and by extension, the roles and responsibilities 
that these actors have. This view emphasizes a focus on the linkages between 
structures of implementation across organizations instead of individual actors or 
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organizations as a unit of analysis. It considers the acting structures within these 
entities, and the relationships they create with implementation units in other par-
ticipating organizations. The multiple group interests and objectives require a 
focus on the networks that facilitate the process of implementation, but also need 
to emphasize how these are coordinated for effective delivery.  
Problems of coordination 
The inter-actor networks that traverse the different government entities, as seen 
in this study, were undermined by a lack of a focal leadership point. This was 
necessary both as a balancing arena where issues that undermined the sale 
process could be addressed, and as a central actor that could give direction and 
connect the bits and pieces of the whole process. These problems were further 
manifested in knowledge gaps, discrepancies, and communication breakdown 
between participating departments, and even between different ranks within a 
single department.  
The issues at DLA, the department responsible for land reform, crossed over 
to affect the forestry case. The DLA was faced with a lack of technical knowl-
edge that accompanied the land reform strategy. While the political objectives of 
redistribution, restitution, and land reform were broadly sanctioned, their imple-
mentation required an understanding of all the relevant legal processes. The legal 
knowledge at DLA was minimal however, and this posed the greatest hurdle for 
the land question. There was a wide discrepancy between what was intended in 
the land policy and what was legally executable. The residual impacts on forest 
privatization are seen through the numerous outstanding land claims on forest-
land. These have made it difficult for forest companies to define communities for 
community-company engagements, as entailed in their agreements with govern-
ment.  
At DWAF, the key actor in forestry, the challenges were mostly internal. 
Having ceded responsibility for actual sale to DPE, they retained the advisory 
and regulatory roles, particularly in managing the lease agreements between new 
owners and government. The chief directorate at DWAF and its Regulations unit 
were supposed to be respectively involved. Instead, the chief directorate teamed 
up with DPE and negotiated leases with SFP and SQF without much involvement 
of its Regulations unit. These leases were reported to have contained inconsisten-
cies and weaknesses that would have been avoided if the Regulations Unit, with 
their technical knowledge, had been included.  
At DPE, the lack of a dedicated forestry cluster to facilitate forest privatization 
undermined the process. DPE had other lucrative government deals, such as the 
partial sale of Telkom; hence forestry issues were relegated to the background.  
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These three agencies represented the core interests of government in the 
forestry exercise, but apart from having very weak linkages between them, the 
roles of individual implementation clusters in each department were not clearly 
defined. Also, communication between these agencies was inadequate to drive 
the process effectively and on schedule. 
The absence of a central coordinating actor, the involvement of numerous 
government agencies, and the problem of an objective overload in implementing 
the forestry sale resulted in a very slow and haphazard exercise, as both sale pro-
cesses took over three years to complete. This in turn impacted on other related 
processes, particularly the plans for creating community-company relationships. 
Impacts on community involvement 
In the empirical chapter 5 on implementation, one factor was highlighted as 
having impeded some of the privatization objectives especially where community 
engagement was involved. This factor was the near-absence of information on 
the privatization process in the communities. Although there were foresters 
dedicated to community issues, they were few, hence it was logistically tedious 
to do all the groundwork and engage interested communities on time for privati-
zation. While the resultant inactivity of the communities may be perceived as 
negative if one looks at it from a local perspective, it also meant that it was one 
objective less to worry about. Hence, it was possible instead to increase the pace 
of privatization in certain instances. The amount of time it took SFP to convince 
surrounding communities, which they report at close to four years, is evidence of 
the challenges of trying to bring large numbers of people into the forest enter-
prise, especially when these are poor not only materially, but also in plantation 
management skills.  
Elsewhere in cases where indigenous forestry is discussed (Ostrom 1990; 
Klooster 2000; Higgins & Lockie 2002), the local person living near the forest is 
understood to possess traditional knowledge and skills necessary for managing 
their biodiversity, and only need the necessary conditions to craft rules of 
governance. In the case of commercial forestry in South Africa, the monoculture 
plantations are exotic and require different silvicultural methods of management 
that are not available within the local skills pool. Second, within the policy 
context of the past South Africa, there had never been an established link 
between the locals and the forests; these were no-go areas for non-employees.  
The forest plantations had been introduced to these areas purely for business 
purposes. They are alien to the natural environment and to the people who had 
lived there before they were introduced. There is no significant pre-existing 
knowledge in the communities, and not much capacity at the supra-local level, as 
there had been no motivation to include the locals in management. A few local 
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people have been involved in the business, but mostly as unskilled workers. 
Hence it may take years to bridge the information gap. It is for this reason that 
part of SFP communication strategy involves disseminating information on what 
the saw mills are about, and how the forest industry makes contributions to local 
economic development.  
Exclusion through negotiation 
In the face of all the contradictions, the process of implementation relied more on 
negotiation and bargaining, rather than in adequate fulfilment of its stated objec-
tives. In this respect, the forestry case generally reflects a broader trend in South 
Africa’s policy processes, where privatization has involved the government 
negotiating with business, labour unions, and other interest groups. The forestry 
process involved old and new businesses, the public sector, local communities, 
and interested individuals. The study suggests that negotiation offered temporary 
solutions and helped to facilitate the pace of the asset transfer exercise, but did 
not solve the relational issues that came up, especially during the post-transfer 
situation. When certain policy intentions are sacrificed, for instance the attain-
ment of black representation in new ownership structures instead of a gender-
balanced one, these issues may still resurface to cause disharmony when the 
business becomes operational. Likewise, when an external (urban) black business 
is chosen over local (rural) entrepreneurs, as seen in the SQF case study, these 
issues come back to cause tensions later on. Finally, political objectives of seek-
ing redress impeded getting the optimal financial returns from the assets.  
It is in a similar respect that Miraftab (2004:239) argues that, when concepts 
like empowerment, social capital, or community participation are depoliticized 
and used as ‘building blocks’ for neo-liberal governance, these attempts portray a 
situation of symbolic inclusion, but at the same time they maintain a situation of 
material exclusion. Government touted forest privatization as one of the best 
opportunities for peripheral rural communities to enter business. The idea of 
communities gaining a foothold in forestry was used to justify forest privatization 
in the light of opposition from trade unions and left-wing politics.   
The forestry sale process suggests that exclusion is a result, not only of priori-
tization under circumstances of an objective overload, but of power play as well. 
When government does not protect materially weaker actors, the rest use their 
power to influence the process. Relatively weaker and unorganized groups, like 
the communities in these cases, lose out to organized business. What happened in 
the forestry case was that as soon as the policy process was transformed into a 
negotiation process, the only interests that were served belonged to those who 
happened to be present at the negotiation table. Communities in this case were 
materially excluded. 
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Forestry outcome in the context of power relations 
The objective overload and the power dimension in the forest sale process reflect 
a broader trend in South Africa’s post-apartheid policy processes. 
The objective overload was primarily a result of the skewed race-based power 
and policy at apartheid, and was an attempt to correct these discrepancies within 
the shortest time possible. What made the policy scenario ambiguous was the 
economic path that South Africa has subscribed to in the post-1994 period. While 
this macro-economic policy was evidently neo-liberal, the numerous social needs 
dictated that the economic model should be not only flexible, but also tailored to 
accommodate such interests. Because some of these objectives that were incom-
patible with the principles of a free market found their way into policy (for 
instance BEE), their successful implementation significantly depended on a com-
promise on power.  
A key characteristic of policy implementation processes is the role of power 
and influence and how different actors use their leverage to advance their 
sectional agenda. Walt (1994: 1) observes policy making also as “about who 
influences whom and how that happens”. The labour union in South Africa has 
used its position of influence to direct policy to a certain extent, and their most 
outstanding opposition was directed at the governments’ privatization process. 
COSATU, the umbrella body of several trade unions, used its influence as a 
member of the tripartite alliance (ANC, SACP, and COSATU) to push the inter-
ests of the workers during policy making. In the forestry case, this was mani-
fested in the agreement with government, which said that during the sale of the 
forests there would be a moratorium on retrenchment by the new owners for at 
least three years after the forest transfer. Pre-privatization government workers at 
SFP for instance, had the option to take severance packages, or be retained on the 
same or better remuneration packages. An agreement of this nature may not be 
entirely favourable for business, given that evidence from most privatization 
exercises points to retrenchments as one of the activities private actors employ in 
order to cut costs and increase efficiency. Business, on the other hand, pushed 
their own interests, among these ensuring that government did not include 
unviable forest assets. They also demanded that areas with settlements (like in 
the SFP area, near Umzimkhulu) were excluded from the privatization deal, and 
at best reverted back to the local municipalities. Inasmuch as government took 
responsibility for unresolved tenure issues and advanced a 70-year lease to the 
private forest interests, such insecure situations were still used by the private 
sector as leverage to lower the price of the assets.  
A situation of compromise underlies policy processes, and in the end, much of 
what each interest gets out of the transaction depends on its ability to use its 
power and influence to its benefit. How then did local communities, who were 
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not at the negotiating table, benefit from such a process? Local interests that may 
have missed out of the elite negotiations had the option to position themselves to 
benefit from the spin-offs that emerged from the downstream business transac-
tions. However, their late entrance worked against them, as they had to fit in 
within a framework already designed and consolidated by more powerful inte-
rests.28  
Interests that were not strongly represented, or had no leverage were most 
likely the losers at the decision-making stages. Although the spin-offs, like the 
new businesses created by SFP and SQF, offered a reprieve, these had to work 
within the framework set out at the leveraging stages. If the communities were 
excluded early on, as evident in this study, then no amount of community enter-
prises or projects was likely to mitigate their weak power position. The power 
debate in South Africa, as I also take farther in the next section, has been argued 
from a similar standpoint. Macozoma (2004) argues that the diffusion of econo-
mic power to those disempowered by apartheid, can only be meaningful if busi-
ness leaders from these groups make in-roads into the important decision making 
structures; otherwise the old power structures remain intact and economic apart-
heid continues. 
The weak position in which the SFP community Trust found itself, due to both 
financial and human resource constraints, undermined its constructive engage-
ment with their partner company. It also placed the communities in a situation 
where they depended on SFP to fund their investments; and this further perpetu-
ated dependency and eroded their bargaining power. SQF on the other hand, 
concentrated on creating individual business people who had better chances of 
becoming power brokers on behalf of their communities. 
Implementation: Concluding note 
Along the implementation process only some of the objectives survived, and 
seldom in the manner that they were intended. The survival of any objective 
partly depended on the influence by actors who managed to remove, dilute, or 
elevate some of the initial intentions, according to what they considered favour-
able. For instance, during the forest privatization exercise in South Africa, the 
original asking price was devalued, as the private sector felt there were too many 
social developmental objectives attached as conditions to the sale, which they 
considered as disincentives. Also the idea to be sensitive to gender balance was 
traded off for a focus on a balance that was first and foremost based on race. The 
objective of empowerment seems to have favoured black elites at the expense of 
rural and less educated individuals and/or communities. Funding for forest 
                                                                 
28
  I revisit the implications of these enterprises on local communities in the later section on co-manage-
ment.  
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science research reduced as a result of state withdrawal, and the state’s intention 
to sell their assets as one national forest estate had to be rescinded for smaller 
packages that could accommodate new, medium-sized investors as well. Existing 
labour forces within the state forests up for sale were retained for a period of 
three years at the expense of the popular cost-cutting measures by private sector. 
In the end, no particular objective was absolutely satisfied according to the 
initial expectations. Each interest group had to give up some expectations in 
order to make gains elsewhere. Government managed to sell part of its assets, but 
not at the intended price, while the private sector paid less to compensate for the 
risks of taking on too many social responsibilities instead of purely market-
related ones. Hence the implementation exercise became a negotiation process 
where exclusion was part of the consequences.  
Community groups in our case studies came to the negotiation table after the 
deal had been sealed between government and private forestry. They were 
excluded, not only because of their lack of financial and organizational capabili-
ties, but also because they were not at the negotiation arena early. Their being 
considered as peripheral actors placed them in a position where they could only 
be considered for beneficiation after the businesses were up and running. Bene-
fits to communities were addressed through outreach and entrepreneurial activi-
ties that sprung forth, such as the contracts discussed in both SFP and SQF cases.  
While balancing policy objectives during implementation is not a unique 
exercise, what made this particular exercise even slower and more tedious was 
the involvement of too many government agencies with different interests in the 
transfer process. This multiplicity required emphasis on coordination and leader-
ship, both of which were lacking. The lack of policy integration across the 
government departments was both a case of low prioritization of the forestry 
exercise and a general lack of political will across the board. 
In implementation theory as discussed in chapter 2, policy objectives may be 
lost along the way mainly due to the gap between the policy maker and the policy 
implementer. On the contrary, implementation problems in this case study were a 
result of the objective overload and their contradictory nature that led to negotia-
tions and subsequent exclusions.  
Reinventing ‘community’ for forest business 
The discussion in this section is dedicated to the relationship between the forest 
companies and communities. As I discussed in the empirical chapter 6, the two 
cases present a variety of models of community engagement in forestry. In the 
SFP case, communities were partners in forestry and own 10% of the company. 
At the same time, SFP engaged selected individuals in business mentorship as 
demonstrated in schemes such as Owner Drivers and Dargle project. These were 
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done in addition to conventional community outreach initiatives, such as giving 
bursaries to students and supporting local health care facilities.  
In the SQF study, a partnership was forged with a black business IL and 
reflected a normal business-to-business transaction. Alternative ways of enhanc-
ing local skills was done through Fukamela, the contractor mentor program. 
Communities were engaged through conventional corporate outreach programs, 
and there were also attempts by SQF to offload some of its shareholding to com-
munities so that they could become a business partner as well. 
These cases show how the two forest companies are attempting to transform in 
a way that enables black actors and community groups to take part in forest busi-
ness. The one question that was common in the two cases was how to identify or 
create a community for business. Should they rely on administrative boundaries 
or kinship territories under traditional authority? How could identified commu-
nities organize and be represented in a way that enabled their engagement in the 
business to receive benefits in an equitable and transparent way? Were there 
existing stocks of collective social capital that could be relied on when seeking to 
define or create a community? 
This section summarizes key results as seen through certain actions and per-
ceptions toward community organizing that both SFP and SQF employ. In the 
context of the case studies and supported by related theories, I revisit the creation 
of local institutions for forest business, the role of the local elite in community 
organizing and the role of facilitation. As a final core point, this chapter also 
analyzes in a comparative manner, the community approach against the focus on 
individual entrepreneurs. These two models fit loosely within certain theoretical 
discussions on natural resource management.  
Between neo-populist and neo-liberal styles of resource governance 
Various theoretical concepts have been used to explain trends in Natural Re-
source Management including forestry. Chapter 2 explored some of these. Two 
main schools of thought were highlighted and these are the neo-populist and neo-
liberal approaches to resource management.  
The neo-populist school fronts for radical shifts in the way natural resources 
are managed. It challenges approaches that exclude local and supra-local users 
from resource management, and advocates for their centrality. Preceding prac-
tices were mostly state-based and authoritarian. The state placed emphasis on the 
resource and its preservation, while there was little consideration for local users. 
Under the ideas of the neo-populist school, concepts like co-management have 
become prominent to reinforce the local user as a capable resource manager, 
especially when there are clear rules to guide use. This perspective has not gone 
unchallenged, especially as western-type democracies take root in developing 
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countries. Ideological shifts have not only traversed political systems but encom-
pass the governance of natural resources as well. Within these transitions, the 
market has increasingly gained hegemony and sought to replace the state as the 
key actor in resource management. 
The neo-liberal approach to resource management aims to centralize the busi-
ness sector as a key player. The private sector, having a relatively more powerful 
influence on policy, has managed to pressure developing states to embrace their 
demands. As a result privatization has occurred among other pro-market reforms, 
albeit, with some degree of caution in some instances. With most of these states 
are still faced by numerous developmental needs, it becomes equally important to 
mitigate the inability of the market to respond to social and sustainability needs. 
So while government agrees to let the private sector move in, the latter is 
encouraged to engage in practices that are sensitive to these needs. It is these 
dilemmas that lead to adoption of mixed strategies, both in policy papers and in 
practice, and the reason that elements of concepts like co-management survive 
even through neo-liberal tendencies such as privatization. This is a common 
characteristic of enlightened late-phase liberalism where the market dominates, 
but is kept in check externally by a combination of state regulation, labour 
organizations, and activism by non-governmental organizations. Business is also 
guided internally for broadly strategic or moral reasons to pursue objectives of 
social responsibility and environmental sustainability. 
These demands have seen to the re-emergence of neo-populist elements in 
predominantly neo-liberal processes. The result is what Higgins & Lockie (2002: 
419) call “hybrid practices”, referring to how social aims and efforts at sustain-
ability are retained within new forms of governance.  
South Africa’s style of privatizing its plantation forests can also be viewed as 
a mixed approach to governance that gives in to market demands, at the same 
time trying to live up to some of its political ideals of enforcing a people-centred 
outcome. The numerous and often conflicting objectives prevalent in South 
Africa’s policies signify the struggle to accommodate social and private interests 
within a market-dominant process. These occur through the integration of private 
individual action and collective action. This in no way implies that there is 
consensus and a united vision to the direction forestry takes, since even within 
changes in management styles, different interests still attach different values to 
the resource. The mixed approach is beset not only by complex logistical 
problems, as we have seen through the previous chapters, but also by relational 
and local institutional issues. 
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Local institutions for forestry 
The adoption of such mixed strategies demand that group interests are organized 
and institutions established or existing ones broadened to accommodate new 
perspectives. Although differences in perspectives and interests might still occur 
even within the same organization, or within local communities, it is important 
that local communities, like their private counterparts, strategically position 
themselves to advance and to attain the end of their interests. Klooster (2000) 
outlines some of these requirements and so does Williamson (2000, in Behera & 
Engel 2006: 351) who makes a more categorical description of the levels upon 
which institutions can be analyzed. The first level considers the extent to which 
existing informal institutions may be embedded in customs, traditions, religion, 
or norms. The second stage examines the nature of the institutional environment, 
and how formal rules can be created within broader existing laws, for instance 
those that are related to private property. Thirdly, he considers how contractual 
processes unfold and how existing governance structures support these. The final 
level of analysis takes into account the incentives, resources, and the nature of 
their allocation.  
The most significant aspect of this whole process is to develop rules to guide 
behaviour relevant for collective action. Local institutions are then necessary as 
rules (Ostrom 1990), as platforms for negotiation, distribution of benefits, and for 
seeking markets (Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997). Ostrom (1990: 39) indicates that 
the problem is not often to do with the organization itself, but the process of 
organizing or “how to change the situation from one in which appropriators act 
independently to one in which they adopt coordinated strategies to obtain higher 
joint benefits or reduce their joint harm”.  
According to these theories then, the creation of local institutions as shown in 
the SFP case, and to a lesser extent at SQF, calls for a lot more than just bringing 
a group of people together under a legally recognized entity. For a private enter-
prise, which may feel obliged to have local interests institutionalized hurriedly so 
that business may go on, ignoring the intricate details of local dynamics and 
obstacles to organizing poses a threat to the future of such collaboration. The 
creation of a community trust - Singilanga Directorate Trust (SDT) - for the pur-
poses of being engaged by SFP as a partner is a case in point. SFP’s urgent need 
to start forestry operations after making a commitment to surrounding communi-
ties to take them on as partners in the enterprise saw a haphazard bundling of 
large areas of settlements under one umbrella organization. SDT became the 
institution for thousands of households, many of whom did not know each other 
and had never worked together as a group. The SDT “community” was differ-
entiated, not only by their disparate physical locations, but also by language, 
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cultural norms and class. A respondent gave one example of the class factor 
blocking community action: 
Projects are for poor people…people who have the means do not join local projects. They 
are independent and are not interested. This could be one of the reasons that our local insti-
tutions fail. (Interview 26 March 2004). 
The opinion above is an interesting contradiction to what most literature on 
local organizing suggests. Local elites are often portrayed as hijackers of local 
initiatives for personal gain. More importantly for the discussion here, it high-
lights the problem of insufficient rationalization of the collective. In addition, the 
perception of the local elite varied depending on the inclination of the actor as 
respondent. For instance, the elites who were interviewed generally felt they had 
something to offer, but were discouraged by the amount of mistrust levelled 
against them. SFP thought that these elites caused trouble and politicized com-
munity action that they were trying to facilitate. This point is further elaborated 
in the next sub-section.  
The understanding of “community” by communities themselves may not be 
based on territorial boundaries on which external actors such as SFP tend to rely, 
but rather on non-territorial kinship ties. It is due to similar ambiguities that lead 
writers like Ostrom (1990) and Klooster (2000) to call for a focus and emphasis 
on institutions as rules, rather than a reliance on the notion of community. 
Klooster (2000:3) understands institutions as “rules that coordinate social rela-
tionships, help balance behaviour and solve the assurance problem”. 
The implication is that if the elite within participating communities were 
genuinely interested, there would be rules, and functional institutions would be 
created, but it was not certain whether their involvement would spur the interest 
of the poorer members of these communities. The lack of motivation for 
organizing to join the forest business was a result then, of a combination of what 
was perceived as inadequate incentives, with many people preferring activities 
that brought immediate economic benefits, as opposed to those that were rele-
gated to the future. Also, historical pessimism surrounded commercial forestry 
practices: local residents remembered the prohibitions set during apartheid that 
removed them from the areas the forests stand, some of which are of cultural 
value to them. Removals to give way for forestry also saw the reduction of fields 
for cattle rearing as a preferred economic and cultural activity in most of the 
Eastern Cape.  
The question of community and local elites 
As stated previously, there exists ambiguity in the way the role of local elites is 
perceived in the process of crafting and managing local institutions. In the SFP 
case, the capacitated were perceived both as the villains and as the missing link 
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in efforts at institutional development, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
This was manifested mostly in the SFP case. On one hand, the more capacitated 
individuals were considered as a threat and as capable of demoralizing the rest of 
potential participants. At Singilanga Directorate Trust (SDT), some Trust leaders 
expressed such disillusionment, arguing that while their institution was facing 
difficulty due to low levels of capacity, particularly in entrepreneurial manage-
ment, the few with some skills were viewed by fellow members with scepticism 
and significant mistrust. Managers at SFP, who intimated that the troublemakers 
for SDT were the local elite, also expressed similar sentiments; they viewed them 
as self-seekers and as hindering the overall process of mobilizing SDT commu-
nities to work towards collective goals. This view differed when talking to 
opinion leaders or those classified as the local elite. While they acknowledged 
the problems of capacity, they recognized the contradictions prevalent in the way 
they were regarded as well. It is for this reason that they tended to concentrate on 
individual businesses rather than involve in local collective initiatives. 
The second case study, SQF, did not initially engage their communities 
because they claimed the forest communities had not formulated rules that would 
guide their engagement, and were therefore not adequately organized to be 
partners in the enterprise. The second attempt by SQF to offload some of its 
shares to these communities was undermined by the demand by some traditional 
authority leaders that a portion of the enterprise be reserved solely for their own 
benefit, hence separated from the community as subjects. SQF’s parent company, 
Mondi, had operated in the same area of KwaZulu-Natal for decades, and often 
accessed the residents through the Traditional Authority. To directly engage the 
community in the forestry enterprise required a new set of understanding and 
rules, but SQF preferred a separate institution, steered by a local committee and 
separated from the influence of the Traditional Authority. SQF’s attempts to 
bypass traditional authority and access the community directly failed. This is 
partly because the Traditional Authority still wields significant influence on 
issues of local organization, and easily frustrates ideas that attempt to sideline 
them.  
This example is a paradox of sorts, but it points to how power and influence 
can obstruct attempts at local business engagements. The Traditional Authority, 
particularly in KwaZulu-Natal province where SQF operates, has retained legiti-
macy even as new political democracies took root by virtue of their role as custo-
dians of communal land. They hold in Trust community assets especially land. 
Therefore it was a contradiction that they demanded for themselves, as an entity 
independent of the community, 40% of the available 10% shares that SQF was 
willing to transfer to community ownership. On the other hand, it was strategi-
cally poor for Mondi and by extension SQF to bypass traditional authority when 
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significant transactions were involved, when they had previously relied on this 
traditional leadership to access the rest of the community. The SFP option in the 
Eastern Cape Province of advancing the idea of local committees from the begin-
ning, as opposed to placing strong emphasis on traditional structures, helped to 
avoid problems that may have been posed by middlemen and brokers. Only in 
the process of creating a community Trust, SFP similarly neglected the elected 
local councils, hence missing out on influential actors. Such actors could have 
used their influence to help SFP communities, for instance in accessing options 
for financing or speeding up the legal processes of institution building, or simply 
providing platforms for connecting to the more external formalized structures. 
Both SFP and SQF attempted to exclude certain local entities that they thought 
would negatively influence their processes, either by politicizing or usurping the 
roles they needed residents to exercise. While SFP mostly sidelined political 
entities or personalities, but in a small way reached out to traditional authorities, 
SQF were unable to offload the shares to the community, as they were stuck 
trying to bypass the local traditional authority. In the end, SQF decided that these 
shares would be transferred instead to the junior partner, IL that also runs 
Fukamela training scheme, until such a time that a workable solution would have 
been negotiated with the neighbouring communities. The private actors’ reluc-
tance to use existing local institutions as stepping stones or as partners in their 
enterprise confirms the perceptions often associated with the local elite, who are 
viewed as opportunists or potential obstacles to advancement of development 
concepts, such as participation or community involvement.  
On the other hand, the private actors’ tendency to pick and exclude was a part 
of their subtle resistance to the policy environment that coerced them to work 
with the locals beyond the traditional realm of corporate social responsibility, 
and that actually gave the people a voice in the forest business. Hence, some of 
the perceived difficulties also partly represented a ploy to self-sabotage part of 
the processes that private entities felt were incompatible with their conventional 
operations. Issues such as community’s incapacities or the ideological inclina-
tions of the elite are indefensible factors that companies can use as a pretext to 
act either superficially in the case of SFP, or only through selected private 
individual actors as exemplified by SQF.  
The point that stood out from the case studies, and particularly with local 
people, was that where the private companies wanted to offload part of their 
ownership to the local people, there was remarkable interest in the anticipated 
financial outcomes, rather than in the intricate processes of joint organizing 
necessary for receiving such benefits. People were more interested in the end 
(benefits) rather than the means (process) and rules. Such reluctance could be 
explained by the lack of prior experience in working collectively for profit-
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making, the fear that at the end, there may not be results for efforts put in or that 
the more powerful people, including private actors and elites, may benefit at the 
expense of those vulnerable. These fears were not far-fetched, given the past 
exploitative economic experiences and the prevalence of residues of apartheid-
structured power relations.  
Options for creating community enterprises 
Part of the solution could be to introduce collective activities in small doses, as a 
way of harnessing trust. SQF was already approaching their communities through 
small activities but with a long-term view of consolidating trust for future 
formalized business groups. Alternatively, new schemes could use existing in-
formal structures meant for other activities, and transform/strengthen these to the 
realm of business. Reliance on such pre-existing ‘collective social capital’ helps 
to define groups of actors being any social entity who have already cultivated 
some sense of stability and cohesion. They could be fairly organized small 
groups focused on a kind of business, or an informal group with enough internal 
trust to enable formalization processes to take place. Such informal collective 
structures are already present in the villages and are often used, for instance for 
micro-credit schemes, funeral committees or youth soccer groups. The idea is to 
tap into existing structures where there is already a working understanding 
amongst members.  
Territorial or kinship-based communities can also convert into business groups 
if they are coherent and stable enough to work as a unit. The SFP target group 
was a combination of territorial, kinship and functional communities. The 
diversity was great, and so were the distances. The group was impersonal and 
had no experience of working as a group. The informal units mentioned above 
were present within the large community, but they were outside the criterion that 
SFP employed to define its community for forest business. 
SQF on the other hand, paired up with an individual black elite company but 
at the same time, was taking the longer route of first creating a relationship with 
its communities. It was doing this through engaging the communities in needs 
assessments, being the link with other external agencies, whether private, public, 
or non-governmental, and seeking markets for local products such as wood arte-
facts and honey.  
Actors could also be individuals who have sufficient self-efficacy and some 
capacity to engage in the forest-related business. Missing skills can be acquired 
and existing ones improved. In fact this is the route that has proved most success-
ful with both SQF and SFP, as seen with the Fukamela and the Owner Drivers 
Scheme respectively. The success of these individually focused initiatives is 
quantifiable in terms of the jobs being created, and also because beneficiaries are 
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required and expected to pass on acquired skills, especially in forest business 
management. The snowball effect is mainly exemplified by the Fukamela 
scheme, which after training only three contractors by end of 2005, reported that 
a total of 320 jobs had been created as a result. In comparison, SQF and SFP 
successes at community engagement were still minimal. On the SFP side, al-
though annual dividends had been declared a couple of times that saw the 
community’s portion transferred to the Trust, its impacts were yet to be felt as 
communities needed to agree and plan on projects that benefited them as a 
collective. Unlike the individual route, beneficiation by whole groups of commu-
nities required consensus and considerable planning. 
It is important to note that what has worked for the private sector-community 
alliances are approaches that are more or less conventional to business. These 
practices are guided by laws that business people understand, and are devoid of 
the complexities of dealing with whole communities. The individual approach 
considers people who show interest, have the motivation, and some formal 
capacity that can be supported and improved. The niche of these models and 
what differentiates them from normal business objectives is the emphasis on their 
multiplier effect to benefit more people within their communities.  
The reason that the private companies invest time experimenting with large 
communities is to fulfil the political emphasis for a broader approach to doing 
business. Community involvement in forest management is absent, although at 
SFP, they are represented by one member in the board of directors. The strategies 
employed both at SFP and SQF are attempts at community beneficiation through 
creating enterprises, rather than a move towards involving them in daily 
management of the forests. As pointed out earlier, the plantations are exotic, 
established purely for the manufacturing sector and require particular expertise. 
This makes their management distinct from other nature management, such as 
wildlife or natural forests, where neighbouring communities may have some 
close affinity.  
The role of facilitation  
In this study, attempts at building local institutions have been led by private 
enterprise (SFP and SQF). These have been coordinated within certain time 
limits that were convenient for the forest business to take off. Without significant 
prior collective action by the said communities, especially in business, and 
coupled with the quickly but loosely defined community boundaries, the role of 
private company actors as facilitators of such local processes is highlighted.  
Local organizing as initiated by SFP, and to a lesser extent by SQF, gives an 
image of an external scheme being sold in the local arena. This worked to 
deprive the process of the essence of community ownership that SFP and SQF 
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intended to advance. The question that remains then is how to sell a business idea 
to a group of communities and at the same time ensure that the process is bought 
and owned as a community initiative. Would the enterprise have been perceived 
differently had the idea been sold by entities other than the private sector, for 
instance locally connected individuals or a public sector agency like DWAF?  
In other sectors such as mining, strategic community beneficiation has been 
organized with the help of government officers and sometimes by non-govern-
mental bodies. There have been cases of both success and failure. The problem of 
facilitation is not so much about who does it, but how it is conducted. As Ostrom 
(1990) observes, such processes may need to acknowledge the threats to collec-
tive organizing, and to first understand why it might be difficult for certain 
groups to work together easily, and not others. Anxieties about what are per-
ceived as external ideas may be rooted in negative and discriminatory past 
experiences in communal areas, as was characteristic in the study areas. To some 
extent, the reluctance to appreciate collective organizing for forestry is simply 
out of preference for other rational economic choices.  
Management: Concluding note 
The organizing process need to be one driven by target communities themselves, 
if they feel motivated and interested in joining the enterprise. When facilitation is 
led by the established private sector, as we have seen in attempts by SFP and 
SQF, there is a tendency to focus on outcome, and these in turn ignore the 
complex details that local communities need to deal with in order to build strong 
institutions. Knowledge of existing associational networks rests with communi-
ties, and it is incumbent upon them to identify these, and where necessary to 
build new institutions. Building and consolidating stocks of trust is an internal 
initiative, rather than a phenomenon that can be imposed from outside by the 
private sector. While business entities proposing to have alliances with commu-
nities may feel obliged to facilitate the process, there is need for clarity on what 
facilitation involves; otherwise it can easily overshadow communities’ own 
attempts to try and become legitimate owners of the enterprise. 
‘Power over’, ‘power to’ and the forestry case 
As discussed in the empirical chapter 7 on empowerment, emphasis on its prac-
tice has mainly revolved round the issue of increased ownership by historically 
disadvantaged groups of productive assets. The SFP and SQF companies have 
both approached ownership from different angles. While SFP tried out a collec-
tive approach by partnering with a whole group of communities, SQF instead 
adopted the more conventional route of teaming up with a black business group.  
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SFP and SQF mainly responded to two elements in the BEE framework, those 
being ownership and enterprise development. To some extent, development of 
enterprise is intricately linked to skills development, as seen through SQF’s 
Fukamela and SFP’s Owner Drivers Scheme, which are training and mentoring 
schemes accompanied by preferential forestry contracts. The understanding of 
empowerment by local respondents in the study areas without disregarding the 
focus on ownership or enterprise rather emphasized the fulfilment of immediate 
needs. These include jobs, access to affordable education and training, and better 
health care plus other basic infrastructures. This understanding of empowerment 
shifts the focus away from ownership, and re-focuses the debate on skills 
development and education, which are included in BEE objectives, but receive 
little strategic and political attention compared to the issue of ownership.  
This section is a broad analysis which discusses and connects the notion of 
power and empowerment as understood at four different levels: in theory, within 
the context of forestry case studies, in South Africa’s public discourses, and as 
prescribed in South Africa’s policy.  
To recapitulate the debate on power as discussed in chapter 2, existing 
theoretical categorizations of power present several variants, but for this present 
section I will rely especially on the concepts of power over and power to.  
The notion of power over has been used to denote a context where power is 
dominant, controlling, and able to subjugate those who possess less. In most 
cases therefore, it refers to economic capital, which includes among other things, 
the accumulation of financial capital, various types of wealth, and assets such as 
land, productive entities, and shares in companies. The alternative view of power 
advances the idea of power to, and implies that, unlike power over, it is not 
necessarily authoritative, but more positive and able to change people’s social 
and economic capacities. This version of power can be equated with the accu-
mulation of human capital, or the acquisition of productive resources, whether at 
an individual or collective level, of assets such as education, skills, corporative 
capacities and self-efficacy.  
The empowerment story of South Africa’s forestry as revisited below com-
bines efforts that advance both notions of power. Practices toward skills and 
entrepreneurial development of individuals and communities in which SFP and 
SQF engage for instance, fit into ideas of power to as they build capacities. On 
the other hand, transfer of ownership and control are aimed at balancing the 
skewed distribution of economic wealth and power, mostly in the hands of white 
South Africans privileged by apartheid. Hence, its conception adds up to the idea 
of power over.
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Power in BEE policy 
At a theoretical level, the BEE policy objectives, as detailed in chapter 3, loosely 
fall into two categories of capital: economic and human capital. The BEE efforts 
at one level, aim to enable designated groups to own the country’s productive 
assets. At another level, the emphasis is on developing human capital through 
quality education, mentoring and skills, and training initiatives. Underlying these 
efforts is the emphasis on a broad-based BEE that has the capacity to reach as 
many deserving people as possible. 
In practice, BEE has appeared to favour black elites and politically connected 
individual business people, thus raising immense public debate and frustrations. 
In this respect, the practice of BEE qualifies in a narrow sense, as opposed to the 
broad-based idea upon which it is conceptualized. It translates much more to the 
idea of power over, or the acquisition of economic capital, rather than to an equal 
focus on developing human capital or power to. 
Attempts to depoliticize the meaning of empowerment, or to balance its under-
standing beyond the economic by re-emphasizing skills development has not 
helped to diminish the tensions. Various legislations challenge the traditional 
structures of dominance, whether between the genders, between different races, 
or between owners of capital and labour. These inequalities remain largely 
unchanged however and, at worst, are increasing. The perpetuation of traditional 
inequalities is to some extent attributable to policy strategies that tend to priori-
tize and elevate certain objectives over the others. Taking the example of gender 
versus the debate on race, the empowerment strategy implicitly places more 
value on a de-racialized economy over a gender-balanced one. The same applies 
to the production of a minority black elite, who are able to take on the white 
dominated decision making structures, versus a focus on the majority poor, i.e. 
prioritizing race over class. The initial rebuttal from the government side postu-
lates that BEE was designed for, and remains, a strategy to enable the entry of 
black people into the economy and not an overall poverty reduction strategy, 
these being addressed in several other policies (Mlambo-Ngcuka29 2006), a 
response that makes theoretical sense but is practically flawed in light of the 
magnitude of continued poverty at the lower levels.  
Power and empowerment in South Africa’s public discourse and in the case 
studies  
In South Africa, the empowerment efforts in forestry, as in other economic 
sectors, derive their meaning from the guiding legislative framework. While 
some elements of the BEE guidelines are specific, for instance the targets that 
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  Mlambo-Ngcuka is the former Minister for Minerals and Energy and current Deputy President of 
South Africa. 
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guide employment equity, its application in other areas (such as ownership/equity 
or entrepreneurship) are fairly flexible and encourage creativity. Hence, entities 
can come up with their own ideas, as we have seen within the two forestry cases. 
Regardless of attempts to streamline the understanding of empowerment and to 
operationalize it, even if loosely, according to a certain set of procedures, its on-
the-ground understanding, as opposed to that of the policy-maker, is still not 
synchronized and depends on the needs of different categories of people and their 
expectations from the economy and the political order. The understanding as 
derived from the case studies indicates that the youth, for instance, voice their 
immediate concerns to be access to education and jobs in that order. For people 
who happen to have low levels of education and at the same time are past their 
productive age and also residing in the rural areas, their expectations would be 
met if public sector services were brought closer to them: if they could access 
affordable education for their children and if solutions were found to the 
unemployment situation that plagues most of South Africa. Workers expect 
training, growth, and upward mobility, better wages, and elimination of race-
based remnants of discrimination in the workplace. Owners of capital, on the 
other hand, want workable legislation, not BEE or employment equity conditions 
without skills to fulfil the requirements of the legislation. Other owners of capital 
resist in various ways efforts to have them extend their shareholding to individu-
als or entities simply by virtue of having been excluded during apartheid.   
In essence, there is no single understanding of empowerment, but need, ambi-
tion, sectional interests, and the general quest to improve one’s economic and 
social standing largely guide it. The ownership-focused understanding of em-
powerment is an inherent catalyst of conflict. Already, there exist three major 
categories of those who have shown resistance. One group consists of people 
mostly from the privileged class, who see it as an attempt by the state to redis-
tribute their wealth; hence they focus on preserving what they have accumulated. 
The second group is allied to the trade unions, who in principle support empow-
erment, but disagree with the way it has been practiced, as amounting to cherry 
picking of politically connected individuals and making them rich through high-
end corporate transactions. Then there is the group of academics and analysts 
(see Mbeki 2004; Terreblanche 2002; Miraftab 2004; McEwan & Bek 2006) who 
view empowerment as it unfolds in South Africa as fundamentally flawed.  
Exemplifying the latter group, Terreblanche (2002) and Mbeki30 (2004) view 
the South African version of empowerment as one that, in alliance with big busi-
ness, works to hoodwink South Africans that there is some attempt to open up the 
economy to more people, while in the real sense, big transactions only rotate 
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  Moeletsi Mbeki is a political analyst and critic of South Africa’s BEE programme and not to be con-
fused with President Mbeki. 
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among a few black elites, trusted by South Africa’s big business to give them a 
politically correct image. Hence the concept of empowerment as understood in 
South Africa is highly contested between different viewpoints. It is seen as ex-
clusionary on one side, and as a tool for redistributing, rather than creating, 
wealth on the other hand. As Miraftab (2004) underscores, terms like empower-
ment have been depoliticized, or made to appear less conflict-ridden in order to 
strip them of their original intentions of engaging problems of inequality. Instead 
of being applied to transform these, the concepts have been made into tools for 
preserving the status quo. Depoliticization of such terms lead to their being sugar 
coated and embraced by the very same structures that they were meant to chal-
lenge, but with the intentions of reinforcing the neo-liberal agenda (ibid.). If we 
were to follow this argument for the forestry case, then inserting the concept of 
empowerment into the restructuring agenda would have worked only to reinforce 
privatization and benefit only those already rich. Is this what happened in the 
forestry case? What would it have been in the absence of BEE objectives? 
Including elements of BEE into the forestry cases contributed to an objective 
overload, as discussed in the previous section on implementation. It is likely that 
if it were a conventional privatization exercise without BEE, the process would 
have moved faster and with lower transaction costs. On the other hand, BEE 
target groups like rural communities and individuals mentored under schemes 
like Fukamela would not have benefited to the extent that they did. This would 
have made the outcome narrow, and only biased toward established forest busi-
ness. While implementing BEE through the forestry sale created some difficul-
ties, it made a difference for both existing and new forestry capitalists, and to 
some extent, on the poor as well. These do not basically challenge the neo- 
liberal agenda, but they do introduce elements of equity within that context. 
The forestry cases that I studied here, as already mentioned in the previous 
section, are fair examples of the two sides of the BEE debate: the collective 
equity versus individual entrepreneurship approach. Collective shareholding as 
seen in the SFP case is more of a symbolic action, rather than one that would 
make significant economic difference to the position of subscribed communities. 
This makes good political news, but the details suggest that its ability to make a 
difference is dwarfed by the sheer number of beneficiaries when weighted 
against the monetary value of their shareholding. The community ownership 
scheme of SQF is not successful either, being bogged down in local politics. At 
SFP and at SQF in particular, however, the approach to empowerment through 
the not-so-popular individual route focusing on supporting entrepreneurship 
presents a more attractive model than the community route, inter alia by virtue of 
the snowballing effect of Fukamela, its contract-based business-training pro-
gramme.  
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A perspective has also surfaced in South Africa’s public discourse on BEE 
that attempts to drive the debate away from issues of asset ownership (whether 
collective or individual) to those of skills, training and entrepreneurship. Mbeki 
(2004: 3) argues that the problem with BEE as it has been practiced in South 
Africa, is that it takes the best of black people and have them concentrate on 
chasing shareholding deals in existing companies, rather than focus their energy 
and skills on creating new products, new companies, and new wealth. This 
practice, he adds, leads to a situation where South Africa is “playing to a culture 
of entitlement rather than a culture of entrepreneurship and a culture of learning”. 
SDT and IL, the junior partners of SFP and SQF respectively, qualify by virtue 
of the way they acquired their shareholding, as entities created out of entitlement. 
The products of SDT and IL, such as Fukamela and Owner Driver’s Schemes on 
the other hand, are entrepreneurial initiatives with a vision to create business 
people out of available human resource at the local level. The fact that Fukamela 
emerges out of IL also shows that with a clear vision and commitment, even 
companies created through the perspective of asset ownership (power over), are 
capable of being agents of skills creation, entrepreneurship (power to), and 
economic change at the local level. Moreover, these schemes are much closer to 
the local people’s own priorities of empowerment. 
Risk as a key ingredient of BEE 
The case studies also reveal that the risk that comes with capital transfer is an 
important element for BEE schemes to work. If capital is transferred with high-
risk strings attached, it will not be accessible to many, due to lack of collateral or 
the required amount of start-up capital. SQF’s partner IL, illustrates the case 
where the available opportunity for business with Mondi required that IL had 
access to funds to finance its own shares, and at the same time assume responsi-
bility for any risks involved. For BEE, this kind of a risk-loaded access to capital 
means that only the elite is able to take up such business opportunities while the 
poorer sections of the target groups are locked out.  
Other initiatives like SQF’s Fukamela, SFP’s Owner Drivers Scheme and the 
Dargle project are examples of capital transfers with reduced risk, so that they 
become accessible to entities from the community, who have a basic self-
efficacy, and education, and who are interested in a business opportunity. The 
forest companies lower the risks in these enterprises through loan guarantees and 
a longer grace period for repayment, accompanied by low interest rates. More-
over, access to capital is improved by providing the necessary mentoring and 
training together with the economic transfer. This example suits BEE, for it is 
able to reach the poorer sections of society who had no prior avenues to capital, 
possess low skills, but have an entrepreneurial spirit. This BEE route also has the 
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capacity for skills transfer, and at the same time it diffuses power to people 
through capital transfer. In addition, there is a high potential for more opportuni-
ties or spin-offs for other interested individuals from the communities.  
The third example involves access to capital, but with a very low or even zero 
degree of risk attached to it. This type of capital transfer is manifested in the case 
of SFP and its partner, SDT community Trust. The shareholding by SDT was 
funded by SFP, and all community members within its defined operation area 
became beneficiaries. Because there are no risks involved for members, the 
motivation for making it work is low. The communities are recipients of passive 
capital in the form of company shares, but are without management responsibil-
ity, targeted transfer of skills, and the necessary training. Although this BEE 
route generates benefits in the form of annual dividends when the company 
makes profit, and the community can use these to improve local amenities, the 
concept is narrow and does not address the real problems of unemployment, low 
skills, and lack of entrepreneurial development. 
A fourth example is that business opportunities with manageable risk levels 
may be created without capital transfer, in fact, being at stake. As elabourated in 
chapter 6, SQF experiments with the building of relationships with their commu-
nities through activities that support local micro-projects in bee farming and 
crafts. While such efforts may appear as traditional corporate attempts towards 
social responsibility, SQF emphasize that initiatives like these are part of their 
broader effort to gradually build trust with these communities so that with time, 
they can engage in bigger business engagements. Such an understanding of 
empowerment also de-links it from the conventional meaning as an economic 
transfer process.  
The economic understanding of empowerment has become dominant due to 
the urgency with which the idea of black emancipation has been conceived, and 
the fact that it was initially tailored to increase and improve the black middle 
class. This initial conception has also ensured the concentration of BEE action on 
elite individuals with the necessary social networks. Empowerment as an econo-
mic action is also spurred by the very reasons it was pursued in the first place. 
Due to the fact that apartheid disempowered blacks in order to empower Afri-
kaners in both political and economic terms, if redress is about correcting these, 
then it also becomes ambiguous to advance a kind of empowerment that does not 
address squarely the preceding practices that it aims to correct. The historical 
context then plays an important role in the way each interest group perceives the 
type of empowerment that they expect, or think they deserve, or for the already 
empowered, which empowerment they should allow to happen. 
Contestation over the meaning and nature of empowerment in South Africa to 
move beyond empowerment as acquisition of economic capital is necessary if the 
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new meanings are to be holistic. As the two case studies suggest, a simple 
transfer of wealth, for instance in the SDT case, doesn’t do much in terms of 
creating new wealth. On the other hand, a transfer of capital when accompanied 
with sufficient risk reduction and training as practiced at Fukamela, Dargle and 
other similar forest business activities, creates sustainable wealth.  
Existing arguments on empowerment, as generally found within South 
Africa’s development discourse, perpetuate sectional interests and are often one 
sided. Voices that for instance, call for de-prioritization of ownership, risk the 
perpetuation of old power structures established at apartheid, hence they may 
create loopholes similar to the ones currently under criticism. One solution is to 
rethink the strategy by raising the other objectives to the same level of emphasis 
enjoyed by the idea of ownership, in terms of both political and financial focus. 
An increased focus on the other elements of power may be necessary, especially 
on locally accessible packages of capital and risk, and on education and skills as 
a basis for empowerment.  
Within this broad picture, the rural areas require their own balanced BEE 
strategies. The rural areas, where there is minimal concentration of capital and 
skills and other infrastructures when compared to the urban areas, demand an 
approach to empowerment that is different or more intense from the one predo-
minantly pursued in the bigger South Africa.  
Power and empowerment: Concluding note 
The notion of empowerment in forestry and broadly in South Africa raises three 
main issues and these are: the sectional focus of BEE, the use of communities or 
selected individuals as vehicles of BEE, and the type of power that BEE policy 
should emphasize. 
Views on empowerment as a development discourse in South Africa will 
remain polarized and contested due to the various sectional interests that underlie 
the process. Although it is aimed at creating an economic balance where apart-
heid caused a divide, the race-based nature of the BEE strategies makes it 
difficult to depoliticize the concept and put it to work as a tool for emancipation. 
The BEE process has unfolded such that the black elite gains more access to 
business deals and capital, while poverty increases among the black majority. In 
this respect, the debate is now shifting somewhat to the issue of class rather than 
race, and the increasing divide among the black population. The idea of redress 
through BEE is legitimized and morally defendable, given the many years of 
apartheid. From the evidence in the case studies, it is clear that an initial boost of 
capital transfer to historically disadvantaged entities is necessary, but it is also 
clear that people need to be given the space to be innovative, to take risks, and to 
explore varied business interests. Hence limits need to be placed especially on 
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the amount of capital transfer that individual BEE entities receive. This is neces-
sary to reduce a situation where there is a high concentration of capital among a 
few, already rich beneficiaries, and to ensure a strategic re-focus on the poor, 
who really need capital and mentoring assistance. If poverty has indeed increased 
among the black population, then there is reason for BEE to be re-targeted as an 
Economic Empowerment for the Poor (EEP). Given the poverty levels across the 
population groups, most of the beneficiaries would still come from the black 
communities, but preference would be given to the most needy within that group. 
In this sense, BEE would become an equity mechanism that not only focuses on 
developing entrepreneurship, but could also be targeted on other areas for in-
stance, through progressive income tax, rent subsidies, income-dependent univer-
sity fees etc. This would then raise the question of which elements of the present 
BEE would qualify as good candidates of EEP. Based on the case studies, prefer-
ential treatment in procurement, for instance, would take primary consideration 
of poverty and gender disparities. Likewise, small-scale transfers of capital, risk 
and mentoring would be targeted at individuals out of the young, poor, rural or 
urban gendered groups. 
From the two case studies, the idea of a collective versus an individual 
approach to empowerment springs forth of the elite BEE identified above. The 
question is how to have power spread out to the broader poor black population 
rather than a select core. Beyond this, the other significant concern is how to 
ensure that those recipients of power build on it, not only for themselves, but for 
the benefit of society as well. How can the multiplier effect of empowerment be 
achieved?  
The cases that I have discussed in this thesis, without undermining the need 
for an empowerment of the majority, dismiss the notion that a collective focus of 
BEE would bring in better results than an individual focus. The SFP case sug-
gests that engaging a community, whether directly or through a Trust, creates a 
situation where everybody is set to benefit, but nobody does so significantly, as 
the high denominator dilutes the benefits. As a result, the process produces no 
entrepreneurship that can ensure dynamic continuity of the efforts. The Fukamela 
mentoring program at SQF, the Dargle project, and the Owner Drivers Scheme of 
SFP work better because they involve skills transfer and a considerable amount 
of risk to the beneficiary, which keeps motivation and creativity at a high level. 
The strategy also works better when it is focused on potential individual business 
people, who are rooted in the local economy, as this helps multiply local oppor-
tunities more quickly.  
Hence this study proposes that BEE should entail, not only a simple transfer of 
capital, but that this also should be accompanied by a certain degree of risk to the 
beneficiaries. Other than spurring a higher sense of motivation, active involve-
176 
ment in the process is good for learning and the subsequent transfer of acquired 
knowledge and skills. 
Contestation over what type of power should be enhanced in the course of 
economic democratization in South Africa again reflects the diverse interests that 
influence this process. While some analysts (McEwan & Bek 2006; Mifratab 
2004) intimate that BEE, if understood as an economic process, fails to dismantle 
and instead maintains existing power structures, I maintain that the solution lies 
not in concentrating on another type of power that is considered less political, but 
in attempting to emphasize simultaneously strategies that produce power that can 
be sustained. If anything, de-prioritizing one of the objectives of empowerment 
does not necessarily raise issues that are perceived as neglected. The alternative 
is to raise the level of prioritization on issues that support skills, innovation, and 
self-efficacy. 
The next chapter concludes this thesis but at the same time tries to highlight 
the link between the three concepts that have acted as the pillars of this study. 
These are policy implementation, natural resource management, and power and 
empowerment. 
9 
Conclusion 
This study has discussed how the forest restructuring exercise was conceived and 
how the varied interests in the sector were addressed, while keeping in focus the 
broader imperatives of transformation in South Africa. The central question 
aimed to determine how a myriad of interests in the forest sector were reconciled 
and addressed within a single process of forest restructuring. This question was 
laid out in three different dimensions and subsequently treated in three different 
empirical chapters. These include the concepts of implementation, the natural 
resource management system (NRM), and power, as manifested through Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE).  
The study was based on two case studies of SQF and SFP, in KwaZulu-Natal 
and Eastern Cape Provinces respectively. SFP was the first beneficiary of forest 
privatization and opted to partner up with a community, SDT, as its empower-
ment partner. The formation of the partnership took close to four years and was 
marred by problems of communication, SFP’s poor conception of ‘community’ 
and a vast geographic boundary that heightened logistical difficulties. The suc-
cess of the business collaboration itself, as discussed in the empirical chapter 6, 
was undermined not only by these problems but also by certain inadequacies 
within the community especially low skills and financial capacities, and by a 
disparate power gap between communities and SFP. To complement the commu-
nity approach to forest business, SFP also experimented with entrepreneurial 
initiatives that target individuals rooted in communities, but with certain basic 
skills and the self-efficacy to succeed. Such efforts are exemplified through the 
Owner Drivers Scheme, the Dargle project and other labour-based contracts. 
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SQF, the second beneficiary of privatization, approached its empowerment 
efforts through an individual black enterprise, IL. Unlike SDT, IL was able to 
finance its shareholding in the SQF enterprise. This relationship qualified as a 
conventional business partnering. However, to address the issue of empowerment 
in the broader community, IL started Fukamela, a contractor mentoring and 
training programme. Fukamela identified individuals from the community, whom 
they would train and secure for forest contracts at SQF. For the rest of the com-
munity, SQF engaged them through traditional social responsibility initiatives. 
After examining all these cases and concepts, it was evident that the power 
and empowerment dimension was more dominant throughout the study, and had 
shaped and directed the overall restructuring process. Hence power and empow-
erment could be used as a lens through which the other concepts of implementa-
tion and management were understood. The core concern in all these processes 
was how power could be diffused and spread out to new black forestry entrepre-
neurs and forest communities. This was against the background of plantation 
forestry that had been introduced in these areas during apartheid years for purely 
commercial purposes. The forests were not only alien to the natural environment, 
but to the communities as well. The only direct benefits from forestry were 
employment but even then, individuals from the communities had to compete 
with job seekers from outside. How then could you have local communities with 
a high unemployment rate, not well educated and generally poor, join the forestry 
enterprise? This is the point where this case study starts and it is also within this 
context that privatization of forestry took place and where the government 
pushed forward its developmental policies, including BEE. Hence related efforts 
at power diffusion are exemplified in most initiatives as captured in the case 
studies. In light of these facts and of the centrality of power in the findings, is it 
then possible to rephrase the original central research question as follows: How 
does power shape or drive the other two concepts of implementation and NRM 
within the forestry cases? 
Findings on power and empowerment 
This study tried to gauge the understanding of power both from a theoretical 
perspective, and from South Africa’s policy and public discourses on empower-
ment. Most significantly, the study also sought the meaning of these concepts 
from the perspective of respondents. Within South Africa’s public discourse, 
there appeared to be an understanding that there was much government emphasis 
on black ownership of productive assets as the highest determinant of empower-
ment. On the contrary, respondents in the case studies understood empowerment 
as first and foremost the fulfilment of immediate needs. In an area with a high 
unemployment rate and poverty, these needs were prioritized as access to 
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employment, affordable education and training, as well as better social amenities. 
These were perceived as primary needs whose attainment would prepare needy 
individuals and communities for empowerment, as emphasized through owner-
ship of assets, entrepreneurship, and employment at skilled, upper level posi-
tions. The meanings attached to the idea of empowerment also depended on 
status, and these were evidenced in responses from the unemployed youth, the 
old and retired, unskilled labourers, the educated and productive segments, as 
well as private interests. 
The findings also suggest that empowerment processes have worked better 
under strategies that target individual entrepreneurs rather than community 
groups. SFP and SQF operationalized empowerment using mixed approaches. 
The SFP primary approach targeted communities for a partial ownership of the 
company. SQF’s primarily engaged the individualist entity approach, which was 
more conventional to business. They later tried out both other business models, 
targeting individual entities and community groups respectively. Inasmuch as the 
SFP’s community approach targeted a large group of people for empowerment, 
its impacts were low due to the high denominator of beneficiaries when levelled 
against the Community Trusts’ annual dividends. In addition, there was no 
community involvement in the operation of SFP, hence they were passive bene-
ficiaries with no notable transfer of skills from the private actors. SQF on the 
other hand, through its individualist option in operationalizing empowerment, 
potentially seemed better placed to realize outcomes sooner, in terms of the 
entrepreneur multiplier effect demonstrated at Fukamela, the forestry contractor- 
mentoring program. The common emphasis in the case study, across all actors 
including private and community interests, was improvement in skills levels 
within the black communities as a necessary condition to achieving empower-
ment goals.  
Based on these results, the ownership and skills improvement approaches to 
the idea of power transfer can be respectively equated to the theoretical notions 
of power over and power to. While I found that empowerment practices in the 
cases responded to both ideas of power, the main motivation was to open up 
space for groups and individuals excluded by previous policies, but with a view 
to use those already empowered and trained, to impart skills and new opportuni-
ties to other members as well. This role of creating more agents of empowerment 
was possible, even where companies had been created through the perspective of 
asset ownership, understood as the perpetuation of power over.  Hence those who 
had acquired power over, as seen with the elite business BEE partner of SQF, 
were capable and willing agents of skills creation and entrepreneurship or power 
to in the study area, as best exemplified by Fukamela. The cases also revealed the 
presence of three main types of capital transfer. The first one favoured those with 
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access to financial assets and social networks necessary for buying into compa-
nies, but which also involved taking responsibility for risks associated with such 
processes. This type of capital transfer excluded the poorer and less-networked 
empowerment targets, especially those in rural areas. To mitigate this exclusion, 
the two companies also initiated other programs, with access to reduced risk 
capital, but which were attained through involvement in training and mentoring 
facilities, based on assured preferential contracts with the forest companies. This 
idea appeared to work for power transfer in the rural forest areas, especially for 
people who had some basic skills and education, and most importantly, the drive 
and self-efficacy to apply and succeed. The third and final option of capital trans-
fer, as practiced by SFP, relates to the collective strategy of empowerment 
mentioned above, where access to capital for communities was assured, with all 
risks covered and the shareholding funded by the private actor. The community 
then benefits when the company makes profits and declares dividends. Through 
this route, some capital was periodically injected into the communities, but just 
like other holders of passive stocks in the market, the process is devoid of any 
transfer of skills or entrepreneurship. 
The rural area, the setting of this study, was found to require alternative 
empowerment strategies or modification of existing frameworks to suit the 
context. This assertion was mandated by respondents’ criticism of the nature of 
BEE and its urban orientation, but also exacerbated by their relative poverty, low 
skills base, and high illiteracy levels. BEE as it was written and conceptualized 
for the urban elite and in English rather the local language, was seen as another 
tool of exclusion, rather than one that could facilitate their upward social and 
economic mobility. Hence, I concluded that power transfer, in the rural context 
need to be accompanied by more resources targeted at further education, training, 
and the overall elevation of skills. 
This view of power as the central concept may then be used to reinterpret the 
findings on the NRM and implementation issues.  
Findings on implementation and community organizing
The empowerment issues analyzed above trace their origin back to the forest 
privatization objectives and to overall transformational policies. In this restruc-
turing arena there were many competing objectives and interests. The study 
found that in a field with such a multitude of interests, it is not only necessary to 
have bargaining power, but strong informational networks as well. Even with 
government’s intervention to push through certain developmental objectives 
when implementing policy, actors, especially business actors who are in posses-
sion of bargaining power, indeed still negotiate favourable terms for themselves. 
This worked out at the expense of weaker actors, in this case community actors, 
181 
who lacked the relevant information and financial networks. On the basis of 
these, they were excluded from the negotiation table during the implementation 
stages, and this situation in turn worked to predetermine the kind of relations 
they later established with the forest private actors. Future power relations were 
determined at the negotiation arena, and community interests would be facilitated 
largely on the private actors’ own terms. This leads to the conclusion that when a 
policy process becomes overloaded with objectives, it transforms into a negotia-
tion arena with the weaker actors as the likely losers.  
In this study, the local elite as actors was viewed through two contradictory 
lenses. They were understood as the necessary but scarce local human resource, 
and as obstacles to community organizing and private sector/community relations 
at the same time. On one hand, the tensions around the local elite are a manifes-
tation of the private sector’s defensive struggle for survival amidst increased 
developmental responsibilities after government’s withdrawal from forestry. On 
the other hand, it is a sign of a lack of social capital and trust in communities. 
The local elite finds itself in the crossfire of power relations. They are the ones 
best suited to act on behalf of communities, to see to it that the private actors 
keep their promises to the communities, but at the same time, these same 
communities fear that through their influence, the elite may usurp benefits that 
flow from the community’s relations with business. I have extended this view, 
not necessarily to dispute hypothesized notions of the elite as self-serving, but 
also to elucidate how the community perspective is vulnerable to manipulation to 
advance sectional interests. Such tensions influenced the nature of relationships 
that forest companies were willing to have with communities, as well evidenced 
by attempts by SQF to sideline traditional authorities in their areas, and SFP’s 
initial exclusion of local elected leaders.  
Successful community organizing was also undermined by a poor conception 
of ‘community’ by private forestry. It turned out that the idea of determining 
limits to the SFP operation areas for instance, extended beyond what was consid-
ered workable when formulating a business relationship with communities. 
Hence in light of the problems these posed, as discussed in the empirical 
chapters, this study indicates that for private actors to avoid the intricate and 
often complex issues of community organizing, it is better to seek established 
functional local groups, who have consolidated some experience and trust that 
can motivate them to work collectively. Such groups exist in varying degrees, in 
the case study areas. 
Overall then, it appears that while the various interests in the forestry sector 
were addressed based on the backbone of government support through legislation 
like BEE, the real arena of action extended beyond policy support and direction, 
to one where negotiation was central and the degree of power wielded by actors 
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determined outcomes. The forestry and other sectors in South Africa need 
targeted policies that are pro-poor and take cognizant of the priority needs in 
areas that they operate.  
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Summary 
This study set out to assess how diverse interests in South Africa’s forestry were 
tackled during the forest restructuring exercise. South Africa as a new democracy 
and with a recent discriminatory past is faced with numerous developmental 
challenges. One challenge that has been viewed as most urgent, and which has 
perhaps elicited the most controversy, is how to transform the country in a way 
that ensures that the needs of those who faced years of discrimination at 
apartheid are addressed, both in policy and through targeted development action. 
While engaging in these activities, the government has aimed to reduce the level 
of socio-economic inequality in South Africa by integrating what equates a first- 
world economy, with the second economy that is largely poor and faced with 
numerous developmental issues. I argue that this conception of South Africa 
across two economies leaves out a third, the rural economy that is isolated from 
the first economy through distance, a lack of skills and basic infrastructures. The 
first chapter in this thesis introduces these problems through the context of 
plantation forestry. For the forestry sector, options for faster structural changes 
were availed through government’s decision to withdraw from the sector, and 
give way to more private actors. With the government forests up for sale, it was 
hoped that not only would the sector become more efficient in production, but 
that new private actors would be awarded these assets on condition that they 
were teamed up with black entrepreneurs, and also meaningfully involved local 
communities in their operation areas. It is due to these varied interests and policy 
objectives that the central research question was posed as follows: How are 
diverse interests in forestry reconciled, represented, or addressed within a single 
process of forest restructuring and how do these ideals work out in practice? 
Other sub-questions related to this were: 
• How do actors in forestry, including government, private actors, commu-
nity groups, and new black entrepreneurs organize to handle inherent 
tensions in this process? 
• What policy instruments are applied to facilitate this process, and how do 
these work out? 
These questions led to a three dimensional conceptual approach to analysis 
that involved examining notions of implementation, natural resource manage-
ment and power. Chapter 2 is dedicated to these three theoretical issues, with the 
last section dedicated to methods of study. The chapter starts by briefly high-
lighting issues of policy implementation, especially the gap between policy and 
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practice and some methodological implications for research. Moving further in 
chapter 2, concepts of natural resource management (NRM) are introduced with a 
view to capture the discourses on community organizing for resource manage-
ment. Under NRM, I analyzed co-management as a concept that has been popular 
in defining relations between the state and local resource users. With the NRM 
arena widening to accommodate actors beyond the state and local users, there 
have been paradigm shifts as well in the way the concept is perceived. The shifts 
in NRM approaches can be summarized in three major categories borrowed from 
Blaikie & Jeanrenaud (1997). These are the classic, the populist and the neo-
liberal schools of thought. The classic view explains predominant discourses of 
NRM during the period of state control, when local users were excluded from 
resource management. In contrast, the populist view acknowledges the local user 
as capable of resource management in the presence of rules crafted by users 
themselves. The last point under NRM systems focuses on neo-liberal ap-
proaches, where the market becomes a central actor and privatization takes place, 
but also some elements from the populist approaches survive to protect the 
interests of local users. 
Last in the theoretical section, the chapter traces the understanding of power 
and empowerment. It highlights distinctions in their application in different 
research fields and contexts. A point of departure for this study is that in South 
Africa, inequality is rooted in a long history of unequal power relations that were 
race-based and institutionalized. Unlike other countries where similar styles of 
discrimination have targeted minorities, South Africa is a unique case with a 
majority in a post-apartheid transitional phase. Hence, in the theoretical debate 
on power, the chapter overviews general debates on the concept by using 
Foucault’s (1974) departure from the then dominant rationalization of power, in 
which he argued that power was enmeshed in a web of relations and actions and 
could not only be defined as authority over others. Other authors who have 
advanced similar perspectives include Giddens (1984), Rowlands (1997), Mc-
Gettigan (2002) and Sen (1999). They each have acknowledged the role of 
agency, or the ability of individuals to challenge undesirable power relations. Sen 
(1999) argues that the achievement of development itself is dependent on the free 
agency of people. Subsequently, several variants of power have been identified 
but for the sake of this study, I isolated and discussed the notions of power to and 
power over, as the two theoretical types most relevant to current South African 
discourses. It was noted that although power over, in its application, denotes con-
trol over economic assets while power to makes reference to increased capacities, 
such as skills, there are differences in the way they are operationalized, but there 
is no fine line in the end results. This is because power is cyclical, and the 
achievement of one type of power can lead to the other.  
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Based on these three concepts as the pillars of the study, a qualitative 
methodology was chosen as appropriate for this research. The chapter ends by 
presenting how this study was conducted, and it especially justifies the use of a 
case study approach that involved a combination of individual in-depth inter-
views, focus group discussions and a reliance on print media to contextualize the 
case study perspectives onto the broader national discourses. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the South African policy background. It gives an 
understanding into South Africa’s post-apartheid policy trends, and background 
information specific to the case study areas. The chapter details the shifts in ANC 
thought from nationalistic sentiments into the early 1990s, and the drastic 
adoption of a market-friendly macro-economic framework from 1996 onwards. 
The overall economic direction, including privatization of state-owned assets, 
received a firm policy backing in the document GEAR (1996), which was seen to 
replace an earlier, relatively nationalist-friendly policy document RDP (1994). 
Forest restructuring, although it had been conceived much earlier in 1992 by 
corporatizing state forests under the entity SAFCOL, was speeded up after the 
introduction of the GEAR policy. The 1996 policy for Sustainable Forestry also 
committed the state to withdraw from the sector. It echoed the overall sentiments 
of transformation and indicated that ownership in the sector would be diversified, 
the competitiveness of the sector enhanced, and the three facets of commercial, 
indigenous, and community forestry integrated. The diversification of ownership 
in forestry sector forms the basis of the central question in this research. 
Theoretically, diversification is best conceptualized through the practice of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE), as briefly discussed at the end of this chapter.  
Chapter 4 gives a background into the forestry areas of the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal, both sold to SFP and SQF respectively, the two companies that 
make up the case studies. 
Based on the three theoretical dimensions entailed in chapter 2, the next three 
chapters 5, 6 and 7 are empirical, and give descriptive discussions on the pro-
cesses of implementing forest restructuring, NRM and BEE within the case study 
areas. Chapter 5 follows the forestry sale process and it is argued that the low 
interest and lack of political will in forest restructuring contributed to a myriad of 
drawbacks encountered in the transfer. Poor networks between departmental 
implementation clusters, and a general low prioritization of forestry issues, 
relative to other lucrative government sale processes, exacerbated these. This 
chapter is also important for the rest of the thesis as it explains how certain 
objectives were dropped through policy negotiation. In this negotiation process, 
the arena changed into one where those with more power, information, and 
financial networks bargained for the forestry pie, while other policy targets such 
as rural forest communities were left out. Chapter 6 follows on these processes 
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and examines how SFP and SQF, the two case study companies, approached the 
role of community in their newly acquired forestry. They present different 
primary approaches as SFP teamed up with a community Trust, SDT, as its 
business partner, while SQF engaged neighbouring communities through tradi-
tional outreach programs. On a secondary level, both companies try a mix of both 
community and individual empowerment models. The chapter explores problems 
faced in community organizing, and how the private partners handle these in 
order to ensure stronger relationships. A common issue identified in both cases 
was that of community stake in forestland and the pending resolutions by the 
state Department of Land Affairs. Outstanding land claims in forest areas made it 
difficult for both companies to clearly identify limits in operations when en-
gaging communities.  
These issues are carried over to chapter 7, where empowerment actions in the 
case studies are examined. The chapter investigates respondents’ own under-
standing of empowerment against conventional policy meanings. It reveals that 
although what respondents articulated was not significantly different to issues 
entailed in the BEE framework, the distinctions are in their prioritization. Where 
BEE documents have given more weight to issues of ownership, respondents first 
and foremost, give priority to areas of immediate need, and especially access to 
affordable education, training and employment. This chapter also presents SFP 
and SQF initiatives intended to counter the local skills challenges. Most of these 
actions are focused on selected individual entrepreneurs from the community. 
The rationale and analyses for these are contained in chapter 8. 
Chapter 8 is where the key empirical evidence contained in chapters 5, 6 and 7 
are analyzed and synthesized. It is divided into three sections representing each 
of the main issues, as contained in the empirical chapters above. The main issue 
that cuts across the whole thesis is found to be power and its influence in each 
stage of the forestry processes. Manifestations of power influenced the outcome 
of implementation; power (or lack of it) was the basis upon which decisions of 
community-company relations were founded, and power and its distribution is 
the core essence of BEE. Three main perspectives summarize this chapter and the 
whole thesis. First, it is noted that despite the views on BEE, in forestry practice, 
it has combined the theoretical notions of power over and power to. Those who 
have acquired power over have been able to facilitate power to through actions 
initiated in both case studies. Second, the BEE actions revealed that three 
dimensions of capital transfer existed. The first is a straight business arrange-
ment, with all the risks attached as evidenced between SQF and its junior partner. 
The second involves transfer with reduced risks attached and hence more interest 
and involvement of beneficiaries. The third type of capital transfer is community 
focused with limited risks. The latter style made for passive beneficiaries and no 
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significant motivation for community involvement beyond receiving annual divi-
dends. Lastly, this chapter called for alternative empowerment strategies specific 
to the rural areas, in light of their unique challenges. 
With the finding that power was central, this thesis concludes in chapter 9 by 
attempting to rephrase the original central question to read: How does power 
shape or drive the other two concepts of implementation and NRM within the 
forestry cases? In implementing forestry restructuring, power shaped the process 
such that when the restructuring objectives became too many and conflicting, the 
process turned into a negotiation in which those with bargaining power benefited 
most. Likewise power is used to explain the ambiguous role of the local elite, and 
power shapes the relations between the private companies, communities and 
other actors. 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
Bosbouw in Zuid-Afrika concentreert zich op aangeplante bossen van vooral 
eucalyptus en naaldhout. Tijdens het Apartheidsregime waren deze plantages 
staatseigendom en werden ze geëxploiteerd door grote private bedrijven. In de 
overgang naar een democratisch bewind zijn de bossen deel geworden van de 
transitie van de gehele Zuid-Afrikaanse samenleving. De onderhavige studie be-
schrijft op welke wijze de herstructurering van de bosbouwsector is verlopen. De 
aandacht gaat daarbij vooral uit naar twee deelgebieden waar de overgang het 
verst is gevorderd. 
De meest urgente en controversiële uitdaging voor de nieuwe democratie was 
hoe er door algemeen beleid en door gerichte acties tegemoet gekomen kon wor-
den aan de rechten en belangen van hen die waren uitgesloten en gediscrimineerd 
door de Apartheid. De overheid tracht aan deze uitdaging tegemoet te komen 
door herintegratie van twee economische werelden: de ‘eerste economie’ van de 
blanken die de ‘tweede economie’ van de zwarte bevolking exploiteerde en 
tegelijkertijd uitsloot van groei. Dit beeld van twee economieën, hoe waar op 
zich ook, beneemt ons enigszins het zicht op dat er in Zuid-Afrika nog een derde 
economische wereld bestaat, namelijk die van de rurale armoede, waar deelname 
aan vooruitgang nog eens extra belemmerd wordt door grote afstanden, gebrek 
aan infrastructuur en zeer lage niveaus van scholing. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk van de dissertatie bespreekt deze problematiek in de con-
text van de bosbouw. De grondslag voor de herstructurering van de bosbouw 
werd gelegd in de beslissing van de overheid om zich terug te trekken uit de 
sector en meer ruimte te geven aan privé-initiatief, met name door verkoop van 
de bossen – of eigenlijk van de bomen, want de grond waarop ze staan werd 
alleen uit-geleased, zodat de grond beschikbaar blijft voor eventuele nieuwe 
eigenaren in het kader van landhervorming. Deze verkoop van de bossen was 
bedoeld om de houtproductie meer efficiënt te maken maar tegelijkertijd ook om 
wegen te openen voor de bijdrage van de bosbouw in de re-integratie van de 
blanke en zwarte economieën. Voorwaarde bij de verkoop was namelijk dat 
kopers zouden samenwerken met nieuwe zwarte bedrijven en tevens de lokale 
gemeenschappen bij de bosbouw zouden betrekken. Deze meervoudigheid van 
doelstellingen is aanleiding geweest tot de centrale vraag van dit proefschrift, die 
luidt: hoe werden de diverse belangen gerepresenteerd, behartigd en verzoend in 
het proces van herstructurering van de bosbouw, en hoe werkte dat uit in de 
praktijk? Hieruit afgeleide vragen betroffen onder andere hoe de diverse actoren 
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zoals overheid, bedrijven en gemeenschappen zichzelf organiseerden en welke 
beleidsinstrumenten werden toegepast. 
Deze vragen hebben geleid tot het opstellen van drie theoretische perspectie-
ven, waarin respectievelijk macht, het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en 
beleidsimplementatie centraal staan. Hoofdstuk 2 is gewijd aan deze concepten 
en aan de methoden van onderzoek. Het hoofdstuk begint met een verkenning 
van de begrippen macht (‘power’) en machtsversterking (‘empowerment’) en hoe 
die gebruikt worden in verschillende velden van onderzoek. Het vertrekpunt van 
de analyse is dat machtsongelijkheid in Zuid-Afrika gebaseerd is geweest op ras, 
en geïnstitutionaliseerd was in de gehele samenleving. Tevens betrof het hier niet 
een meerderheid die een minderheid onderdrukte, maar het omgekeerde. De 
analyse vertrekt vanuit Foucaults (1974) concept van macht, die stelt dat macht 
meer is dan eenvoudige autoriteit over anderen maar is ingebed in en wordt 
gereproduceerd door netwerken van relaties. Verwante ideeën zijn ontwikkeld 
door Giddens (1984), Rowlands (1997) en McGettigan (2002), die gewezen 
hebben op de rol van keuzevermogen (‘agency’) van mensen, inclusief hun 
vermogen om ongewenste machtsrelaties aan de orde te stellen. Sen (1999) stelt 
dat alle ontwikkeling van mensen afhangt van dit keuzevermogen. Uit deze 
literatuur komen velerlei varianten van het machtsbegrip naar voren maar voor de 
analyse van de Zuid-Afrikaanse situatie bleek vooral het onderscheid tussen 
macht over (‘power over’) en macht tot (‘power to’) relevant te zijn. Macht over
betreft met name macht over economische goederen (en daarmee over anderen), 
terwijl macht tot refereert aan het vermogen zelf je leven te bepalen, bijvoorbeeld 
door het hebben van voldoende kennis en vaardigheden. Bij dit onderscheid moet 
beseft worden dat de feitelijke werking van de twee vormen van macht cyclisch 
kan zijn; het een kan worden ingezet voor het bereiken van het ander.  
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat tevens in op de concepten rond het beheer van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen, met het oog op de analyse van de relaties tussen bosbouw en lokale 
gemeenschappen. ‘Co-management’ blijkt een populair trefwoord voor het aan-
geven van de juiste relatie tussen overheid en lokale hulpbrongebruikers. Co-
management is een product van de ‘klassieke’ en ‘populistische’ benaderingen 
die worden besproken door Blaikie & Jeanrenaud (1997). De klassieke visie legt 
alle nadruk op de rol van de staat als hoeder van de hulpbronnen, tegenover de 
lokale bevolking. De populistische visie wijst juist op de capaciteit van lokale 
gemeenschappen om hulpbronnen duurzaam te beheren door middel van lokaal 
vormgegeven regels. Een derde, ook door Blaikie & Jeanrenaud genoemde bena-
dering is de ‘neoliberale’ aanpak van beheer van hulpbronnen, waar de markt het 
centrale mechanisme vormt en privatisering van de hulpbronnen plaatsvindt, 
maar regelgeving wordt ingezet om plaatselijke belangen te beschermen. Het 
hoofdstuk vervolgt met een korte weergave van enige elementen rond beleids-
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implementatie zoals de kloof tussen beleid en praktijk, en enige implicaties voor 
onderzoek. Ten slotte wordt de onderzoeksaanpak besproken, met name de ‘case 
study’ methode die bestond uit een combinatie van diepte-interviews, groeps-
discussies en studie van mediabronnen om de case studies te kunnen plaatsen in 
de nationale context.  
Hoofdstuk 3 is gewijd aan de beleidsachtergrond in Zuid-Afrika. Het geeft een 
samenvatting van de beleidsontwikkelingen in de post-Apartheid periode en 
achtergrondinformatie voor de case study gebieden. Het denken binnen de ANC 
is verschoven van een nationaliseringkoers neergelegd in het RDP document van 
1994 naar een zeer marktvriendelijk beleid dat in 1996 tot uitdrukking kwam in 
de GEAR nota. De privatisering van de staatsbossen, waarvoor de grondslag al in 
1992 was gelegd door onderbrenging van die bossen in een aparte entiteit 
SAFCOL, werd versneld door de introductie van het marktvriendelijke beleid. In 
de strategienota voor duurzame bosbouw van 1996 verplichtte de staat zich tot 
terugtrekking uit de sector. In lijn met de nationale sentimenten stelde de nota dat 
eigendom van de bossen moest worden gediversifieerd, dat het concurrerend ver-
mogen van de sector moest worden versterkt en dat commerciële en lokale bos-
bouw moesten worden geïntegreerd. De diversificatie van eigendom levert de 
centrale vraag van dit proefschrift. De diversificatie kreeg vooral gestalte via het 
beleid en de praktijk van ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ (BEE), zoals kort 
besproken aan het einde van het hoofdstuk. 
Hoofdstuk 4 schetst de achtergrond van de bosgebieden in de provincies Oost-
kaap en KwaZulu-Natal, die werden verkocht aan respectievelijk de bedrijven 
SFP en SQF. Deze twee bedrijven vormen het hart van de twee case studies. 
Gebaseerd op de drie perspectieven ontwikkeld in hoofdstuk 2 geven de 
hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7 het empirische materiaal en discussie van de twee cases 
vanuit de theoretische perspectieven. Hoofdstuk 5 volgt het proces van 
implementatie van de privatisering, en laat zien hoe een gebrek aan politieke wil, 
een lage prioriteit (bijvoorbeeld omdat andere privatiseringen veel lucratiever 
waren voor de overheid) en versplintering van de overheidsinstellingen resulteer-
den in een veelheid van problemen. Hierdoor verarmde het hooggestemde 
beleidsproces tot een banale onderhandeling tussen de actoren met de meeste 
macht, informatie en netwerken, waarin bredere doelen en andere actoren werden 
genegeerd. Deze konden daarom pas later in het proces worden ingebouwd. 
Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien hoe dit werd gedaan door de twee bedrijven SFP en 
SQF, met name gericht op de lokale gemeenschappen. Beide bedrijven waren 
verplicht om samen te gaan werken met een zwarte zakenpartner, maar volgden 
daartoe verschillende routes. SFP koos voor de instelling van een fonds beheerd 
door de lokale gemeenschappen als bedrijfspartner, en voor de ondersteuning van 
individuele lokale mensen in het opzetten van een eigen bedrijfje geassocieerd 
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aan SFP. SQF koos voor samenwerking met een reeds bestaand zwart bedrijf, 
onder behoud van traditionele sociale ‘outreach’-activiteiten in de lokale ge-
meenschappen. Daarnaast stimuleerde SQF zijn zwarte zakenpartner tot inrich-
ting van een intermediair bedrijf dat individuele lokale mensen naar ondernemer-
schap in de bosbouw begeleidt. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt de problemen die de 
bedrijven ondervonden bij het organiseren van de gemeenschappen en hoe 
individuen die problemen gebruikten om zelf sterkere relaties met de bedrijven 
op te bouwen. In beide gevallen bleek de grote onduidelijkheid die nog steeds 
bestond ten aanzien van de eigendomsrechten van de gemeenschappen op de 
grond waarop de bossen staan een belangrijke belemmering om de verantwoorde-
lijkheden van de bedrijven helder af te bakenen. 
Deze thema’s worden hoofdstuk 7 bezien vanuit het perspectief van empower-
ment. Onderzocht wordt onder andere het idee dat de lokale actoren over em-
powerment hebben, en dat beduidend blijkt te verschillen van het conventionele 
idee dat de overheid daarover heeft. Dit betreft vooral de prioritering van de ver-
schillende doelen die BEE heeft. De overheid benadrukt daarin sterk de over-
dracht van economisch eigendom zoals aandelen in bedrijven; zie de twee 
nieuwe zakenpartners van SFP en SQF. De lokale actoren daarentegen leggen de 
volle nadruk op hun behoefte aan scholing, training en werk. Tegen deze 
achtergrond bespreekt het hoofdstuk de werking en het succes van de activiteiten 
van beide bedrijven gericht op de zakelijke begeleiding van individuele lokale 
mensen naar ondernemerschap. 
In hoofdstuk 8 worden de empirische bevindingen nader geanalyseerd en 
gesynthetiseerd. Het bestaat uit drie secties, ieder gewijd aan een der theoretische 
perspectieven. Het belangrijkste thema dat alles samenbindt is macht. Macht 
bepaalde de uitkomst van de beleidsimplementatie, macht (of het gebrek daaraan) 
was de basis voor beslissingen rond de samenwerking met de lokale gemeen-
schappen, en macht is het hart van BEE. Gevonden is bijvoorbeeld dat BEE in de 
case studies niet alleen een verschuiving heeft betekend van economische macht 
over. Zij die deze macht gekregen hadden hebben hem ook ingezet ter vergroting 
van de macht tot van anderen. Daarnaast is gevonden dat er in feite drie vormen 
van overdracht van macht hebben plaatsgevonden. De eerste vorm is die van de 
gewone overdacht van zakelijk eigendom, met alle risico’s van dat kapitaal erbij; 
een voorbeeld is de relatie tussen SQF en zijn nieuwe ‘BEE partner’. De tweede 
vorm is overdacht waarbij een deel van het risico voorshands bij de sterke partij 
blijft liggen. Deze vorm betrof de begeleiding van lokale mensen naar onder-
nemerschap. De belangstelling hiervoor en het dynamisch effect ervan bleken 
substantieel. De derde vorm van overdracht was het fonds voor de lokale 
gemeenschappen, waaraan vrijwel geen risico maar dus ook geen uitdaging is 
verbonden; het dynamisch effect daarvan is zeer gering, terwijl de transactie-
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kosten zeer hoog bleken. Mede op basis van deze bevindingen roept het hoofd-
stuk op tot een alternatieve aanpak van empowerment in rurale gebieden. 
Gebaseerd op de gebleken centraliteit van macht voor het begrijpen van de 
case studies wordt in hoofdstuk 9 onderzocht hoe de bevindingen rond macht ook 
leiden tot een beter begrip van de beleidsimplementatie en het beheer van natuur-
lijke hulpbronnen. 
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